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ABSTRACT
This study is an attempt to understand the limits and potential
of the public-sector in the provision of distributional services
to the poor. The intention is to understand what does work in
public-sector interventions and why; what does not work, and why
not; and to emphasize the nuanced nature of "success" or
"failure"--it is perhaps more instructive to understand the
inadvertent as well as the direct outcomes of programme
implementation rather than to normatively categorize outcomes as
"successes"i or "failures". The study examines a "successful"
example of state-government intervention in the shelter sector in
the state of Kerala, India, to facilitate this understanding.
Questioning the dominant view that "planning from below" is a
better alternative to "planning from above", the central argument
of the study is that "planning from below" (bottom-up
development), is not necessarily an alternative to "planning from
above" (top-down development). Rather than being considered as
being oppositions, the two styles of development should coexist.
The study of the One lakh Housing Scheme (OLHS), in Kerala, is
used to illustrate this argument. It was found that despite
attributes that would seem "failures", if seen normatively, the
programme performed exceptionally well, and remains the state's
most popular and "successful" programme. This was possible
precisely because an enlightened "top-down" approach, as well as
a committed "bottom-up" style coexisted.
Thesis Supervisor: Professor Judith Tendler
Title: Professor of Political Economy, Department of
Urban Studies.
1
To, Amma and Baba...
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge with gratitude the invaluable
guidance, encouragement, and understanding I received from
Professor Judith Tendler, throughout, and for the inspiration I
obtained from the rigour of her own work. But most of all, I am
thankful to her for being so demanding.
I gratefully acknowledge the help I received from all those I had
occasion to meet and discuss my work with, in Kerala, especially
Mr.P.K. Shivanandan, at the Secretariat, and, Mr. M.S. Matthews,
Ravindran Nair and Thomas Poulose at the Kerala State Housing
Board. In particular I would like to thank Benny Kuriakose, Ressy
George and Gopikuttan for doing so much to facilitate my work--
and Vineet, Dilip, and, Melanie for their support; most of all,
my parents, for making it all possible.
2
Table of Contents
Overview 6
The Argument........................................... 7
I. Introduction............................................. 14
II. Origins of a "Top-Down" Experiment....................... 24
Introduction: "success", "failure" and shelter for the
poor.
The OLHS: perceptions of "success" and historical
significance.
Break with tradition and timing of a "welfare measure".
Conflict and excluded groups as new clients.
Beyond legitimacy: turning of a problem into an
opportunity.
Coalition governments and programme goals.
More on coalition dynamics: seeking a
counterfoil.
Nature of a past programme: agrarian reform and OLHS
fearures.
Beyond political survival: committment.
Conclusion.
III. Formulation and Implementation of a "Top-Down" welfare
measure: the power of popular support................ 65
Linking state interests with national concern
Implementation, public housing and popular support
Finance, welfare and "public participation".
Voluntarism: patronage, "public pressure" and the
media.
When elite interests coincide with programme goals.
The myth of voluntary labour.
Conclusion.
IV. Implementation: Innovation in Land Aquisition...........119
Centrallization: the single-department approach.
Expediency and trade-offs.
Ensuring accontability: "controlled decentralization"
Using discretion to set aside regulation.
Conclusion.
V. Execution: Clarity of the Lines of Control...............139
The Chain of command.
The Works Committee: decentrallization, flexibility,
participation, and, control.
The district collectors: an elite beaurucratic corps.
Conclusion.
3
VI. Conclusion --.... --- -.................................. 160
Good performance: constraints become opportunities.
Good performance : what is "success" what is
"failure".
Setting up a programme to compel good performance.
The power of the media.
The media public pressure and elite participation.
Participation, control and theadministrative
heirarchy.
When elements of "top-down" development coexist
"bottom-up" pressure.
Bibliography...........................................181
4
MYSORE
Tellicherry r 
-
K(
(C.
Arabian Sea
State or union territory
boundary
District boundary
State capital
District headquarters
Former boundary between
Kozhikode and Paighat Districts, before
the formation of
Malappuram District
in 1969.
0 25 50I . I
0 25 50 75 Kilometers
Kerala
75 Miles
MAP of KERALA,
Source: Hardgrave, Robert.L., 1973, "The Kerala Communists".
5
MADRAS
0
INDIA.
Overview: This study is an attempt to understand the limits and
potential of the public sector in the provision of distributional
services--such as housing--to the poor. It does so by examining a
"successful" example of state-government intervention in the
shelter sector in the state of Kerala, India.
The concern with examining a "success-story" is to focus
attention on what does work in public sector interventions, and
why; what does not work, and why not. In addition, the intention
is to emphasize the nuanced nature of "success" or "failure"--
understanding the process of programme implementation, and its
inadvertant, as well as direct outcomes is perhaps more
instructive than rigid, normative categorization of programme
outcomes into "successes" or "failures".
In particular, focussing on public-sector shelter
programmes that have worked well, provides the opportunity to
understand what makes for good performance in a sector where the
benefits are of a divisible nature. 1 Understanding what makes
such projects work well is important because conflicts and
competition is usually heightened over their distribution, making
programme implementation, as designed, difficult.
The state of Kerala offers a good example of a case where
the performance of the government in the provision of social and
1 1By divisible benefits I refer to the distribution of
private goods. Goods such as housing, unlike those of other
distributional services such as health-clinics, roads,
infrastructure, public education, cannot be shared by more than
one beneficiary at the same time.
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distributional services has been fairly distinguished, not in a
single, exceptional sector, but rather over an impressive array
of sectoral activities--such as health, education, housing and so
forth. Furthermore, there has been a continuity in this focus on
distribution across the tenure of a series of state government
regimes--both communist and non-communist.
The argument.
The central objective of this study is to question the
current way of thinking about distribution, development and the
public sector. Proponents of the prevelant view about development
posit that "planning from below" (bottom-up development) is a
better alternative to "planning from above" (top-down
development) . Critics of the "top-down" approach argue that
state interventions targeted towards the poor do not work very
well because they create inefficiencies and cost-burdens due to
the nature of public sector beurocracies--these beurucracies have
a propensity to be large, overstaffed, ineffective and ,expensive
to maintain. At the same time they provide scope for corruption
and graft. Poverty-oriented state interventions, moreover, are
rigid and therefore do not allow contextual variations to be
taken into account. Furthermore, they spread short-term "relief"
or "welfare" through the deep subsidies they invariably carry,
instead of fostering development that can be sustained.
This argument against the avoidable "costs" of many types
of distribution-oriented public-sector interventions, implicitly
supports the prevalent policy-shift away from considering the
7
state as an appropriate vehicle for undertaking poverty-
alleviation measures--a view that has gained currency in response
to the severe debt-burdens faced by third-world governments in
the last decade. Proponents of this view assert that the role of
the public sector must be minimized, its distributional services
cutback and economic indicators improved instead, if the fiscal
viability of most third-world nations is to recoup sufficiently
to make poverty alleviation possible and affordable. The public-
sector stands discredited in both perspectives.
Even while the public sector stands discredited in the
thinking of several mainstream development "experts", scholars
such as Atul Kohli, Jonathan Fox, Peter Evans, and, Theda Skocpol
have focussed renewed attention on the potentialities of the
state as a distributional and developmental actor. For example,
Kohli (1987) and Fox (1988) have used empirical evidence to
inductively support their arguments that we need to reassess the
role of the public-sector by expanding our understanding of how
public sector interventions actually work. They show that rather
than write off the state or the public sector as inefficient and
cumbersome bettrueracies, it is necessary to examine cases where
public sector programmes have been successful, in order to
understand what conditions make for good performance, and explore
the linkages between the "top" and "bottom" that facilitate such
outcomes.
Drawing upon the arguments of researchers such as Kohli
and Fox, and upon empirical material from my own case study of
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the Kerala governemnt, I will argue that "planning from below"or,
"bottom-up development", if you will, is not neccessarily an
alternative to "planning from above". The two paths to
development (seen here in terms of distribution, and poverty-
alleviation) are not mutually exclusive, nor ought they to be
seen that way. Developemnt is served most appropriately when the
"top-down" and "bottom-up" styles of development, work together,
not one at the cost of the other. When both approaches are
present, not only does each compensate for the inherent
weaknesses of the other, but indeed augments the other's
strenghths. This study is an attempt to illustrate this argument.
Using the relatively good performance of Kerala in
distributional services--as manifested in the particular
programme I have studied--I will suggest that this has been
possible because elements of both styles were present--an
enlightened "top-down" approach to development--strong control
centrallized in the government, coexisted with a commited
"bottom-up" style--active public participation, public
"monitoring" of government projects, and demand making by
organized groups. It is significant, moreover, that not only did
these two contrasting styles coexist, but they were not
competitive. Each, the state-government, and the local "grass-
roots" groups seemed to be doing what they were best at,
suggesting that together, these groups can achieve more than
either would alone.
Political parties, and a long history of social
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mobilization that has rendered the electorate highly politically
conscious have played a central role in this "success". I will
show that the notion of dichotomy is not inherent in the "top-
down" and "bottom-up" styles of development. Rather, the seeming
contrast lies in our own categorization of programme outcomes
against normative notions of "good" or "bad", "success"f or
"failure".
Here I refer to the observation that several scholars
(Hirschman, Tendler) have made about the "burden of success".
Given that the criteria used to distinguish "success" from
"failure" are often so subjective, or contextual, or time bound,
it is rarely that the same criteria will apply universally.
Moreover, even the most successful of projects or programmes have
their own pitfalls, false-starts and setbacks. Therefore in
classifying public sector programmes as "failures", we may be
looking at the wrong culprits, and in the process overlooking
some of the more significant linkages and relationships between
events, actors, state and society. Having based much of our
present disenchantment with the public sector on studies that in
the past have documented "failure", it is important that we focus
more closely on some instances where public sector programmes
have performed well, before making assertions about the
superiority of the "bottom-up style" versus the rigidity of the
"top-down approach".
Specifically, I examine the One Lakh Housing Scheme
(OLHS), a public sector low-income shelter programme undertaken
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by the state governemnt of Kerala, as an example of a "top-down"
intervention. The OLHS had several attributes we commonly
associate with failure, yet it performed well. Indeed, it is
regarded as the state's most popular public-housing programme,
not only by government officials, but also by the people of the
state, including the non-beneficiaries--even today, more than 15
years after it was introduced. I ask the questions why this is
so; how did it get onto the government agenda; what worked well,
what did not, why; and what do the beneficiaries think about it.
I show that the good performance of the programme is in part
because elements of top-down control coexisted with those of the
opposite or bottom-up style.
But why is it that unlike most other states in the country
we find a coexistence of this nature in Kerala alone? Several
scholars argue that this combination of planning from above and
below is a function of the leftist regimes that have governed
Kerala. However, my own field work and interviews with several
informants, suggest that the roots of much of what we see as the
"successful" outcome of the programmes such as the one this study
discusses, have earlier origins than the rise of communist
political parties in the state. Therefore, at the outset I
attempt an explanation of what underlies the political awareness
of the people in the state, and the leftist tendencies among
successive incumbents to governmnet office.
The questions of relevance here are: why did the
government take certain decisions regarding development and not
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others? Why are the people of the state so politically aware,
and why do they tend to respond the way they do? The answers to
these questions in part lie in the salient features of the
history of social change in Kerala, and the significance of the
sequence of events that, in large part, are responsible for the
state's relatively good distributional performance.
The sequence of historical events has, in my view,
provided the following features to the social and political
structure of the state to which much of its distributional
achievements can be attributed: A committed set of responsive
governments--ie, elected members of political parties--at the
apex of the "pyramid". A wide network of highly motivated and
commited grass-roots organizations--which typically, and
significantly, include workers of political parties, both ruling
and opposition; religious and sectarian organizations that have
traditionally played a major role in the history of development
in the state; and noe increasingly include highly placed and
qualified scientists, professionals--doctors, engineers,
teachers, professors, economists, high ranking beurocrats and
tachnocrats. Finally at the bottom of the "pyramid" is a
politically aware, literate, and well organized electorate. The
overall system is one where demand-making from various interest
groups is an accepted strategy for dissatisfied groups to get
their demands on the government agenda.
Elements of this "system" are evident in the relatively
successful implementation of the OLHS--the programme around which
12
this study is organized.
PART I
Introduction.
Even as scholars and policy analysts debated about the
need for governments to reconcile growth policies with
redistribution in the late 1970s, Kerala was pointed out as a
unique "model" of development. The literature on Kerala (Morris:
1979, Scott: 1979, CDS studies) described it as being an
exceptional instance of "success" where "without a radical
revolution, or a major increase in industrialization, or even
productivity, important gains had been made in improving the
quality of life of the common people" (cf. Mencher, 1980). The
indicators of social success in this story were high levels of
literacy (70.4% compared to the national average of 36.2%), a
fairly low birth rate (24.9/1000 persons compared to 35.3 in
India), a decreasing death rate (6.7/1000 persons compared to an
average of 11.9/1000 persons in the rest of the country),
declining infant mortality (40/1000 births relative to an average
of 114/1000 births in the country, an increased expectancy of
life at birth (66 years versus 54 years at the all India level),
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noteworthy success in the implementation of land reforms (of the
4.07 million households in the state only 6.7% are landless)
and more recently, innovative shelter programmes for the poor
(according to the 1981 census, the housing shortfall in Kerala
was roughly 10% of its housing stock compared to about 20.3% for
the country as a whole2 . Moreover, Kerala is the first state in
the country where the government works in partnership with
voluntary agencies to provide shelter to the poor).
Most scholars attribute this success of Kerala to the
relatively radical social policies that its successive state
governments have followed. Most of these governments had strong
leftist tendencies, mass support at the local level, and, a
highly politicized and aware electorate. It may be true, as Kohli
has shown in his comparative analysis of the three Indian states
of West Bengal, Karnataka, and, Uttar Pradesh, that left-of-
center regimes are often more capable of undertaking
distributional measures that actually benefit the poor. But when
such left-of-center regimes operate within a democratic frame-
work, rather than an authoritarian one, it becomes important to
ask why is it that the electorate in certain states has chosen to
elect leftist governments? It would seem to me that in such cases
the key to understanding the effectiveness of distributional
policies adopted by these governments, lies in the nature of the
social environment, rather than, merely, in the fact that the
2 Both figures are exclusive of dilapidated housing stock
that needs replacement.
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government is a leftist one.
In the Kerala case this point becomes clear when we
consider that in every state government election, since the state
was constituted in 1956, the communist parties as well as the
non-communist Congress party, have maintained roughly one-third
of the popular vote, each (Hardgrave, 1973: 143). Moreover, while
non-communist alliances have held state power at least thrice,
the communist regimes, although elected to office four times,
have never completed a full tenure, except for the Achutha Menon-
headed coalition (1970-1975) which again was a center-left
(Congress-CPI) coalition.3 Yet, despite frequent shifts in the
composition of the alliances that have governed Kerala, there has
been a continuity in the emphasis on social and distributional
policies across all regimes. It is clear, therefore, that the
distributional success evident in diverse sectors such as health,
education, public welfare, subsidized food, and land, has roots
that pre-date the emergence of communism in the state.
In order to understand the origins of these distributional
trends--trends that are now embodied in the social structure of
Kerala--it will be necessary to understand the history of
development of Kerala, in particular, the history of its social
movements. An endeavour of this nature would of necessity be a
substantial project in its own right, and is outside the scope of
3 Each tenure of the communist parties (CPM or CPI) has
lasted not more than 18 months. Each time the communist
government has either resigned due to internal differences, or
have been dismissed by the Center on grounds of pushing
"unconstitutional policies".
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the present study. I will therefore, only briefly summarize below
some of the salient points that I consider have contributed to
the impressive developmental gains made by Kerala. These points
also provide a pertinent background to the OLHS story.
(1) First, a significant exogenous factor that has helped
guide development in Kerala is its unique geographical and
topographical structure. The state, a long and narrow sliver of
land, bounded by the Arabian Sea on the west and the ranges of
the Western Ghats on the East, has the smallest geographical area
in the country. Yet, it supports among the largest populations,
as a result of which, Kerala has (and has had even in the past)
the highest population density in the country (currently 655
persons/sq.km, compared to the average of 216 persons/sq.km at
the all India level). Being in the coastal and tropical belt, the
state also has highly fertile soil. Therefore, eventhough, due to
high pressure on land, the average size of holding in the state
is small--only 0.49 Ha. compared to 2.0 Ha.in India--the value of
output per hectare from agriculture is Rs. 3731 in Kerala
compared to Rs. 1823 in the rest of the country.
Fertile soil, and potable quality surface water, moreover,
are abundantly available throughout the state. These conditions
have traditionally supported a dispersed settlement pattern that
has two unique features: first, people have settled fairly
densely every where, so that the demographic distinctions between
rural and urban that we are used to, are practically absent here.
Second, given an urban-rural continuum, and a long-narrow
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topographical structure, transportation networks linking most
parts of the state developed fairly early on. There is,
therefore, no region that is really "remote" in Kerala. This has
facilitated communication, which is one reason why the state--
even its rural hinterland--lends itself effectively to
mobilization efforts. Unlike other states where the rural
population is too meager, or too scattered to provide the
"critical mass" that is necessary to form a substantial force,
when organized, most of the political and social mass movements
in Kerala have been rural based (or at least have had rural
origins).
(2) Secondly, Travancore4 , one of the three major regions
of present-day Kerala, is distinguished as being the oldest
"welfare state" in the country. The welfare policies of its 19th
century ruler, Martand Varma, were indeed, precursors of the
social and distributional emphasis evident in the development
policies of contemporary governments. In particular, Martand
Varma (1) laid the basis for a highly developed transportation
and infrastructural network. (2) Introduced the first progressive
agrarian (tenancy) reform in the state in 1865. (3) Established
schools and clinics for the study and practice of traditional and
non-traditional health-care. Thus, he generated an early concern
17
* Travancore remained a sovereign state throughout the
colonial era in India, although it was under British tutelage.
for health care among the common people.' (4) And was responsible
for the early spread of state-sponsored, school education. He
also encouraged christian missionaries to propagate the western
system of learning.
This last point is significant because the early spread of
education contributed to the early development of class
consciousness in the state. The basis for viewing education, as a
means of attaining access to prestige, and social position was
thus laid in the mid-19th century. Furthermore, because
features of "town" and "country" existed throughout the state,
and no region was "isolated" or "cut-off", the provision of
services was not confined to privileged centers. In more recent
times this socio-spatial aspect of Kerala has led to the
distribution of so-called "urban" facilities, all across the
state--even though by technical census definitions, 80% of the
population continues to live in "rural" areas.
(3) This rural population therefore, forms a significant,
and numerically powerful, constituency in the state. The rural
population--which is heterogenous along class and caste lines--
then, would also represent a critical force in any social or
political movement.
Kerala has known several such movements. The most
significant of these are the "teachers movement" of the 1930s
(one school in every village); the "library movement" (a library
5 See Joan Mencher in "Lessons and Non-lessons of Kerala" in
Economic and Political Weekly, 1980, for a discussion on the
early origins of health-consciousness in Kerala.
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in every village), and most significantly, the Moplah (as muslims
in Kerala are called) rebellion of 1836, and the social reform
movement among the Ezhavas in 1903.
The Moplah uprisings were part of an unsuccessful tenancy
reform movement among the muslims of Malabar, that, despite its
failure, "gave the peasants the first elements of class
consciousness"6 . The movement among the Ezhavas7 -- a numerically
dominant backward caste of cultivators and laborers--was led by
their spiritual leader Narayana Guru, who urged them to break out
of stigmatized caste barriers and attain social-economic upward
mobility through education (and prestigious public service
positions). A caste based organization that soon became
politicized as the SNDP, was formed to bring about social
revolution among this backward caste. As E.M.S. argues, "it was
organization of the oppressed and untouchable castes that..for
the first time in the history of Kerala [mobilized] the
overwhelming majority of the peasantry against the prevailing
social order which was oppressive to the entire people of
Kerala..This is why the saintly leader of the Ezhavas must be
considered the first inspirer and organizer of the cultivating
6 E.M.S. Namboodripad--a powerful veteran leader of the
Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M), who was the first
communist chief minister of Kerala, and is currently the general
secretary of the party--as quoted in Hardgrave, "The Kerala
Communists" in Radical Politics in South Asia, edited by Brass
and Franda, 1973: 135.
' This movement, which is regarded as the most significant
in Kerala, was led by an Ezhava saint--Narayana Guru--in 1903,
under the slogan--"One Caste, One God, One Religion".
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and landless peasant masses in Kerala" (cf. Hardgrave, 1973:
136). Ezhavas today form the politically most powerful
constituency in the state, and although their support is crucial
for any party that aspires to obtain state power, the mass
support of the communist movement is drawn predominantly from
this community.
The SNDP also set a precedent for the formation of similar
social and political associations among other castes--these
associations today form the basis of the regional political
parties of Kerala. Therefore, social movements in Kerala are
significant because they have stirred the various communal groups
to social and political consciousness.
This consciousness and political awareness has also been
fostered by the "constructive competition" among the major
communities in the state, by virtue of the social structure of
Kerala which is characterized by a lack of hegemony of any one
class or community. Unlike other states in the country where
Hindu dominance typically prevails--socially and numerically, the
minority communities in Kerala are hardly "minor". The christians
and muslims together constitute more than 40% of the population,
compared to their national strength of less than 5%. The Hindus,
numbering nearly 60% of the population, are also divided along
caste lines--the Ezhavas number 25% of the population, followed
by the politically powerful Nair community, which forms nearly
18-20% of the population.
As noted above, caste and communal-based associations have
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developed through which each group competes to consolidate its
access to economic resources and social position. Furthermore,
to the extent that in the post-independence period there has been
a tendency toward an alignment of major communities with
political parties (for example, the Congress became a party of
christian domination; the Praja Socialist Party was regarded as a
virtual Nair preserve; the Muslim league commanded the allegiance
of the muslims of Kerala, and the communist parties have drawn
strength from the Ezhava and untouchable castes), these social
groups have also competed for political power. Yet none commands
numerical majority.
Therefore, even while the unique social composition of
Kerala has led to caste-based political and social "competition",
which has sharpened the political consciousness of the
electorate, it has also meant that no party can rule with the
support of one community alone. Coalition governments therefore
have become a typical feature of Keralan politics. (This aspect
of Keralan politics is of direct significance to the
implementation of the OLHS, as we will see later). The point
being made here is that the communists do not by themselves
dominate the politics of Kerala nor have their policies alone set
the distributional trend we see in the state today.
In sum therefore, the unique geographical structure of
Kerala which has minimized rural urban differences, provided the
basis for a socio-spatial structure that was conducive to the
21
development of communication networks throughout the state. These
conditions made mobilization of the rural peasantry relatively
easier, and effective. They also enabled the ruler of Travancore
to spread the benefits of education, health and other welfare
policies throughout the (Travancore) state. This early spread of
education and the social and political consciousness generated by
the long history of social movements in Kerala, led to high
levels of political awareness among the people. This awareness,
along with the sense of competition among the caste-based social
groups that reflected a "superimposition of ritual rank, social
status, and economic position", in fact, represented an early
differentiation along class lines.8 Thus a relatively early
process of class formation, high levels of political literacy and
a growing force of the "educated unemployed"on the one hand, and
the persistence of "feudal land relations" generated a political
environment that facilitated the rise of communism in the state
in the post-independence period.
Furthermore, in a society where social movements and past
policy precedents have led to social status being attached to
being civic-minded, a continued emphasis on welfare and
distribution, as well as policies aimed towards improving the
standard of living of the common people, has come to be expected
of successive elected regimes--communist or non-communist.'
This sequence of events has played a critical role in
8 See Hardgrave, op.cit. pp. 138.
* Discussions with B.Kuriakose.
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shaping the nature of relationship between the "state
government" (that for the most part remains "committed" to an
agenda of structural reform and progressive distributional and
social policies), and its, highly politically aware and literate
electorate. How this relationship between the state and civil
society bears on the co-existence of "top-down" control and
"bottom-up" participation, we will examine through the OLHS case,
in the following sections.
23
PART II
Origins of a "Top-down" Approach.
Introduction.
We have seen that distributional policies have
traditionally played a central role in the development strategies
adopted by successive state governments in Kerala. Although the
government first intervened directly in the shelter sector only
in the 1970s, its past redistributive efforts in other sectors--
such as public services, infrastructure and land--indirectly
stimulated shelter related activity.
The extensive land reforms undertaken by the state-
government in 1970, are one example of the state government's
redistributive efforts, that indirectly led to an upsurge in
housing activity in the 1970s. The provision of land-ownership
rights to over 0.3 million formerly landless laborers
(Kudikidappukars) and transfer of title to over 2.4 million
tenant farmers (Kudiyirippu and other tenants), in eliminating
the threat of eviction, provided them with the incentive to
engage in home building. If title to land provided the incentive,
then to some, it also afforded the means, through potential
access to credit from institutional and non-institutional
sources. Access to credit enabled them to participate in a
variety of productive and day-to-day activities (for example the
marriage of a daughter, purchase of cattle, fodder and so forth),
including, house-building. Although institutional finance is
scarce and not readily available to poorer clients, and, non-
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institutional credit carries with it high interest rates, the
indirect impact of land reforms on shelter processes, was one
factor that contributed to the "housing boom" of the 1970s.
If this example illustrates how a redistributive
intervention in the agricultural sector--restructuring land
relations through an agrarian reform--can produce spill-over
effects in another, related sector--shelter, the present chapter
illustrates the effect of a direct intervention by the government
in the shelter sector. We specifically examine the One Lakh
Housing Scheme (OLHS)'0 . The OLHS is significant, because it
constitutes an important event in the sequence of developments
that led government policy to focus on low-income shelter
issues. It represents the turning point in the history of housing
in Kerala, after which housing for the first time became a matter
of public attention. Furthermore, in contrast to the notion of
failure that is frequently associated with low-income shelter
programmes undertaken by the government in much of the
literature on public-sector interventions in the third world, the
OLHS provides an uncommon, therefore instructive, instance of a
"successful" public sector programme.
The dominant view that emerges from the literature on
public interventions is that such interventions are "top-down",
rigid, and, non-participatory approaches to poverty alleviation.
The propensity of the public sector to generate large,
inefficient bureaucracies that encourage corruption and
1*. One Lakh is a measure equivalent to a hundred thousand.
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cooptation of benefits by dominant social and economic classes,
according to the "critique", makes it difficult for public sector
programmes to reach the poorest. Moreover, because of these
inefficiencies in the public sector, and because the government
often operates at large scales, its poverty programmes are
costly. These programmes also involve heavy subsidies. Subsidies
amount to spreading short-term relief instead of development that
can be sustained, and at costs clearly unaffordable in present
times of austerity. In sum therefore, public programmes do not
work very well--especially in the housing sector where the
divisible nature of shelter benefits'' exacerbate conflict and
competition over their distribution, making their implementation
as intended, more difficult (Grindle, 1980).
The OLHS, by contrast, represents an unusual case. Even
while it contains several features commonly associated with the
elements of "failure" singled out above, the programme has been
acknowledged as a success, not only by government officials and
politicians, but also by the people of the state. In fact, its
pitfalls and drawbacks, are also regarded by the supporters and
critics of the programme, as part of its achievement, as they
have provided valuable lessons to those engaged in shelter
provision (as we shall see below) of what does or does not work
Housing is a private good, where there is a one-to-one
correlation between the good and the beneficiary, as opposed to
say, a community park which is a public good, where one person's
use of it will not preclude another person drawing similar
benefits from it.
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in public housing programmes.
A word about the features of the OLHS that if viewed
normatively would ostensibly suggest "failure":
(1) In institutional terms, the state government conceived of the
OLHS, and it was implemented entirely by the state apparatus. (2)
Programmatically, it had an unusually large scale and scope--it
envisaged the provision of one lakh, fully constructed houses--
just what a section of scholars in the low-income shelter field
have been arguing against since the late 1960s. Scholars advocate
against the provision of fully constructed units because they are
usually stereotypical, and do not allow the user sufficient scope
for making decisions about the type and timing of the house. (3)
The prospective beneficiaries were not selected well enough in
advance to allow direct user-input, again a point that is
associated with the "top-down", rigid approach of the government;
it was conceived of as a welfare measure--the land and housing
were to be provided at virtually no cost to the prospective
beneficiaries. In other words it carried a deep subsidy. (4) In
terms of performance, it finally met less than 50% of its
physical target. Moreover, it started out as a one year programme
but extended to more than three.
Despite these apparent flaws, the programme has performed
exceptionally well in several ways, and on closer examination,
the "failures" are not as drastic as they might seem if assessed
normatively or in isolation.
In this chapter we take a closer look at the OLHS
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programme, to understand the potential, capacity and limitations
of the public sector in undertaking redistribution programmes,
and implementing them in ways that ensure the allocation of their
benefits to the actual groups targeted. In other words we examine
the outcome of a "top-down" approach to distribution. In so
doing, my intention is to set up a case from which to argue that
it is spurious to deem "top-down" approaches and "bottom-up"
approaches as being mutually exclusive categories. It is just as
misleading to consider that the merits of one can only be
enhanced by detracting from those of the other, as it is to focus
on debates about growth augmenting policies versus social welfare
oriented policies as if they are oppositions and each approach
necessarily demands the exclusion of the other1.
In the next section I will briefly introduce how and why
the OLHS is perceived as a successful programme by government
officials and the people. This is followed by an elaboration of
the historical significance of the programme to shelter provision
in Kerala. I then explore the factors that, in my perception,
have significant bearing on the origin of the OLHS. In the
subsequent sections I isolate and examine in detail some of the
key aspects of the programme. Specifically, these aspects relate
to the design and formulation of the programme, its unique
financial arrangements, land acquisition mechanism, and finally
execution procedures and the administrative chain of command.
12. A parallel theme has been explored by Amartya Sen in
"Levels of Poverty: Policy and change", 1980. Staff Working Paper
No. 401. Washington.
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Through this discussion I will show that the government made
both, popular participation and centralized control, both, the
central themes of the OLHS, which, for the most part, were
responsible for its good performance.
1. The OLHS: perceptions of "success" and historical
significance.
The One Lakh Housing Scheme (OLHS), carried out by the
Kerala state government between 1972 and 1976 has been noted by
many central and state level officials, politicians, analysts in
the shelter sector, and in some of the literature on shelter
processes in Kerala, as an important, innovative national model
in the public housing sector. It is commonly identified in
official circles as being important because it represents the
first major attempt by any state government to address the issue
of shelter for the poor in a substantial and effective way. The
outcome of the OLHS is called "substantial" because through it
the state government, of its own initiative, sought for the first
time, to provide land, tenure and housing (as opposed to rental
tenements, that are more usual) to one lakh rural landless
laborer households as part of a single, though regionally
disaggregated, non-phased government intervention--a programme
unparalleled in the country. It is seen to have been "effective"
because, despite meager financial assistance from the central
level, and without any funds from other institutional sources in
the housing field, the government succeeded in providing tenured
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land to a lakh landless households, with houses for nearly 50% of
them.
The programme is also seen to exemplify the commitment and
"political will" necessary for the government to carry out major
redistributive programmes. One senior official in the Housing and
Urban Development Corporation of India (HUDCO) illustrated to me
the need for "political will and motivation from the top" by
pointing out how other states such as Andhra Pradesh and
Karnataka that are "now attempting to do what Kerala tried 10-15
years ago in the OLHS" are finding it difficult to replicate its
results, in particular, the wide-spread public enthusiasm it
generated.
If the OLHS is seen as an important programme nationally,
it also has a significant place in the history of housing in
Kerala. Prior to the conception and implementation of the OLHS in
the fourth plan period (1969-1974), shelter in general, and
shelter for the poor, in particular, had not been a major state
sector activity. A few, standard programmes" formulated and
funded by the central government, had been implemented by the
regional engineers of the Public Works Department (PWD), a
central agency responsible for undertaking centrally sponsored
capital and public infrastructure programmes, and the state
government's Revenue Board Machinery through its hierarchy of
These programmes included a few standardized schemes such
as industrial workers housing, plantation workers housing, but
mostly the more general Low income group (LIG), middle and high
income group (MIG, HIG) programmes, with the bulk of these latter
efforts focussed on middle and high income groups.
30
revenue, block and village level officials. Together these
agencies provided less than 3% of the state's housing stock. The
bulk of housing activity was left to private initiative. This
left the poor and the landless, those most in need of affordable
shelter, on the fringes of the private market, on government land
or dependent on the beneficence of landlords and landowners,
living in constant fear of eviction*. As one informant noted,
"before housing became a public concern in the 1970s, shelter was
either a private issue, or a feudal issue".
The OLHS popularized the notion of, and need for low-
income housing in the state for the first time. It increased
public awareness of the shelter issue, and as a result, public
attention became focussed on government housing policy. With
public attention, public criticism followed, inducing an element
of responsiveness on the part of the government to public opinion
on shelter issues. This trend has been maintained and is one
factor underlying the trends of innovation in Kerala's approach
to low-income shelter evident in the subsequent efforts of the
government and non-governmental sectors. The formal partnership
of the government with the NGO sector in shelter provision, is
one manifestation of these efforts.
'*. The poor, in addition to being at the lowest end of the
economic spectrum are also at the bottom of the social hierarchy,
being mostly untouchables or from other low-castes.
is Interview with B. Kuriakose, consultant to non-
governmental organizations involved with shelter and rural
development; active designer of low-cost shelter, and worker at
the grass-roots level.
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The OLHS also marked a shift in the structure of public
redistributive programmes, the funding of which was reorganized
to include allocation of monies in favor of low-income housing.
The state sector did not have a separate budget for shelter until
the third plan period (1960-1966), when Rs. 31 million (roughly
US$ 3.1 million in 1972 currencies) was provided for the first
time. That only 59% of this amount was spent by the government,
attests to the low priority given to housing until as late as
1966. It is also no coincidence that in the fourth plan period
(1969-1974), the time during which the OLHS was initiated, the
state sector expenditure increased two and a half times, to over
Rs. 46.3 million, against an outlay of Rs. 23 million'.
As the first major, experimental, shelter programme for
the poor taken up by the state government, the OLHS set the stage
for the involvement of public institutions in the shelter sector.
Even as the OLHS was awaiting formal passage, two new quasi-
government agencies were formed--The Kerala State Housing Board
(KSHB), and the Kerala State Housing-Cooperative Federation
(KSHCF)--both mandated to provide shelter related assistance,
with state-wide jurisdiction. Neither of these new agencies were
involved in the implementation of the OLHS (we shall see why
later), but took on separate programmes at more modest scales.
These programmes added considerably to the housing stock in the
. All outlays in current rupees. See "Facts and Figures On
Housing in Kerala", 1979. Government Of Kerala. Government Press,
Trivandrum; and "Statistics for Planning", 1983. State Planning
Board, Government of Kerala. Trivandrum.
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state during the decade of the seventies.
Further, in providing an example, through its merits and
pitfalls, of what worked well, and what did not in public housing
interventions, the OLHS served as a major learning experience not
only for the government and its public institutions engaged in
shelter provision, but also for other non-governmental agencies
involved with housing.
2. A break with tradition: coalition governments, the origin and
timing of a "welfare measure".
The perceived success of the OLHS noted above is all the
more striking for two reasons--the break from past practice that
the OLHS signified, and its timing.
It is evident that as an experimental programme through
which the state government initiated its involvement in the
production of low-income shelter, the scale of the OLHS is hardly
one that is commonly associated with an "experimental, initial
attempt". If the programme was motivated by nothing more than a
concern for the housing condition of the poor, we would expect
the government to have made a more modest beginning, gradually
increasing its involvement with the accumulation of experience or
the formulation of a specialist public sector housing agency.
Why then, did it break with its past tradition of remaining at
the fringe of shelter provision, and undertake a programme of
such ambitious scale and scope, in a relatively untried sector
which lacked a competent state level institution or agency to
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which responsibility for implementation could be assigned?
Similarly, the timing of the OLHS also raises questions
about how the programme got onto the government agenda.
The state government conceived of the OLHS in 1971, as a
distribution programme targeted towards a section of the poorest
10-15% of the income spectrum. Its introduction followed very
closely the land reforms, another redistribution programme whose
implementation had just begun in 1970. Widespread conflicts were
taking place throughout the state because of restructuring of
land rights and the consequent shifts in the relative power of
social groups that an agrarian reform inherently implies." The
chaos that this reorganization of power brought about is clearly
does not provide the stable environment usually considered
necessary for the implementation of a massive programme such as
the OLHS. Why did the government then choose to introduce the
OLHS at such an unsettled period?
In sum, what brought about the birth of the OLHS at this
particular historical moment and not another?
The significance of the "success" of the OLHS, in part,
lies in the details of its process and outcome. However, the key
6 See Herring, Ronald, J. 1983, "land to the Tiller", Yale
University Press for a discussion on the nature of social tension
and change the reform engendered. Of particular significance is
the coexistence of agrarian violence--clashes between landlords
and laborer groups, as well as laborers and the political parties
opposed to the reform, with the tendency of individual reform
beneficiaries--laborers, small, marginal and middle tenants--to
avoid alienating powerful elites on the grounds that reformist
regimes often prove ephemeral, or, its opposite, that subsequent
land distribution attempts may be contrary to their interests.
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to the elements that made those processes and achievements
possible lie in the manner and moment in which the programme was
conceived.
In the discussion below, I show that the origins of the programme
lie in more than the government's need to preserve its own
legitimacy in response to successful demand making from an
important political constituency. In addition, the government
also had its own concerns (which we will discuss later) in under-
taking such a visible programme, and structuring it the way it
did. Indeed it turned to its own advantage the conflict that
overtly led to the formulation of the OLHS. This "advantage" was
not merely political survival, nor, aggrandizement of its power,
but stemmed also from the government's commitment to the
conditions of the rural underclass. The government set the
programme up so that its good performance became a political
necessity--tantamount to its credibility. The programme was
therefore designed so as to compel it to be successful.
2.1 Past redistributive activity and the inadvertent generation
of a new demand making group: conflict and excluded groups as new
clients.
Just as large, high profile, distributive programmes often
originate out of political necessity, ostensibly the conception
of the OLHS is closely linked to the state government's need to
mitigate some of the unintentional, though not wholly unlikely,
outcomes of the land reforms. On the opposite side of the same
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coin, to the extent that the OLHS was a response to successful
demand making from a politically powerful constituency, it was
also a response to pressure from below; attesting to the presence
of a system where organized demand making by various sections of
society to elicit distributional favors from the government is an
accepted strategy.
The land reforms benefitted two classes among the poor--
small farmers (Kudiyirippu) and landless agricultural laborers
(Kudikidappukarans). Both these classes had historical interests
in land--the former (mostly ezhavas, and other backward castes)
as tenants of small holdings, 71% of which were less than an
acre, and the latter (mostly the untouchable or scheduled castes,
such as pulayas and parayas) as serf or slave-like classes, who
did not own or rent land, but were granted the right by large
landowners to live on their land as free-tenants in return for
their services as farm guards.
The Kudikidappukars who gained title to their house-sites
and upto 400 sq. yards (40 cents) of land around the sites,
however, formed less than half of the agricultural laborers in
the state who were landless at the eve of the land reform
legislation in 1970. The remainder, which included laborers
living on government owned (puramboke) land or those living on
rent, were not only excluded from benefits of the agrarian
reform, but in fact faced a worsened housing situation, because
of the reforms.
This is because after the state government passed the land
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reform legislation in 1970, in the early phases of its
implementation landowners were still quite unclear as to how the
reforms would actually affect them. Unlike in the past, no
landowner would permit a landless laborer to live in rentable
quarters on his premises, lest this might become the basis of a
claim by the laborer for ownership later'. In particular,
landowners kept laborers who were members of unions or labor-
associations, at a distance. As a result of this difficulty in
finding cheap accommodation after the land reform, sections of
the excluded landless agricultural laborers resorted to protests
and demonstrations, demanding concessions and compensation from
the government, similar to those gained by the reform
beneficiaries. Agricultural labor associations and sections of
the opposition seized the opportunity to launch attacks against
the government, alleging exclusionary behavior. Those newspapers,
over which opposition groups had influence, published these
allegations, generating adverse publicity against the newly
elected government and its policies. This further fuelled the
conflict between those included and excluded from land reform
benefits. To the excluded landless laborers the Kudikidappukars
appeared to have been treated as a "privileged" class--because
despite being in the same economic category, they had gained from
the reform merely by virtue of their historical interests in
land. They were now viewed by the landless as the new landed
7 Reported in "A Good Cause for Contractors", in the
"Economic and Political Weekly" , 1972, an article on the OLHS.
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"elite" among the agricultural laborer class who sought to
maintain their distance from the rest. There was also bitterness
among the landless over the growing propensity of this new
"elite" to collude with other small and middle peasants, against
the interests of those excluded, by refusing to share their gains
economically or to support their cause politically".
In addition, the unrest among the excluded landless
laborers over housing and land ownership, was exacerbated by the
deteriorating employment conditions they faced during the early
1970s. This period witnessed a significant growth in the supply
of rural labor (figs. in Alexander) due to several reasons".
8 Based on talks with B. Kuriakose, V. Gnanamony, political
survey reports on Kerala in the "Economic and Political Weekly"
July 4 1970, Nov 7 1970. See Herring op cit. footnote 49: 214 for
a opinions expressed by non-beneficiary agricultural laborers in
a survey conducted in 1980. Also see E.M.S. Namboodaripad,
"Peasants and Laborers: Allies in a Common Struggle," in Peasant
and Labor 3, no. 1 (January-February 1974). Namboodripad,
currently general secretary of the CPI(M), and former chief
minister of Kerala (1957-1959 and 1967-1969), admits that
conflict between the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries among
agricultural laborers has been one outcome of the agrarian reform
that has served to divide this class along lines of landowning
small peasants and landless laborers. In an attempt to mitigate
dissension among the "rural proletariat" that has traditionally
formed the communist mass-base, he has felt compelled to argue
that there continues to be common platform for both these groups,
in several articles, including the one referred to above.
9 For example, as an indirect outcome of increase in the
capitalization of large farms as a means adopted by large farmers
for hedging against the ceiling law provision of the land reform
which excluded mechanized farms from its purview; subdivision of
land into smaller holdings due to the reform; a growing
propensity of small farmers to switch from paddy cultivation to
commercial and tree crop cultivation, especially coconut, which
contracted labor requirements; the general depression of
traditional industries such as coir, and cashew processing that
had thrown other workers into agriculture; steady inmigration of
"cheap labor from neighboring states who were under-cutting
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Although the prevailing wage were not depressed by this increase
in labor supply, and in fact continued to rise due to trade union
agitations, the number of days in a year that agricultural
laborers could find employment declined measurably. Thus despite
higher minimum wages, household incomes of the laborers remained
low. On the other hand, with rising wages, prices rose. While the
Kudikidappukars had access to modest "fixed" income through the
sale of marginal produce from their garden sites, and to credit
against their land title, the landless laborers faced a slack
labor market, shrinking incomes, higher prices and a worsened
housing condition. Therefore, even while these landless laborers
were being organized by trade and labor unions to secure gains
from the government, unrest among the landless laborers was on
the increase (Raj and Tharakan, 1983: 72).
At the same time, agricultural laborers are an important
political constituency and have traditionally formed the mass
base of the communists. It would not be in the interest of the
communist faction in the coalition government to allow unrest
among its own constituency to build up. Moreover, active labor
union mobilization renders unrest among agricultural laborers
very visible. This visibility can easily cause localized unrest
to spread into wider agitation.
organized local labor; natural population growth of Ag.
households and a significant increase in the entry of women from
these households into the labourforce (Mencher, 1980, Herring
1979, Raj and Tharakan, 1983, interview with K.K.Subramaniam,
observations during field trip, conversations with ag. lab.
households.)
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The congress-CPI led coalition government (The United
Front) that took office in 1970, saw the potential lines of
conflict that could arise if this unrest over land, housing and
employment became exacerbated, and the threat that such escalated
conflict could pose to the stability of the new coalition. If the
government had to maintain its legitimacy and ensure its full
term of tenure in office, it would have to act rapidly to prevent
the growing discontent that had emerged so early in its tenure,
from becoming a crisis, leading to broader disenchantment among
the rest of the people. Given the nature of the electorate in the
state, where a majority measure a government's competence, in
part, by what it has done for the poor, the government needed
immediate evidence on the ground to demonstrate its concern for
the agitating and disgruntled landless laborers.
Therefore, breaking with past tradition, the state
government announced the OLHS in 1971 in response to pressure
from labor unions, and demand making by a politically significant
group among which unrest was inadvertently fostered by the
government's own redistributive activity. It was designed to
provide land and housing, the two issues over which conflict had
built up, to those landless agricultural households who had not
derived benefits from the land reform" . For reasons mentioned
above the government could not afford the OLHS to be a failure,
10 That the OLHS was expressly targeted towards a single
client group--the rural landless agricultural laborers who had
been left out of the land reform benefits--was brought up by all
my informants. Also see Nalapat. M.D., " One Lakh Houses Scheme"
in Economic and Political Weekly, April 17, 1976: 2268.
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politically.
2.2 Beyond the legitimacy question: the government's own
hierarchy of goals, and the turning of a problem into an
opportunity.
The OLHS first emerged as the government's response to
demand making by a dissatisfied, though vocal, constituency.
However, there was something more than pressure from this
important political group that led to the OLHS being taken up at
such a large and unprecedented scale. This "something more"
relates to the governments own goals in implementing the OLHS,
which are linked with 3 factors--two endogenous to the
institutional entity that a state government is, and one
exogenous, outside this institutional entity: (1) the newness of
the government; (2) the fact that it was a coalition government
and, (3) the nature of agrarian reform and the sluggish pace at
which the land reform was proceeding since the government
commenced its implementation in 197011.
2.2.1 Coalition governments: goals, speed, success and spill-
over benefits of large, visible programmes.
" Regarding factors that lead to certain decisions being
taken by institutions or organizations at certain points in time,
Herbert Simon, in his discourse on a somewhat different issue of
rational philosophy, and rationality in administrative behavior,
provides a clue. He suggests that an institution or
organization, in choosing to make certain decisions, may often
have an hierarchical structure of goals, where attainment of an
end at each level, progressively becomes a means to broader or
more distant ends (1961: Ch.4).The OLHS, similarly, was more than
a mere means to an immediate end, as we see below.
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Non-authoritarian, representative governments worry about
their legitimacy. They will usually act to prevent conflict among
social groups from building up to a crisis, particularly if
conflicts surface in the government's early years in office. More
so if they come from relatively well organized groups who carry
political weight due either to numerical strength, economic
dominance or powerful social status, or some combination of each.
How the government chooses to act, how soon it acts, and the
scale of its action, will depend on the conception of state power
that groups within the particular society share, the relative
influence of the various social groups, and, the extent to which
dissatisfied sections of society can effectively mobilize support
and public attention. For example often, announcing the
"intention" of action or having a programme "on the anvil" will
be sufficient for the government to buy time to actually
implement when it is ready, rather than when demands are made on
it.
The Congress-CPI led coalition, in whose tenure the OLHS
was formulated, could not expect to satisfy its electorate by
announcing its "intention" to do something for the laborers. Due
to the rather different historical path the state government as
an institution has traversed, and the particular social structure
in Kerala that I briefly mentioned in the Introduction,
conceptions of state capacity, and expectations by the people of
government response to pressures from "below" in Kerala, are
closely related to the perceived character of political parties
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whose members are the incumbents in office--ministers. At the
same time, political parties elected to state power themselves
have specific notions of development which have led to a
sustained focus on redistributive policies and an active attempt
to reach the poor.
Trends established by the very first communist government
in 1957 which politicized and publicized its commitment to using
"state power as an instrument in the struggle of the people", and
built its mass base among the poorest, have become virtual
yardsticks against which the performance of subsequent
governments is measured. Since 1957, however, several different
parties, and alliances have come to power in the state. The
subsequent communist fronts have also been varied in nature and
in their cast of characters. For example the communist party
split up in 1964 into the more "rightist" CPI and the more
"radical" CPM. But the most significant trend has been that
coalition governments, as an institutional form, have become a
typical feature.
In 1970 the coalition that came to power was led by the
former communist faction (CPI), in conjunction with the Congress-
- precisely the party traditionally regarded as the "main enemy"
of the communist movement by left sympathizers, and one that the
CPI had been accused of "falling in line with" during the split.
As a result, skepticism about the robustness of this first ever
center-left coalition, and fears of a "revisionist cooptation" of
the CPI's agenda of "structural reform" by the Congress were rife
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among the coalition's opponents. They argued that a coalition
which depended on the support of parties ideologically opposed to
the left, and with landed, industrial interests, could not
possibly carry out "radical redistribution policies". The CPI, at
the head of the coalition was therefore, under pressure to
demonstrate, relatively quickly, its commitment to radical
reform, and concern for the poor peasantry, that it claimed was
its constituency. An image of stability, that had been the
central theme of the coalition's electoral promise, had to be
combined with visible evidence of reform. As some members of the
coalition noted, "There is a powerful radical group among the
politically conscious people in the state. This group will not be
satisfied with just an honest administration. It will demand
positive results in the field of radical reform" (Karunakaran,
1970: 1774). This they saw could be achieved "..if substantial
good work could be done by the new government", quickly (Nair,
1970).
The discontent among the landless agricultural laborers
over the outcome of the agrarian reform, and their demand for
land and shelter, provided the new coalition with an opportunity
to do "some good work". A large programme that would provide land
and shelter to one lakh of the poorest households, would
certainly be regarded as a progressive effort by the new
government.
Providing housing as part of the OLHS was important in
several ways. First, it would provide visibility to the
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programme. Unlike most other distributional services such as
community development, credit assistance, health, and, education,
the physical nature of shelter programmes renders them visible.
Large shelter programmes not only reach a greater number of
beneficiaries, which both helps the poor, as well as, affords
greater political rewards, but they make programme benefits even
more visible. Large shelter programmes, if successful, therefore,
not only become large and visible, "achievements", benefitting a
large number of clients, even if from a selected target group.
Secondly, large construction projects provide spill-over
benefits. Shelter programmes have spread effects that get
transmitted more broadly throughout the economy--such as
generating unskilled and skilled employment in the construction
industry. While the creation of unskilled employment helps spread
gains further among the poor, skilled employment and the
generation of demand in the construction inputs sectors (that
such projects entail) disseminates programme benefits,
indirectly, to societal groups other than the immediate programme
beneficiaries, (including small and large contractors), even
while stimulating the economy through the forward and backward
linkages of the building industry. A large scale programme, such
as the OLHS possessed the potential to provide all of these
additional spill-over benefits.
Therefore, in addition to providing benefits that would
ameliorate, in a modest way, the unemployment problem in the
state, a large programme if successful, and if completed rapidly,
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would furnish the new government with visible and concrete
evidence of its commitment and stability that it sought.
Hence it was in the interest of the government to ensure that the
OLHS was implemented with speed, and that it perform well.
2.2.2 Coalition dynamics: seeking a counterfoil for sluggishness
and protracted turbulence of landreform implementation, publicity
and a welfare measure.
We have noted the ostensible reason that led to the birth
of the OLHS--the government wanted to ward off potential unrest
among a section of an important political constituency--landless
laborers--over being excluded from benefits of the landreforms.
Being a center-left coalition government whose commitment towards
the poor, and institutional capacity was questioned by its
opponents, the government saw in the OLHS an opportunity to
demonstrate its stability and responsible governance. The large
scale of the OLHS, and its visible housing component would help
the government do so.
The perception of stability that the OLHS could implicitly
provide was important to the new coalition government for another
reason. It could divert attention away from the government's
sluggish performance in the ongoing agrarian reform.
As yet, the coalition government had been in office for
less than a year, and had barely consolidated its own internal
position--portfolio sharing and division of ministries among the
8-party coalition, much less have enough "progressive" measures
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on the ground to demonstrate to the electorate its stated
commitment towards structural change and reform. The one, major
progressive measure it had acted with speed to commence
implementation of, was the agrarian reform. But even that had a
slow start, and many within the government along with opposition
parties and the social classes committed to the reform, were
uniformly critical of implementation procedures. One reason for
tardy implementation, as we will briefly see later, lies in the
inherent nature of an agrarian reform itself. The other reason
lay in the nature of the United Front coalition government, and
the class character of its member parties.
As is common with coalition governments, the precarious
inter-party balance of power can be easily destabilized even by
ordinary pressures of disagreement among the members--for example
lack of agreement over agenda setting, regional or location
specificity of programme benefits, inclusion or exclusion of
members from decision making, relationship of new ministers with
the established underlying bureaucracy, consensus generation and
so forth. Agreement over the issue of agrarian reform, which by
definition, envisages a drastic redistribution of land-ownership
and privilege, shakes up the relative power of social groups and
most importantly, from the perspective of political parties,
produces clear losers and winners among their constituencies, is
likely to be even more problematic. The 8 member-parties of the
United Front alliance had distinctly different constituencies.
(just as the leaders themselves were drawn from different classes
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of society):
The CPI and some of the socialist parties whose mass
support was drawn from the poor peasantry, were the only two
parties that stood ideologically committed to the reform.
Although the earlier leaders of the CPI were drawn from landed,
even formerly aristocratic classes, the new crop of leaders are
socially and economically much closer to the lower classes that
they represent. The coalition had both types of leaders, but was
led by the former, who favoured programmes that would benefit the
poor more directly, such as the landreforms.
The congress member of the coalition, despite its links
with middle and large farmers, pro-capitalist stance, and upper
class leaders, also favored the reform, if only in principle, and
mostly for future political gains. After the split in the
congress at the national level in the late 1960s, the more
dominant faction which was now part of the United Front
Coalition, sought to shift its "rightist" image to a "left-of-
center" one. The growing agrarian unrest in the wake of the
Naxalbari uprisings of 1967 in Bengal and Bohr, that had in part
influenced the party's crushing defeat in some states in the 1969
midterm elections, had underscored the need to shift its mass
base in rural areas to small and middle farmers. Support for the
reform would provide the "progressive" character it was seeking.
At the same time it would convince the "large left vote" in
Kerala of its "radical" leanings, and pave the way for making
future inroads into the mass base of both, the CPI and the CPM.
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All the other parties, including the Muslim League, were
sectarian or regional parties with landed, communal
constituencies and leaders, that stood to lose the most from the
reform. The Muslim League had on previous occasion been charged
with "opportunism ..and lack of commitment to the United Front's
left programme, in particular the land reform" and there is
recorded evidence that these charges were accurate (cf. Herring,
1983: 193; footnote 16). Similarly, the Kerala Congress, a
politically significant, Syrian Christian splinter party,
representing powerful land-owners, industrial and commercial
elite interests, stood opposed to the reform in practice, even
while lending it verbal support. Although not part of the formal
alliance, this party's implicit support was crucial for the
coalition 2 , therefore, its position on the reform became
important.
With a mixed group such as the above, and the opposed
interests of their constituencies, the coalition was bound to
face internal pressures from its members and supporters, for
modifications or at least delay in landreform implementation. At
the same time, even the dissenters from within the 8-party
alliance realized that subverting a reform, for which widespread
popular support and public involvement had not only been
12 As we saw in chapter one, the Kerala congress and the
Muslim League, although parties with regionally specific
constituencies, have been critical to the making or breaking of
coalitions in Kerala. Except for the present Left Democratic
Front elected to power in the state no other government has
survived for long without their support.
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mobilized, but kept alive for over a decade, would be political
lunacy. Even extensive foot-dragging they recognized, was likely
to be, and in fact was being, interpreted by the supporters of
the reform as ineptitude and insincerity on the part of an
uncommitted government. A coalition seeking to project an image
of stability, cohesion and institutional capacity could hardly
afford such a view.
Therefore, a mutually acceptable informal criteria
evolved as to which provision of the reform would be implemented
first13 : The transference of title to the Kudikidappukars was
taken up first. Implementation of this provision required no
physical redistribution of land, and involved very little land
"loss" for the landowners: the liability of every landowner
worked out to a mean area of only 0.08 acres per valid case.
Simultaneously applications from tenant farmers for transfer of
title were invited, to assure the people that tenancy transfer
for which there was the largest lobby among small and middle
farmers, was underway. The most contentious provision--the
enforcing of the land ceiling law, which involved the actual
expropriation and redistribution of surplus land from large
13 This, of course, has not been explicitly admitted to by
government officials, or stated in the literature I have read,
and only speculated upon by some of my informants. However,
events as recorded in the journals published in the early 1970s
clearly suggest a strong possibility that this indeed could be
the case. For example see Economic and Political Weekly, July 4
1970, Special Number, July 1970, Sept. 26, 1970, November 7,
1970, July 17, 1971; The Hindu, (February-November 1970, 1971),
Herring op.cit., Hardgrave, "The Kerala Communists:
Contradictions of Power", in Radical Politics in South Asia,
1973, MIT Press. Cambridge.
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farmers--from which the landed stood to lose heavily, and the one
most likely to have the powerful Muslim League, Congress, and,
Kerala Congress supporters up in arms, was put off for later.
Since the gains to the Kudikidappukars of obtaining title
to their house-sites came early in the implementation sequence of
the reform, these gains were also the most visible. Frictions
between them, and the landless agricultural laborers, who despite
belonging to the same economic category, found themselves
excluded from the benefits of the reforms due to their lack of
historical interests in land, were bound to arise. Especially
because coalition dynamics had led to the postponement of the
expropriation of surplus land for redistribution, the one
provision under the reform that could potentially have benefited
the excluded group.
In seeking to maintain internal cohesion, over the
handling of one of its own redistribution programmes, therefore,
the coalition government inadvertently created an external
problem. The resolution of this new problem, a by-product of a
progressive, but partial measure and internal politics within the
government, eventually required the formulation of yet another
distribution programme, the OLHS. Akin to what Scokpol terms the
"dialectic between state and society", political mobilization,
and awareness had led to further demand making by the excluded
group along lines of the benefits from which it had been excluded
(1985: 25).
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2.2.3 Nature of an activity as determinant: turbulence,
surrogate counterfoil and the features of the OLHS.
Apart from the intra-coalition dissensions discussed
above, there were exogenous reasons, outside the direct control
of the government that delayed implementation procedures, and in
part led to decisions about certain features that became
important in the design of the OLHS.
It is in the nature of agrarian reform that implementation
often takes time to be realized. The operationalization process
of such reforms is commonly a slow and chaotic one. The pace of
implementation is hindered especially if the process demands
constant constitutional ratification from the Central level, and
if the judicial system with its procedural rules, and, precedent-
based methodology plays a central role. At the local level,
setting up an effective implementation machinery, and getting it
to work takes time. Problems emerge in assigning tasks to various
levels of government involved with the reform, collecting,
scrutinising, processing and confirming the validity of each case
over which there may be claims and counter-claims. This often
runs into controversies and legal disputes involving court-room
procedures that may take weeks, even months to be resolved.
Meanwhile, widespread class confrontation is typical. Conflicts
develop between landowners who stand to lose and thus, seek
informal and extra-legal ways and means of resisting the new
laws, and tenants, who, finding their staying power implicitly
strengthened by these new laws, are eager to gain immediate
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access to what they think they now rightfully own--recognizing
that delay often means denial of rights in a land reform. Petty
bureaucrats and lawyers see in this process opportunities for
windfall gains. The actual functioning of some field officers and
tribunals may be at variance with stipulated procedures, either
deliberately, because they disfavor the reform, or inadvertently,
for reasons of expediency, or due to pressure from influential
elites who seek to mitigate their losses.
All of these features were present in the Kerala case.
Despite widespread public support for the reform that we noted
above, and commitment from key legislators in the government, the
Planning Commission observed that "among the officials incharge
of the legislative, judicial, and, executive processes there were
some who had never really accepted the policy of the reform.
Their words were at variance with their deeds", and dilatory
attitudes were common (EPW, 1977). On the other hand an
atmosphere of militancy, confrontation and severe partisan
antagonism had built up due to protracted confrontation between
the supporters of the reform and the landed and their
representative political parties. Threats of organizing a "land
grab" movement from CPM supporters aggravated the situation. This
charged atmosphere was further exacerbated by publication of
reports on major incidences of violence by the media. (: in one
district alone (Alleppy), 25,000 activists were accused in cases
of agitation in the first five months of 1970.) Attacks by
landowners and the laborers on each other were constantly in the
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news (cf. Herring, 1983). Public disclosures by labor
associations of known cases of graft and corruption among reform
implementation officials were also an embarrassment to the
government. In the midst of this turmoil, the discontent among
the excluded agricultural laborers was gaining attention from
opposition parties and the public.
Quick action on the part of the government, as we
discussed earlier, was imperative. Even while the government
sought to make rapid revisions to speed up implementation
procedures, and address the demands of the landless agricultural
laborers through the OLHS, it saw in the latter, and its massive
scale, an opportunity to provide a counterfoil to the turbulence
sluggish reform implementation had generated. This could be
possible if the unusual and unprecedented nature of the OLHS
could be sufficiently publicized, to capture public attention.
The same media that had projected chaos in the case of land
reform implementation could be used to politicize a large
programme that sought "only" to distribute considerable benefits
to a section of the rural poor rather than to extract anything
from other better off sections. This could potentially divert
some of the attention focussed on the government's performance in
the land reform issue, towards a high profile and visible,
distributional measure, in a sector that had hitherto received
little attention from the state government. In a socio-political
context where high levels of political awareness and literacy
among a "radically oriented" electorate have traditionally served
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to focus public attention on government policy, initiation of
state-sector activity in a new sector, in a big way, would
certainly attract attention.
It was also important that the programme be designed as a
"welfare measure" that did not detract from its distributional
image by expecting the poor, who were to be its beneficiaries, to
pay for their houses. Moreover, since the prospective target
group, the excluded landless laborers, were measuring their
losses against the gains of the Kudikidappukars, who had paid
practically nothing for obtaining land title, it would be
politically difficult for the government to now charge the
former.
Embarking on a programme of this nature would not only
ward off discontent among those who had been most visibly
excluded from the land reform, but if adequate public interest
and attention could be mobilized, the opposition would be forced
to support a measure so directly targeted towards the poorest,
rural underclass. This could not only help diffuse potential
antagonism towards the OLHS, but would make accusations about the
government's lack of commitment to the poor and structural
change, difficult.
The key features of the OLHS, that emerge from the above
analysis", therefore are: speed, which was necessary to pacify
14 It must be noted that this analysis is my own
interpretation of the sequence of events that led to the
formulation of the OLHS, based on the literature and discussions
with informants, therefore it will not necessarily be synonymous
with what official accounts of the government claim.
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the agitating group, drawing public attention at a critical time
towards a positive move by the government; scale, the programme
had to be sufficiently large to generate the impact the
government was seeking, and achieve other spill-over benefits
that would spread through the economy, even if in a modest way;
visibility, the programme would ideally require a component that
was concrete, visible and not diffuse. The provision of fully
constructed housing, which was also what was demanded, would meet
this "criterion"; publicity, the programme had to be projected as
more than just "a government response", which some sections could
attack. Rather it had to, as far as possible, involve the active
support of people throughout the state, and not merely the
beneficiaries, if the opposition were not to jeopardize it though
organizing negative support against it; a "welfare" nature or
nearly one, which rather than pull the programme down would help
the government obtain support from an electorate that considered
it the government's responsibility to provide relief to a
constituency that was to poor to pay for the benefits of
distributional programmes; and finally, most important was that
it had to be a success. All of the above goals would only be met
if the programme turned out successful. As it was, the government
was taking a major risk in entering a sector it had little
experience with, while the state apparatus was busy with the
implementation of the land reform that in itself was drawing
criticism. It was now adding to it the burden of another large
programme. If the OLHS failed the government would have on its
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hands a large, highly visible, highly publicized failure; on the
contrary if it succeeded, the government would have an equally
large and visible "success"."' That the programme indeed perform
well, was, therefore crucial. One way the government could
achieve this was by assigning the OLHS high priority, and by
taking the responsibility of implementation in its own hands,
rather than entrusting it to other agencies, such as the central
PWD, or even the new state level agencies that were being
simultaneously formulated, the KSHB and the KSHCF.
Thus several features of the OLHS emerged due to the manner and
moment in which it was conceived.'
15 Some of the senior officers involved with the OLHS, that
I spoke with reported this pressure of implementing the programme
with speed, while ensuring that it performed well.
16 I emphasize the above points because in my perception
they are central to the birth of the idea of the OLHS and impart
it with characteristics that subsequently play an important role
in its performance. But I also emphasize the above sequence of
events to show, as I noted in the Introduction, that a
"communist-led regime" in a parliamentary democracy, like other
regimes faces certain constraints, if you will, to its autonomy.
National concerns will often impact state-level political
alliances. The power of the Center vis-a-vis the state-government
will also have implications on the institutional potential of a
state government. These will explicitly, or implicitly delimit
the framework or define the range of possibilities within which
the latter must operate. More important, the particular social
setting in which a state-government operates--the setting from
which its own members are drawn, or have links with--will make
specific programme choices more viable, necessary or more
appropriate than others. So that the leftist orientation of a
state government will not by itself, deterministically, suggest a
given set of options that will normatively hold true. This, of
course, is a well known fact, but it is useful to understand what
other factors will influence government decision, and how, if
understanding the limits of public-sector potential is the
intention.
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2.3 Beyond political survival: communist regimes and commitment.
If this is the political background against which the idea
of the OLHS was conceived, there was also genuine support for the
idea of targeting distributive efforts to the poorest of rural
laborers on the part of the CPI Chief Minister and his party
members in the coalition. As Shivanandan, the Special Secretary
(Revenues and Agriculture) to the government noted, despite
political compromises "commitment to doing good work, is the
personal creed of the communist leadership. The problems come
when they have to confront the power of the Center..
constitution.. or then sections of their own bureaucracy.."
According to him, the CPI leaders of the coalition in fact
exploited the opportunity to provide early in the life of the
coalition, some serious relief measures for the poor peasantry,
and at the same time be able to exploit their partnership with
the Congress, (which was also at power at the center,) to secure
more finances from the "powers-that-be" at Delhi. Moreover, the
specific design of the programme and the momentum generated to
implement the OLHS with speed is in large part attributable to
the commitment and personality of the then minister of housing in
Kerala (M.N. Govindan Nair), who was made responsible for its
implementation. The minister was known for his concern for the
housing conditions of the rural poor and had long argued for the
government to structure a coherent housing policy and set up a
viable state-wide shelter related administrative machinery. That
overall charge of implementing the OLHS was invested in the
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housing minister who had more than mere political interest in the
issue of low-income shelter, turned out to be crucial for the
performance of the programme, as we will see.
But, another issue becomes important. Even while the
coalition government had members such as the CPI, who were
genuinely committed to using the opportunity offered by the OLHS
to push through a major relief measure for the poor who were
their constituency, there were other interest groups within and
outside the government might question why one large
redistribution programme (land reform) should be so closely
followed by another distribution measure (the OLHS), where again
the lowest classes would be the prime beneficiaries"7. How
important are these other groups to limit the scope of
redistribution services targeted specifically towards a single
constituency? Historical precedence indicates that these
interest groups are not unimportant. For example, the previous
CPM led government (1967-1969) had fallen precisely on charges of
favoritism, politicization of distributional benefits, propensity
to reward its supporters and constituency (predominantly the
poor), and on grounds of partisanship. By contrast, the United
Front coalition needed to acquire just the opposite image if it
17 Although it is well documented by several analysts who
have studied the outcomes of land reform in kerala, that net
quantitative benefits of the reform accrued far more to "richer
farmers", than to the poor, especially the landless, and that
land never really went to the "tillers", senior officials and
bureaucrats as well as some of the political parties representing
landed interests have consistently maintained that the poor were
the primary beneficiaries of the reform.
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was to remedy the political damage done to it by slow land reform
implementation, pull off the OLHS successfully and yet not appear
to have indulged in a zero-sum game, where benefits could accrue
to one section of society only at the cost of some other.
It is significant therefore that the Coalition's visible
move in favor of the poor through the OLHS, soon after the land
reforms, (which in theory were also aimed at benefitting the
poor), was accompanied by conciliatory gestures towards the
industrial, landed elite and the middle classes.
At the same time as the OLHS was formulated, the
government announced a "Ten Thousand Industries Scheme"1 ". In
keeping with the government's electoral agenda of "developing
Kerala industrially", public finance was to be made more readily
available to local industrialists planning to start up firms, and
similar incentives were offered to those from outside seeking
plant locations in Kerala. The image of stability would only add
to the environment necessary to convince businesses to locate in
the state'3.
18 Interview with Shivanandan, IAS officer who is currently
Special Secretary for Revenues and Agriculture, and was Deputy
District Commissioner in the field during the conceptualization
and implementation of the OLHS.
19 This attention towards the industrial elite, or
economically dominant classes is noteworthy. As we saw in chapter
one, successive state governments in Kerala, even the most
radical left governments such as the first undivided communist
regime led by E.M.S. Namboodripad, have been very careful in
their relationship with this class. One reason, of course, is
that traditionally it has been the minority communities, such as
the christians, who have controlled industry and commerce. These
communities both, enjoy special constitutional protections that
in effect are "supra-state governmental", and therefore
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Simultaneously, the compensation price for expropriated
land was increased, and the ceiling raised, in order to appease
large land-owners. (Early exemption of land belonging to
religious, charitable and educational institutions from the
ceiling provision had already removed the earlier ambivalence
over the future of such property.) Surplus land obtained through
the nationalization of private forests in 1971, was to be
redistributed to displaced laborers and, significantly, the
educated unemployed2 o.
Nationalization of banks by the center was exploited to
divert credit to middle income groups--the small and middle
relatively outside the control of the state government, and are
represented by political parties that play a powerful local role
in making or breaking coalition governments that have become
typical in Kerala. Another reason, which is reflective of the
limits of power of leftist state governments in a federal
political structure, is their ideological focus on distributional
issues in the face of deep financial dependence on the center.
These regimes recognize the importance of industry in this
context, realizing the limits of agricultural growth potential to
generate enough resources (employment, income) in the state to
meet future demands for economic prosperity and its
redistribution. To that extent the attention towards economically
significant elite is not purely a question of their influence
over the state, but the latter's own interest in them, as well.
Leftist regimes are also conscious of their ideological
commitment to upholding relatively high statutory wages of labor
and are aware of the impact of high labor costs, as well as of
the militant potential of organized labor, on industry.
Therefore, given their concern about the development of economic
forces, they will not indiscriminately alienate industrial elite
as they will feudal interests. This is a curious position, and
requires further study elsewhere.
20 Herring, op.cit.: 200. High levels of unemployment among
the educated (matriculates and above) unemployed has been an
unusual, but acute problem in Kerala that has led to significant
outmigration.
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peasantry in the rural areas and small-scale entrepreneurs and
the self-employed in urban areas. Following the footsteps of the
Center, the proposal to raise the wages of white-collar employees
of banks and government employees was another measure aimed at
winning a section of the middle-income group.
Therefore, even if in moves unrelated to the OLHS, or
moves that were temporally close to the OLHS only incidentally,
the government had acted to elicit the support of other
significant interest groups; So that at the time the OLHS was
taken up there was no cause for other interest groups to allege
partisanship, or express active opposition to it. It is clear,
that if the state government's typical bias towards capital is
missing in Kerala, it is not without pressures from elite
influence which it must deal with. (This, as much of the above
analysis, might seem to reduce regime-motivations in making
certain decisions and not others to their perceived vested
interest of maintaining political power--a caveat raised by
authors such as Kohli, in a different context (1987). But it is
important to appreciate that in addition to political survival
and an ideological commitment towards social change, elected
communist regimes are also "state-managers" mandated to maintain
a healthy economy. This requires not ideological dogmatism, but
working with all interest groups in the society.)
2.4 Conclusion.
Thus, what would seem to be the opposite of the conditions
considered necessary for the implementation of a major
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distribution programme in an untried sector--precarious balance
of coalition governments, turbulence due to the land reforms, and
lack of previous experience with shelter programmes--turned out
to be just the conditions that made OLHS a politically viable
programme. The turbulence of the reform period--from which the
government sought to divert public attention by formulating the
OLHS as a large and prestigious distribution programme--and
successful demand making from a prominent excluded group, were
precisely the conditions that turned the OLHS into a high
profile, high priority programme, that had to be implemented with
speed. Therefore, we see that although the OLHS originated in
response to pressure from below, the coalition government turned
it around to achieve some of its own goals that went beyond the
interest group that would directly benefit from it. This
political interest of the government in ensuring the "success" of
the programme invested it with the one feature essential for most
programmes that perform well--commitment from those at the very
top of the state administrative hierarchy, the powerful decision
makers.
Yet several studies have shown that despite a government's
"intention" of making a programme successful, implementation
results may turn out quite differently on the ground. Commitment
from the "top" is a crucial feature of programmes that have
worked well, but conversely, does not by-itself suffice or serve
as guarantor of potential good performance. Moreover the danger
in an approach where the government ambitiously takes on the
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simultaneous implementation of two difficult and large
programmes, despite its attractive political rationale, is that
the performance of both might suffer from the state apparatus
being overburdened, or from rivalries between departments
implementing them. That this did not happen with the OLHS, is
evident from the perceptions of its "success" noted earlier. How
did the government convert its ambitious goals into a programme
that could be implemented? How did the programme actually work
out in practice? What are the features responsible for the areas
in which it performed well, what were the problems? What do the
beneficiaries think of the outcomes of the OLHS? Did it remain a
one-time dead-end programme, we examine below.
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PART III
3. Formulation and Implementation of a "Top-Down" welfare
measure: the power of popular support.
That the leaders at the top of the state administrative
hierarchy support a programme, we have noted, is important for
the programme's "successful" implementation. Yet, eventhough
state government leaders in Kerala supported the OLHS, the
implementation of the programme faced one important constraint.
In the federal structure of parliamentary democracy in India,
state governments are dependent on the Center for financing major
distribution measures. Most states are therefore constrained from
undertaking large programmes, that do not meet central government
approval, for want of adequate funding from the latter. How then,
does a state government, which is dependent on the Center for
finances, translate the seemingly ambitious goals of undertaking
a "welfare" programme of massive scale targeted towards a single,
low-status constituency, with speed and efficiency, into an
implementable programme that can win Central approval and justify
an early release of funds?
The coalition government did so by taking advantage of a
programme that the Center itself had recently announced.
3.1 From ambitious goals to an implementable programme: linking
state interests with national concerns.
In 1971, even while the idea of the OLHS was taking
official shape in Kerala, the Central Government had announced an
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extension to its Minimum Needs Programme (MNP), under which it
was willing to meet upto half the cost incurred by the various
state governments to acquire, develop and distribute 100 sq. yds.
of land per household, free of cost, to landless rural laborers
in each state. In formulating the OLHS the Housing Minister was
quick to grasp this opportunity provided by the Center, but
bargained with the latter to secure three significant
modifications consistent with the state's local and political
needs of the moment:
1) The state government would commence work on the OLHS in all
districts of the state simultaneously, instead of the phased
district-by-district implementation sequence suggested by the
MNP. This would generate considerable employment during
construction--at least 6.7 million man-days were projected; it
would stimulate the economy by generating activity in the
construction sector; allow some economies of scale to be realized
by enabling the government to procure building materials in bulk;
and would provide the visible impact the government was looking
for, without forcing it to make the politically difficult choice
of selecting one district over another as is inevitable in a
phased programme.
2) The state government doubled the area alloted to each
laborer household to 200 sq.yds, and along with the site, took
the responsibility of providing fully constructed houses on each
site--an aspect that was not part of the original MNP plan. It is
noteworthy that doubling the area, made the land allotted to
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each potential beneficiary household roughly equivalent to the
amount obtained by the kudikidappukars in municipal areas, under
the land reforms. Fully constructed houses, further, provided the
programme with its visible component and potential to generate
the employment estimated above.
Further, in keeping with the conception of the programme
as a welfare measure, the prospective beneficiaries would make a
token contribution of only Rs. 110, or, 9% of the total estimated
construction costs, in eleven equal monthly installments payable
in the first year of occupation. This contribution was "intended
to provide the beneficiaries with a sense of participation
without imposing a heavy financial burden on them", but indeed,
was never seriously enforced by the government (Nalapat, 1976:
588)21
3) The programme in the first instance would cover about a third
of the over 0.3 million households considered eligible, within a
period of one year. This would provide the scale and speed the
government sought, while spreading benefits to a fairly large
number of beneficiaries. But how could it be programmatically
ensured that, in a state where the intense pressure on land (655
persons per sq. km.) makes acquiring both rural and urban land
difficult, acquiring land is difficult, land for one lakh houses
could be acquired early enough so that a hundred thousand units,
could indeed be constructed within twelve months? This assumption
21 Interview with Thomas Poulose. See also, Nalapat M.D.
"One Lakh Houses" Scheme in Economic and Political Weekly, April
17, 1976.
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seems ambitious when seen against the fact that hitherto the
state government had barely managed to provide less than half
this amount in each of its five year plan periods.
The key to this lay in the first modification noted above:
work was spread across all the districts of the state. The OLHS
was not a project concentrated in space. The target of one lakh
units and house-sites was disaggregated into components of a
hundred units each, to be provided in each of the 960 panchayats
in the state. In each panchayat, the government would acquire 5
acres of land in 5 separate parcels, in five different villages,
and provide 20 semi-detached, clustered dwellings on each one
acre parcel. Therefore, even while the programme was popularized
as a "massive" one, in terms of implementation it was analogous
to several small projects dispersed throughout the state--but
overlapping in time. Although the regional distribution of the
targeted one lakh houses did not correspond with the relative
proportion of landless rural laborers in each district, as one
might expect an "equitable" distribution to be, it did not draw
challenge from areas of high labor pressure. On the contrary,
this uniform dispersion of the OLHS units, prevented the
government from appearing to favor some districts as opposed to
others and, from over-burdening some districts more than others.
Moreover, managing the construction of 20, rather than 200 units,
and ensuring their timely completion, is easier (a point I will
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return to later)2 2 . In formulating the OLHS, the government
therefore, took care to design the programme in such a way that
theoretically, it would provide both the grand "scale", and yet
be manageable enough to provide the "speed", the government was
seeking.
Thus, having started out with a clear idea of what the
Coalition wanted to achieve through the programme, the Housing
Minister succeeded as a first step, in incorporating specific
changes into the structure of a standard central programme with
"common rules", to both, suit local needs and at the same time
acquire funds from the center to ensure an early start. But what
made such well tailored modifications possible?
It is infrequently that a central government will impair
the implementation of one of its own new programmes that it wants
taken seriously, by setting a precedent of being rigid and
22 It is much more usual for public housing agencies, and
city managers to prefer large, spatially concentrated projects to
capture the economies of scale they offer, especially, in the
provision of infrastructure and services--such as transport,
drainage, health, education and so forth. By contrast, as we saw
in chapter one, Kerala already has a well developed network of
such services dispersed through out its rural and urban areas so
that additional development costs are considerably reduced.
Moreover, potable water, even if not piped, is abundant--a large
proportion of urban and rural houses use hand-pumps, standpipes
or private wells for water supply, and leach-pit or soak-pit
latrines for waste disposal. These latter, furthermore, are the
responsibility of a different agency, the Kerala Water Authority,
with its own separate budget.
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uncompromising over regional modifications2 3 . Kerala was the
first state to implement the "spirit" of the land distribution
programme under the MNP, therefore its experience would set the
"precedent" for other states. This was one reason that made it
easier for the minister to bargain with the central government
for changes. At the same time, a central government will also not
want to set a precedent of being too easily manipulated by giving
in too much. In this regard the leverage of the Congress partner
of the coalition, also in power at the center, worked to the
state-government's advantage. Not only did this intra-party
influence add to the Housing Minister's bargaining power, but
enabled the center to be prevailed upon to bear not half but the
full cost--an estimated 8 crores--of providing land to a hundred
thousand landless laborers. Not a mean achievement given India's
federal political structure where center-state relations have
traditionally been strained due to the tight financial control
the center has over the state-governments.
Linking up with a programme whose implementation was
important to the central government, as well as using the
23 The Prime Minister had herself expressed concern to the
chief ministers on several occasions about the growing discontent
among the rural poor, and the threat it posed not only to
progress in agricultural production, but also to the existing
political power-structure. As an incentive to get the states to
take this problem seriously, a Central Land Reforms Committee was
formed in 1970, to "look into the problems relating to the
financing of land reform measures" and the "distribution of land
to the landless" ("Chief Ministers' 'No' to Land Reform", in
Economic and Political Weekly, October 3, 1970). The programme
under the MNP that the Kerala government used was one outcome of
the Committee's recommendations.
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presence of the congress in the coalition--the very party that
was accused of "diluting the CPI's radical agenda", to "secure
more from Delhi", enabled the state government to surmount the
traditional rivalry between the Center and the states,
especially, opposition-led ones, over questions of finance. This
tactical move by the coalition government that worked well for
the OLHS, stemmed from the power that a state-governments
possesses by virtue of its strategic location in the political
and administrative hierarchy of a federal system. Such power also
results from the attitudes that political parties have towards
each other at the national level, and the way they influence
political alliances at the state level.2 4 .
It is noteworthy that such power, of linking up with the
Center directly, or manipulating national and local political
relationships to bargain for concessions, is not typically
available to the same extent to individual, semi-autonomous
public sector agencies, such as the KSHB. It is even less
commonly available to agencies operating in the non-governmental
sector who are usually small, have local or regional
constituencies and often appear to be, or claim to be, working
against the government. The NGO's also often seek to portray the
24 Indeed, the Prime Minister had gone on record saying that
some aspects of the Kerala pattern of the CPI-Congress alliance
might be repeated at the national scale in the 1972 general
elections (Karunakaran, "Kerala's New Coalition", in Economic and
Political Weekly, October 24, 1970. pp. 1775). Therefore, it
would be in its interest to nurture the alliance by being
responsive to local political conditions faced by the center-left
coalition, rather than drive a wedge between them by being rigid
about the OLHS.
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image of being "objective and non-partisan" by attempting to
remain "outside the political game". As a consequence their locus
of power often remains limited, unless of course, they have
connections with the government, direct access to external
(foreign, donor) financing for which the governments also
compete; or work in a "politicized" sector or activity, closely
with constituencies that are politically important to state,
local, even national governments. For example, church
missionaries (in Kerala) working with the poorest classes who
form the mass-base of the non-communist parties such as the
congress, and even some of the communist parties. Nevertheless it
is noteworthy that a large programme, whose successful
implementation depends upon bargaining and negotiations with the
center, might be more effectively implemented directly through
state level ministers and their departments, rather than by
quasi-government or non-government organizations.
3.2 Implementation, public housing and popular support.
In essence, the OLHS, as it was formulated, introduced the
notion of direct public sector intervention in the provision of
fully constructed units for the poor, through deep subsidy,25
into the structure of the state's redistributive policies for the
first time. Each of these attributes of the OLHS--direct
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25 The subsidy came from the programme being designed as a
welfare measure with the government bearing over 56% of the
construction costs.
intervention by the government, provision of fully constructed
units, and a heavy government subsidy--are just the
characteristics that housing experts, through long and thorough
analysis of public housing projects, have advocated viable
shelter programmes for the poor should avoid. What then, was it
about the OLHS, that converted these characteristics that have
been the bane of public housing into benefits?
The more usual public housing projects are typically
urban2". They involve the production of rental units--tenements
or walk-ups--that the government constructs en-masse and
subsequently manages. These projects are undertaken routinely as
just another aspect of urban management. When constructed they
become that many numbers by which the low-income housing stock is
augmented in official records. When occupied they exist silently
as segregated urban anomalies to which the rest of the population
learns to be indifferent. If they are poorly maintained or crime-
ridden, they are seen to be the concern of the low-income
residents and the particular public agency charged with managing
them. The rest of the government bureaucracy, and the rest of the
better-off population cares little about what goes on within
these "dismal" settlements, unless the tenants themselves
organize and find the initiative to demand, and in some instances
26 The housing problem is seen to be far less severe in
rural areas and "experts" argue that government projects in rural
areas do not work very well because the poor do not really want
them. See Indira Hirway, "Housing for the Rural Poor" in Economic
and Political Weekly, August 22, 1987.
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receive, control over at least the management of their tenements.
Then we say, successful co-ops have formed or we eulogize the
notion of tenant control. But for the most part, they exist at
the fringe of our consciousness, except if we happen to be
"tenant action groups" or "enlightened, socially conscious
outsiders"--academics, researchers or so forth. On the other
hand, we might take notice of public housing when their problems
worsen to such an extent that their destruction captures public
attention--Pruit Igo, is one instance, there might be many more
local ones. Then we call it the demise of another misguided
attempt by the government at doing what it does poorly. Another
failure gets added to the growing list of the public sector.
Public housing as we commonly know it, therefore, rarely impacts
the day-to-day thinking of those who have no stake in it.
The OLHS, by contrast, was different from other public
hoising programmes in two central ways:
(1) It did not begin and end quietly as just another low-income
public housing project. Instead, it was made a high profile,
prestigious public event from the very start. It captured the
attention of the people throughout the state. Ironically, better-
off non-beneficiaries participated much more actively in the
programme than the actual client group. (2) Instead of the more
usual rental housing, the OLHS provided ownership. Not merely of
the units, but most importantly, of land.
Both these differences, whose origins can be traced back
to the reasons that brought the OLHS on to the government agenda,
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are central to the good performance of the OLHS and to its image
of being a "success". I take up the first mentioned point, next,
and will return to the second one in a separate section later.
3.2.1 Publicity, participation, "movements" and "spreading of
responsibility".
There is ample evidence that focusing public attention on
government programmes is not unusual. Eckstein for example tells
a vivid story about the influence public attention had in
compelling a vacillating government to provide housing to
earthquake victims in an urban colony in Mexico. But most such
examples are cases where attempts at obtaining publicity usually
come from the would-be beneficiaries, demand-making social groups
or, non-governmental institutions that organize them. These
attempts then, are a means of pressuring a relatively less
responsive regime to provide a service or access to a service
that the demand-making groups perceive is denied to them by the
status quo. By contrast, in the case of the OLHS, it was the
government itself that sought to focus public attention on the
programme rather than the opposite. Why?
We have already identified two reasons why the coalition
government wanted to publicize the OLHS from the very outset.
First, because in doing so, the government was focussing
attention on a progressive programme that would provide evidence
of its institutional capacity and commitment to the poor. In a
social setting where the majority of the population will rarely
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object to programmes aimed at benefitting underprivileged
classes, the government could obtain widespread public support
for the OLHS by publicizing the intent of a programme targeted so
directly to the poor. This support would not only divert some
attention from sectors where the government was lagging in
performance (such as the land reforms), but would also provide an
image of stability, and in the process, fetch political rewards.
Second, once substantial public support for the programme could
be mobilized, it would be difficult for the government's
opponents to be publicly antagonistic to the programme. In
addition, there was also the tradition established by past
communist governments of actively mobilizing popular support and
participation "to keep a check on the administration and..help in
the implementation of policy" (Lieten, 1979: 31). Although
administrative structures have not been made a "mass issue" and
in practice bureaucracies remain entrenched, efforts by left
governments to "take the people into confidence" have been
sustained. They have even come to be expected by the
electorate.2 7 The CPI member of the coalition was no exception,
27 As B. Kuriakose mentioned, inefficiencies, corruption and
nepotism from non-communist governments is tolerated to a greater
degree by the people, than from the Left Front. Past precedent
has led to the view that "..the other parties are inherently
power mongers and elitist. Why should they be expected to
suddenly change? ..but E.M.S. [Namboodripad] and the communist
parties have shown their commitment to the people and the
"masses". They have generally been honest and principled..at
least the older leaders and the intellectuals in the Party have
taken this ideology to the people. So all others are judged by
their standards. But the marginal difference may be that some
ministers..the new ones may want to share from the spoils of
office; others may have greater courage to oversee justly and to
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it was also expected to do so.
If then, the government realized that public involvement
was crucial for the programme, it did not leave mobilizing this
involvement to chance, but rather made it the central theme of
the OLHS. Once it was ensured that finances from the Center for
land acquisition would indeed be forthcoming, the programme was
widely publicized through advertisements in the media under the
slogan "housing is a right--shelter for the landless our social
responsibility". Pamphlets and posters distributed through
village and block-level offices focussed on the scale and intent
of the programme. If the scale of the OLHS captured public
attention, the slogan under which it was politicized (with its
emphasis on "our social responsibility") sought to evoke
enthusiasm not only among the prospective beneficiaries, but
among people throughout the state. That every panchayat in the
state was to participate in the programme, helped carry this
message beyond single localized constituencies, reinforcing the
projected image that the entire state was being mobilized. As one
informant noted, "when the people are taken into confidence by
the government, events become politicized here. Once they are
politicized, and public involvement is sustained for long enough,
they become virtual 'movements'."2 The government sought to do
precisely this--convert what would normally have been a mere
also ensure that officials under them, as well, do not take
cuts..corruption [and ostentation] among left ministers is not
expected. It will rarely be tolerated.."
28 Discussion with B. Kuriakose.
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distributional effort, another public housing programme, into a
"movement".
In addition to widespread, and early publicity, it
deliberately designed public participation into the
implementation process in such a way that the burden of the
"success" or good performance of the OLHS was made not only the
government's own responsibility, but was in part transferred to
the people themselves. This spreading of responsibility to the
people is most explicitly evidenced in the arrangements made for
financing the construction component of the OLHS. The means used
to spread this responsibility to the people was centered around
the notion of "participation".
3.2.2 Finance, welfare and "public participation".
So far we have seen that the attempts of the government to
publicize the OLHS had a broad coverage--indeed, a state-wide
focus, aimed at the people. If one objective of this publicity
was mobilization of "public participation", then who were the
"people" whose participation the government sought? In what form
was this "participation" expected?
The total cost of the OLHS was estimated at a little over
125 million (in 1971 rupees). Over one half of this cost was to
be borne by the state government2 9 . The rest was to be financed
29 This included the provision of Rs 700 worth of building
materials (56% of construction cost per unit)--cement and tiles--
free to every panchayat, timber from state forests at nominal
rates, a grant component of Rs. 75 per dwelling, and the initial
provision of the loan component of Rs 110 per unit to be
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through voluntary donations of cash, services and unskilled labor
from the public.
The "participation" that the government wanted was,
therefore, more than symbolic support. The participation it
wanted involved contributions of cash, kind, and labor time. The
"people" whose participation the government wanted, included most
centrally, the better-off non-beneficiaries who had the capacity
to provide the cash and "kind"--hardware, sundry materials,
transport. It involved socially oriented groups, (also non-
beneficiaries,) who could provide voluntary services, and part of
the unskilled labor. Finally, it included the prospective
beneficiaries, and other non-beneficiary laborers, who would
provide most of the unskilled labor. These people to whom the
call for involvement was addressed, then, were, the wealthy
elites, businesses with interests in the construction and
transportation industries (apart from others), non-governmental
voluntary organizations, religious and philanthropic
institutions--organizations in the business of social service,
college student associations, communal organizations (Nair
Service Society, the Ezhava Association, and so forth),
agricultural and non-farm laborers, perhaps unemployed labor, and
finally, the prospective beneficiaries--landless agricultural
laborers--themselves.
It is clear, then, that the actual beneficiaries, who, the
recovered from the beneficiaries later.
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literature on low-income housing says should be the center-piece
in project "participation", were only one small segment of those
whose involvement the government required for the OLHS to work.
Indeed they were not even selected until after construction had
commenced (with some exceptions, where they were selected soon
after land was acquired). This is because the programme was
designed that way--it depended on the voluntary participation of
non-beneficiaries for its good performance. Thus, if the OLHS was
a "welfare measure" it was not designed as one where the
government came in with a massive subsidy, and unobtrusively
carried out construction, with or without user-input. Rather,
part of the cost of this "welfare measure" was to be shared by
the upper and lower class non-beneficiaries through donations of
cash and labor. Consequently, part of the responsibility for the
"success" of the OLHS was spread on to the people themselves. As
an informant noted, with such a large component of public
involvement, in a state where most people are usually not
indifferent to government programmes or to the poor, if the
programme did not perform well, despite government effort, it
could easily mean that the "people did not care enough for the
poor..". But how was the government to ensure that this
participation would be forthcoming? Was it actually obtained?
3.2.3 "Voluntarism", patronage, public pressure and the media.
Therefore, the resources required for the execution of the
OLHS--a public-sector distributional programme with divisible
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(private good as opposed to public good) benefits targeted
narrowly towards a single, low-status client group--were in part
tied to the active "participation" of just the opposite social
group--wealthier non-beneficiary elite. This is in striking
contrast with what we commonly understand about elite vs low-
income behavior, especially in the context of large
distributional government programmes. That the government relied
on "voluntary" donations to obtain this participation (on which
the feasibility of the programme depended), is even more
striking. Before proceeding with the question of how the
government ensured participation from non-beneficiaries it is
important to understand why it chose to rely on voluntary
donations.
"Voluntary" action--which leaves the option of acting or
not acting upto the individual--inherently introduces an element
of uncertainty. Should the wealthier elite decide not to
respond, or participate, such a strategy could cripple the
programme. Why then, did the government deliberately build in
this uncertainty into the design of a programme whose "success"
was politically important to it?
This is where three aspects of Keralan society are worth
stressing:3  (1) the notion of patronage, (2) the other to the
power of public pressure, (3) the role of the media.
30 Interviews with Thomas Poulose, ex-housing secretary to
the Kerala state government and ex-officio Secretary of the KHSB,
who subsequently evaluated the OLHS, and is currently the
Director of the Trivandrum Development Authority; M.S. Matthews,
Deputy Director of the Loans Department, KHSB.
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Poulose notes that egalitarianism and philanthropy have
played a central role in the rise of voluntary services in Kerala
(as is the case in most other parts of the country). In fact, the
Act under which voluntary organizations are registered, is called
the "..Charitable Societies Act" along the lines of welfare, and
financial assistance traditionally rendered by prosperous
families to lower classes within the locus of their religion-
bound communities. Such philanthropic service is, indeed,
tantamount to status in the social hierarchy, evoking notions of
patronage and, hence, social power. This trend continues even
today, though in a more diffuse and secular form (despite the
"class-consciousness" that has radicalized sections of Keralan
society). For example, apart from the landed and erstwhile
aristocratic families, even poorer families who have acquired
wealth through remittances from out-migrant kin in the Middle-
East, "have tried to help friends and acquaintances who cut
across caste lines. They have become almost philanthropic, and
are looked up to by others for occasional assistance and monetary
help"3". However, the political aspirations of upper class
leaders of communal Societies have led them to expand the reach
of their social services in search of a larger mass-base, for
example, the Thangals--muslim religious leaders, Syrian Christian
leaders of the Kerala Congress (who are also the industrial and
business elite in the state), powerful Nair families of the Nair
31 Interview with M.S. Matthews.
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Service Societies, and so forth3 2 . The Coalition government,
whose members were also drawn from the same social setting, and
some even had links with the groups mentioned above, relied on
the traditional ideas of patronage and philanthropy that the
"voluntary" contribution component of the OLHS invoked.
Therefore, the government did not act in abstraction, but rather
with a recognition of the features of the social structure within
which it operated.
If recognition of the social and cultural features of the
society led the government to introduce voluntarism into the
structure of the OLHS, the government also realized that the
"voluntary" donations were required early, if the programme was
to proceed with the speed that it sought. And, the
contributions, in terms of the amount expected, would not
necessarily be forthcoming on their own. As Matthews noted "there
has to be enough of a cause, and prestige in the cause, for
people to come out and make donations of the magnitude the UDF
[the coalition government] was expecting." Mere publicity was,
therefore, not enough--we are used to worrying about active
opposition from non-beneficiary groups, especially the "elite",
that might undermine the performance of a programme targeted
towards the poor. But in a case such as this, where the success
32 The prominent examples are: the Nair Service Societies,
Church-based Syrian Christian organizations, Muslim associations
headed by the Thangals (religious priests), the SNDP--an
organization started in 1903 for the social and spiritual
advancement of the backward Ezhava community and the Yogakshema
Sabha of the Namboodri Brahmins.
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of the OLHS depended on the participation of non-beneficiaries as
potential donors, even their indifference would be sufficient to
disable programme implementation. The programme, had to be made a
"public issue"; and enough political weight accorded to it if the
egalitarianism and notions of patronage mentioned above were to
be evoked. It was therefore necessary for the government to
actively mobilize support and participation from the potential
non-beneficiary donors. Broad based publicity aimed at evoking
the interest of the entire state--rather than merely the
immediate recipients, politicization of the programme, and
attempts by the government to project it as a "movement" were
means that the government used to make the programme a "public
issue". A visible programme, in which people were taking active
interest, would attract donors: in making their "voluntary"
contributions visible, it could carry rewards of "status" for
them. Therefore, indirectly, without coercion or compulsion from
the government, "public pressure" and potential status could
provide the incentive for the better-off non-beneficiaries to
contribute, early. Awareness of the potentials inherent in given
political conditions, understanding of the features of the
particular social environment, along with conscious efforts by a
government, if coordinated, can perhaps achieve what an
authoritarian "directive" may well not.
The media (especially that over which members of the
coalition had influence), in addition, reinforced this notion of
"public pressure". By publishing constant updates on programme
84
performance, tracing the geographic distribution of its progress
and carrying statements/messages from the ministers involved, the
media created "a sense of competition" between the various
districts. Tardy performance was linked to a lack of concern by
the people for the poor, and elitism. The media also published
criticisms of the programme, which served to heighten the debate
over the programme, thus further adding to the attention it
received. It is little wonder then that the programme is commonly
remembered today as the "much-publicized, much-criticized",
though "most popular" programme of the state. Thus, even if
compulsion was precluded, the media played an important role in
keeping up the pressure on the people to contribute and
participate.
The government also acted to underscore the official
priority assigned to the OLHS. Appeals for public involvement
came from the highest elected officials--the Chief Minister and
the Housing Minister, adding political weight to the programme
that was already advertised as a prestigious event. Arrangements
were made at all levels of government--state, district and local,
to raise funds and solicit donations. A Chief Minister's housing
fund was created for collecting money to purchase building
materials, and fixtures such as doors and windows. Government
employees contributed one day's salary to the Chief Minister's
fund (although this can hardly be called "voluntary", as
circulars were passed to the employees by their department heads
to authorize the government to deduct a day's salary. Peer
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pressure, and appeals from senior officers caused most employees
to authorize the transfer); every schoolchild donated one rupee
to it. Appeals were also made to philanthropic organizations,
schools, colleges, religious institutions, ethnic organizations
and to those private individuals who could afford it, to make
voluntary contributions of upto the cost of one house (Rs.1250 in
1971 prices). The ex-maharajah of Travancore donated Rs.3 Lakhs
(US$ 30,000 in 1972 currencies). As an incentive some of the OLHS
segments were named after those who donated more than Rs. 10-
20,000. Besides the Chief Minister's housing fund, district
collectors, incharge of implementation at the local level, were
authorized to receive contributions to meet transport costs and
to assist the financially weak panchayats with cash. In addition,
panchayat presidents themselves, who are elected officials, were
expected to urge their constituencies to contribute. Voluntary
student and youth organizations organized themselves to assist in
the fund-raising process (EPW, 1972: 2268).
During the course of implementation over Rs. 20 million
(roughly 16-18% of the construction costs) was collected through
this process, in addition to voluntary transport facilities in
several districts, some materials and services (a total of 6% of
construction costs). The unskilled voluntary labor that the
programme managed to receive was however less than 20% of the
total amount expected (15-16% of the construction costs were to
be met through free unskilled labor. Only 3% of construction
costs was finally met through this method). (We will see why, in
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a subsequent section below.)
That without coercion, regulation, or compulsion, the
government succeeded in collecting over Rs 20 million, through
"voluntary public donations" and "participation", in a programme
targeted towards a single client group, is remarkable, even if it
was about half of what the government had originally expected.
We have seen that the "participation" was not arbitrary,
but, carefully planned by the government on the basis of an
understanding of what it could do, and what public support could
or could not do in the particular social and political context of
the state. Moreover, eliciting the kind of participation it
wanted, was not left to chance, instead it was structured into
the design of the programme. In ensuring that this participation
would indeed be obtained, at least in part, the government relied
upon its knowledge of the social and cultural characteristics of
the electorate, an astute understanding of the political
conditions, the media, and energetic recruitment efforts of its
own. Finally, the government was selective about the groups
towards whom it targeted its appeals for participation. Clearly,
the wealthier non-recipients of the programme were of prime
importance because of the capital they would provide. The actual
beneficiaries of the programme were on the periphery of the
government's recruitment efforts--they were not even selected in
advance. The outcome, is reflective of this prioritization by the
government, signifying that participation is not necessarily
forthcoming on its own. It need not, in fact, involve the
87
participation of the targeted beneficiaries, nor will it be
forthcoming from them on its own. Yet we have also seen that the
government alone could not have forced the involvement of those
groups whose participation it did require--wealthier elite and
other non-beneficiaries. It could create the conditions to which
the latter could potentially respond; but the response had to
finally come from them out of choice, not compulsion--even in a
"top-down" programme.
3.3.3 Participation: when elite interests coincide with
programme interests, and when they do not.
There is another dimension that will make non-recipient
"elites" contribute to a programme in which only a section of the
poor will benefit. This is likely when the elites may themselves
indirectly benefit from the gains accruing to the poor through
the programme. It will be in their interest, then, to ensure that
the programme performs well. In the OLHS case there are three
distinct examples of the relationship between interested donors
and good programme performance. The donors involved were
plantation owners, some large landowners in areas where the
communist party had a stronghold, and some relatively new
contractors, who were just getting into the business of
government contracts. In each case good programme outcome was
consistent with their interests.
In the factory-like, capitalist conditions of plantation
operation, Zagoria has noted, the availability of communications
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and organization have facilitated an early and strong tradition
of communist mobilization plantation workers(cf. Hardgrave, 1973:
141). This background of (primarily) labor union organization has
provided plantation workers with a strong voice.
These workers have traditionally lived in tenements
provided by the Public Works Department (PWD), or by the
plantation owners on plantation land itself. This precludes the
ownership of this property by the workers. The land reform Act,
in the form in which it was implemented, excluded all plantations
from its purview. Plantation laborers therefore were also
excluded from the gains of the land reform, just as the other
landless agricultural laborers were. However, given the
plantation workers' location specific organizations and strong
links with communist labor unions, their demand for land
ownership from plantation owners (for whom they worked), carried
with it threats of militancy. Militancy on plantations has
normally taken the form of strikes, destruction of the crop, or
disruption of work.
This fear of militancy and the potential loss of revenue
through work disruption would not at all be what the owners as
businessmen would want to perpetuate. The OLHS provided them with
a perfect opportunity to mitigate the agitation of their
labourforce, without having to bear too much of the burden
themselves. They could let the government come in with the lion's
share of finances, effort, and land, to provide the laborers with
what the latter demanded from the them--the owners. The voluntary
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donations of cash that the programme required were a small price
to pay for the peace with labor it might bring. It is striking
that Idukki, where plantations are most concentrated, was the
only district that not only met its full target under the OLHS,
but indeed exceeded it by 13.3%."* It was also one of the
districts where cash contributions, mainly from the plantation
owners, were substantial; and unskilled labor input from
prospective beneficiaries--plantation workers--was above the
state average.*
At the same time, the district is really an outlier--it
has the lowest population in the state, but the second largest
area (after Canannore), and hence the lowest density (in 1971,
when the OLHS was conceived, it had 150 persons/sq.km, compared
to the state average of 549/sq.km). It also has fewer, panchayats
and villages, though with a larger administrative jurisdiction
(whose structure is spatially dictated by the large plantations,
unlike the proliferation of small holdings in other areas).
Consequently its physical target under the OLHS was the smallest-
-1,500 units and sites, compared to the largest target of 12,200
units in Cannanore3 5 . The small target, therefore, might have
further facilitated the "benevolence" of the plantation owners,
*3 Source: Results of an official survey carried out in
March 1976 to assess the status of the OLHS. Reported in Nalapat
M.D,, op. cit.
3* Interview with M.S. Matthews.
3 Nalapat M.D., op. cit.; and Statistics For Planning 1983,
Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Kerala.
Table 1.9, pp. 6.
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accounting for excess-of-target performance of the programme. The
greater gains to the landless workers that this implies were, in
sum, certainly not in conflict with the interest of the
plantation-owner elite, who sought to use the OLHS as an
opportunity to diffuse the unrest among their own workforce.
Their "participation" through voluntary donations of cash that
the government wanted, was therefore, forthcoming.
Similarly, some of the landowners in Palghat also had
interests that made them act in ways that improved the
performance of the OLHS in that district. Upto the end of 1974,
the performance of the OLHS in this district was poor. It had
achieved only 12.3% of the physical target set for it (1,120
units out of the expected total of 9,100). But by the time the
programme was officially declared closed in March 1976, its
performance ranked third after Idukki and Trivandrum, and 61.8%
of the target had been achieved3 6 . What accounted for this
impressive improvement in a little over a year?
Palghat district, formerly part of the Malabar area, is
one of the main rice regions of the state. It has the highest
percentage of agricultural workers to total workers (48.42% in
1971, compared to the state average of 30.69%), has a large
proportion of scheduled castes in the population, and until the
landreforms in the early 1970s had the largest proportion of
tenants among cultivators. Traditionally, there has existed a
36 Nalapat M.D. op. cit.
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"cordial", though exploitative relationship between land-owners
and agricultural laborers--cultivation has been carried out by
"permanent laborers" who see themselves as informally attached to
certain landowners and landholdings. Despite some labor-union
activity by the communists (CPM), unions became a force in the
district only in the mid-1970s.3 7 Primarily this was an outcome
of the interests focussed on organizing labor by other parties
such as the Congress, CPI, and smaller socialist parties, after
alliances within the ruling coalition began to shift in the
early-mid-1970s. As in other parts of the state, there was
resentment among landless laborers against the "new tenants",
(many of whom were marxist workers) after the land-reform was
introduced in 1970. This resentment, that had thus far been
mitigated by the "security of patron-client relations", was
exploited by the new union organizers. The introduction of a new
Act in 1975 for registering permanent workers at the panchayat,
against higher minimum wages, became a tool that the new labor
unions used to mobilize the laborers, especially the landless
casual workers. Work stoppages, demand for higher wages, and
longer hours were rampant in this period, fuelled by the
"competition among each political party" to recruit union
membership. However, farmer and landowner associations, which
have been dominant in this district, did manage to get the
37 For example the daily wage of a field laborer in 1970-
1971, was the lowest in the state (Rs. 4.05, compared to the
state average of Rs.5.09), despite Palghat being a CPM "strong-
hold". Figures from Statistics for Planning 1983 op. cit.
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panchayats to "go slow on the Act". But, indirectly, this focused
union attention on the tardy performance of the OLHS. Increased
contributions to improve its implementation became a "concession
won by the unions to not look so bad", especially in those
pockets where marxist landowners dominated."8 For the land owners
this would have been a worthwhile price for an end to union-led
work stoppages.
Although this account seems to illustrate how little the
"participation" of the landed elite was indeed "voluntary", it
does show that extra-governmental pressure, in this particular
case had a greater potential for eliciting participation by
elites in a programme whose benefits they would not share. In
other words, regulatory compulsion by the government may not
always achieve, what pressure from other political actors, such
as the unions in this case, could. But finally, "concessions"
were obtained because the landed elite saw in it a compromise to
end work stoppages while pacifying the labor and unions."9 Good
outcome in a "top-down" approach, therefore, need not be without
elements of "bottom-up" processes. In fact, "bottom-up" processes
can be built into a "top-down" approach.
38 Based on account by M.R. Nair; talks with B.Kuriakose.
Also see Alexander, K.C. "Emergence of Peasant Organization in
South India", in Economic and Political Weekly, June 1980.
39 Certainly, there might be other reasons for the
improvement of programme performance which should be
investigated: Were there administrative changes at the panchayat,
village or district level? and so forth.
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The third example concerns some construction firms who
were in early stages of business and had an eye on lucrative
government contracts. Construction firms in Kerala, as in most
other parts of the country, find state government contracts
attractive.
First, the government tends to rely on contractors with
whom it has built a good working relationship. Once contractors
develop contacts within the bureaucracy on the basis of
consistent early performance, they are usually favored when
contract bids are floated* . This means that there is some degree
of continuity and stability in working with the government.
Second, government contracts are usually large, which means that
the returns to the contractors per project, are also substantial.
Third, there is "security" in working with the public-sector--the
government will rarely renege on payments. Moreover, payments
will normally come on time. Finally, there is also much to be
made by the contractors from arbitrations and "other leakages"--
bribes, and so forth*". Therefore, contractors usually vie for
government contracts.
40 M.S. Matthews, Kerala State Housing Board.
41 It is surprising that almost all informants who discussed
contractors complained about the "arbitration problem"ie,
contractors "do work worth one lakh, and over some reason which
is usually petty, go in for arbitration for say, 6 lakhs. And
they manage to win it" (Babu Jacob). Yet none of the officials
reported that this has made the government discard such
contractors or prefer smaller ones. They explain by saying that
there are few contractors in the state who are large enough or
experienced enough to undertake government contracts "on a
regular basis". Therefore the government is forced to put up with
those that they have, or can find. Arbitrations notwithstanding.
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Those contractors who vied for government contracts saw in
the OLHS an opportunity for establishing a good track record and
demonstrating their capacity to complete projects on time. For
the government, as well, the programme, with its disaggregated
components, objectives of speed, and good performance, became the
testing ground for new construction firms. Thus it would be in
the interest of the contractors seeking to impress the
government, to ensure successful and timely implementation of
portions of the OLHS entrusted to them. Poulose and Matthews
point out several such cases in various districts where
interested contractors helped out with cash, or at least with
labor and services.
But there was more than simply the interest of contractors
themselves, that played a role in this good performance. Local
language dailies carried articles that urged contractors to
contribute liberally (Matrabhoomi, a leftist daily; Malayala
Manorama, a Kerala Congress controlled daily). Reports of this
nature from supporters of the programme also appeared in
newspapers and journals over which the government had no
influence. (These reports were also targeted to a different class
of people--middle and upper income groups). Two examples of such
newspapers and journals are, The Hindu (a popular english daily),
and the Economic and Political Weekly, as is evidenced by an
article on the OLHS in the latter: "..here is an opportunity for
the private contractors who have grown fat on government contract
work to help a good cause...they can help to strengthen the
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'voluntary' services for construction work at the panchayat level
with their resources of men and materials. Who knows that some
such expectation is not behind the robust optimism of the Housing
Minister.." (EPW, "A Good Cause for Contractors", 1972: 2269).
Once again we note that the media played a significant role in
getting the "elite" or the well-off to contribute.
The programme segments in Trivandrum and Ernakulam stand
out as two prominent examples of these cases. Trivandrum, after
Idukki had the highest number of completions under the OLHS--
79.7% of the target, while Ernakulam was fourth after Palghat,
with 61.6% of its original target met4 2
The good performance of the OLHS in Trivandrum and
Ernakulam can however, also be assigned to other reasons; reasons
that have to do with the importance of these two districts.
Trivandrum is the administrative capital of the state, and hence
the seat of the state government. Powerful bureaucrats are based
here. Political elite from the more important political parties
have their headquarters here. Most significantly, the government
officials and ministers, many of them deeply involved in the
OLHS, were located here. The physical presence of such
bureaucrats, politicians, and ministers who wanted the programme
to succeed, would certainly help ensure its good performance.
Being the state capital, Trivandrum also has a large number of
other private and public offices/institutions that often require
construction services. Private contractors working on the OLHS in
42 Source Nalapat M.D. op.cit.
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this district, therefore, would be particularly interested to
perform well.
Ernakulam is the commercial capital of the state, where
most businesses are located. As in Trivandrum, but for different
reasons, public and private sector construction projects are
concentrated here; a fact that would provide the contractors of
the OLHS with an incentive to show good results. In addition,
important businessmen are located here. Businessmen who need to
deal with the government (regarding permits, licenses etc.) often
maintain formal and informal contact with key officials,
bureaucrats and politicians to bypass bureaucratic red-tapism.
They will rarely alienate important government officials with
whom they maintain such contacts by appearing to oppose a high
priority, prestigious, and much publicized government programme.
Instead it is likely that they will regard such a programme as an
opportunity to reinforce their ties to the government. By the
same reasoning it would be in the interest of prominent
businessmen in Ernakulam to contribute to the success of the
OLHS.
Non-beneficiary elite, then, participate in programmes
from which they do not benefit directly, particularly, if it
serves their own interest in some way. Powerful exogenous
factors, such as the media in this case, pressurize the elite by
creating expectations among the people about the contribution of
the better-off--expectations that are often tantamount to
imposing pressure. The good performance of the OLHS in the
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districts discussed above illustrates the point that even in a
"top-down" approach, the government need not turn repressive, or
appear to be "imposing". Public pressure does this for them. do
this for them.
Having seen the "potential" of such participation we now
examine its limits. The government, we noted, received nearly
half of the voluntary cash contributions it had expected. In
contrast to this participation by wealthier elite, the government
received less than 20% of the expected unskilled labor
"voluntarily". Why?
3.3.4. The Myth of Voluntary Labor
The literature on low-income public housing is replete
with case studies of projects that failed because they lacked
beneficiary participation. Participation of the poor that has
come to be advocated as desirable by several evaluators based on
the critique of such "failures", includes participatory decision-
making, and beneficiary involvement in project implementation4 3 .
In projects for the poor that involve construction, participation
of low-income beneficiaries typically takes the form of voluntary
labor--the poor can give little else in terms of cash or
4 At the same time there is a growing body of literature by
researchers who have looked at the notion of "participation" far
more critically. Going beyond normative wisdom which says that
participation is always "good", they have discussed several cases
where participation has worked less well or regressively, even in
"successful", participatory projects. See Tendler, J. Turning
Private Voluntary Organizations into Development Agencies:
Questions for Evaluation, A.I.D. Program Evaluation Discussion
Paper No. 12, U.S.A.I.D., 1982.
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materials. The underlying assumption in such cases usually is
that voluntary labor is participatory, it is desirable because
beneficiary involvement helps reach benefits to the target group,
and that the beneficiaries want such participation.**
The OLHS, by contrast illustrates that voluntary labor
from the poor is not necessarily participatory, especially when
it is expected free; that beneficiaries are not necessarily
interested in such "participation"--beneficiary labor may not
always be forthcoming on its own; and that even without
beneficiary participation, it is possible for benefits to reach
the intended target group.
Just as the government had expected to meet 36% of the
construction costs of the OLHS through voluntary donations of
cash and services, it expected the entire unskilled labor
requirement (12-15% of total construction costs) of the OLHS to
be financed through free and voluntary contributions of labor,
presumably from the potential beneficiaries, and other
"volunteers" at the village level. The primary, stated objective
underlying this expectation was to lower unit costs.
In its budgetary estimates for the OLHS, therefore, the
government made no provisions to pay unskilled labor. The
assumption that voluntary unskilled labor would be forthcoming,
however, proved unrealistic. According to a post-OLHS survey
** See Tendler J., (ibid.) for a discussion on how little
voluntary labor from the poor may be participatory in practice.
Indeed, often it may be regressive, if in addition to being
voluntary, it is expected to be free.
99
carried out for Trivandrum district only 18%--(about 3% of
construction costs)--of unskilled labor was procured free and
"voluntarily"*". If we assume this proportion is representative
of other districts in the state, then contrary to its original
assumptions, the government finally bore 80% of the unskilled
labor costs. The resultant cost squeeze was one reason why only
44,000 houses were completed when the programme closed in 1976,
even though land was distributed to all the targeted one lakh
landless laborer households.4 * In the process, however, an
additional 1.6 million man-days of unskilled employment were
generated, costing the government 9% of total construction costs.
Therefore we note that even though participatory procedures in
the form of voluntary labor were built into the programme, it was
not forthcoming voluntarily.
More significantly, there appear to be several
contradictions in the way participatory procedures related to
labor were designed into the programme by the government.
First, as we have seen in the example above, if one of the
official goals of the OLHS was to generate temporary employment
among the poor during construction, why did the government expect
free unskilled labor from them? Moreover, is the expectation of
5 See Nalapat, M.D. op.cit.
46 Although this figure, of 44,000 units, is reported in an
official survey carried out by the state government in 1976,
most, in fact all officials I met, said "about 60,000" units were
finally completed under the OLHS. They explain the increase as
those units that were "under construction when the OLHS was
frozen", and were completed later the same year.
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free labor from those at the bottom of the income distribution
not regressive and exploitative? In particular, why would a left
government want to impose hardship on the poor by choosing this
option? Second, if the government did want free unskilled labor,
beneficiary participation would seem the most logical, and the
least regressive. But it is clear that beneficiary participation
was not a major concern of the government. Beneficiaries were not
even selected in advance to allow this to happen.
Indeed, we find that given the weight that capital carried
in making the OLHS work, the government's eagerness to elicit
cash donations and support from the richer elite dictated the
design of its participatory procedures. The prestige, broad-based
publicity, and indirect pressure generated by the media, which
served to project the OLHS as a state-wide "public issue", gave
the elite "enough of a cause" to contribute to. But the
visibility and the status of this "publicity" did not provide the
poor with similar incentive to provide free labor. Why did the
poor not "participate"? How did the seeming contradictions noted
above actually turn out?
The issues embodied in these questions can be seen to have
worked in three ways. First, the obvious reason why the publicity
did not provide the poor with the same incentive to donate their
labor is an economic one. Given their poor economic condition,
working without wages serves as a hardship which poor households
will not take on voluntarily, as we will see below.
Second, it is noteworthy that in all the government's
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appeals to the "public" to donate cash, services and labor, the
beneficiaries were never singled out as an exclusive group from
whom contribution of free and voluntary labor was urged.
Despite the image of public participation, or in fact precisely
because of it, the government did not actively focus efforts to
identify or involve the prospective beneficiaries in the
production of their own units. If, then, the government expected
free unskilled labor it was not specifically from the
beneficiaries. To the extent that the prospective beneficiaries
were reasonable candidates for providing free labor, it was left
to them to volunteer. No coercion was used to obtain their
"participation"--for example programme benefits were not made
contingent to their contribution of labor. Therefore, despite the
seeming mismatch between the government's concern for the poor,
and its requirement of free labor from them, they were not forced
to volunteer without wages. Indeed, the government finally paid
for the unskilled labor as is evidenced by the extra cost burden,
we noted, it had to bear.
From another perspective, the mismatch mentioned above, in
fact did not exist to begin with. The implementation of the OLHS
coincided with the peak period of the migration of skilled
workers to the Middle-East. This left a virtual vacuum in sectors
such as construction. Although this opened up opportunities for
the less skilled and the unskilled to obtain skills, exploit the
market, and come into the field, training them was necessary.
Individual, exclusive training programmes are capital, time, and
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personnel intensive. The OLHS, therefore, provided an ideal
opportunity for the government to train large proportions of the
unskilled "on the job", with no additional public spending, even
while lowering unit costs for the OLHS. If the labor time
invested by voluntary unskilled laborers is seen as an investment
in developing skills that would allow a future transition from
being contingency or secondary labor into the mainstream, free
labor from them during the "training" is not as regressive as it
might appear. Indeed it would seem a clever strategy on the part
of the government. Not identifying the beneficiaries early, then,
would make perfect sense, as it would bring more laborers in,
allowing a larger proportion to be "trained". To the extent that
the government finally ended up paying for unskilled labor, the
"strategy" can be seen not to have worked as well as it could
have from the perspective of the government, but just the reverse
from the point of view of the "trainees".*
Third, the media played an inadvertent role in dissuading
voluntary beneficiary participation. We have noted that the
mechanism of "publicity", and the projection of the OLHS as a
"public effort" and "welfare measure" by the government through
the media, that was so vital in eliciting finance from the elite
worked contrary to the government's expectations in acquiring
" This reasoning is speculative in that none of my
informants explicitly stated the connections, although the flight
of skilled construction labor during the OLHS, its impact on the
local construction industry and the government's intention to
train the unskilled were mentioned by several of them.
Particularly M.S. Matthews.
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voluntary labor. The same media led the prospective beneficiaries
to believe that the entire state was being mobilized to
contribute to their cause. They knew they would benefit anyway,
and saw no need to contribute their labor free of cost. Further,
in the media tardy performance was linked with the people's "lack
of concern for the poor", "lack of involvement of the people",
and "elitism". But the potential beneficiaries, or the poor were
never singled out for their lack of participation.
Why then would the potential beneficiaries--landless
agricultural workers--who are among the poorest in the social
hierarchy, contribute their labor for free? As it is, their
economic hardship often compels them to engage in multiple short-
term jobs, placing a premium on their labor time. As one group of
OLHS beneficiaries in Trivandrum district acknowledged that they
did not care for "participation" that involved work without
wages. They had to worry about earning enough to last through the
week. They would rather allocate their time earning a livelihood,
seeking jobs that at least fetched the minimum daily wage, than
be in a position, of relative luxury, to "donate" their labor.
Furthermore, although the programme was in progress in
each district, and the local landless laborers in the selected
villages knew at least some of them would benefit, there was
ambiguity about which households would indeed be picked.
Moreover, the project locations were often distant, making it
unrealistic for laborers who were not even sure if they would
benefit, to travel to these sites to donate their labor.
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From the above discussion it is clear that, given the
choice, the prospective beneficiaries would not contribute their
labor free. Other poor non-beneficiaries e.g., the unemployed or
the underemployed laborers would have even less of an incentive
to work for free. As it turned out, those who did work for the
programme, were paid the minimum daily wage in most cases.
Therefore, the handling of unskilled labor by the government was
not as regressive or contradictory as the government's initial
intention might imply. Indeed, the distribution of the cost
burden, was far more progressive than is usual--in the end the
richer elite contributed more than the poor, to a programme where
the latter were the sole beneficiaries.
Finally, the government's focus on wide, public-based, as
opposed to, beneficiary-based participation, helped ensure that
programme benefits indeed reach the intended target group. In
addition to the fact that the target group was politically
important, and that the programme proponents within the
government were committed to reaching the benefits to the poor,
mobilizing public support from the start, and making public the
target group, helped keep a check on local discrepancies. Care
was taken to publicly display the names of all applicants (for
example at the panchayat office, village office and fair price
shops) to allow the people to eliminate cases that they felt were
ineligible. Despite the lack of beneficiary participation,
therefore, programme benefits were not coopted by the less poor,
as is often the case in projects such as sites and services, and
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others where elites play an active role.
Having seen that voluntary labor is not necessarily
participatory, nor will it always come from the beneficiaries,
and that lack of such involvement need not skew the benefits away
from the targeted group, we now examine more closely why
voluntary labor was not forthcoming in this particular case, and
under what conditions it may be received.
Just as the government relied on the longstanding
tradition of patronage to introduce voluntarism to procure cash
donations from the elite, it relied on the "enthusiasm of the
beneficiaries", the "ideal" of "community self-help" to obtain
unskilled labor.** However, this assumption of spontaneous
enthusiasm and "self-help" is not consistent with existing
trends. Despite Kerala's history of social movements and trends
of "collective action" that are evident when groups organize to
make political demands, cooperative efforts, even at the village
level have rarely been spontaneous.* Rather, they are usually
48 4 No other explicit reason was given by any of the
officials I spoke with for the government's reliance on voluntary
contributions of unskilled labor. Evidently it was taken for
granted that there would be "enthusiastic participation by the
prospective beneficiaries and others at the village level".
* According to professor K.K.Subramanium, even the social
movements are organized with political party support, but they
have been caste, religion and communal based, despite the
"secular intentions of those who organize them". .."between
loyalty to the community, in the communal and religious sense,
and loyalty to the political party, there is a strong
individualistic trait in the typical malayali.." " Cooperatives
in the sense of societies, for example building societies, are
such a major phenomenon is states like Gujarat--Ahmedabad for
example. In Kerala this aspect is almost entirely absent. Any
cooperative movement, in general, has not been very successful here."
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organized by "enlightened", upper class, "outsiders", such as
political activists or reformist organizations. In other words
there is little evidence of a tradition of "community self-help"
that would motivate the poor to donate labor voluntarily.
Community participation would not be forthcoming without active
organization and recruitment efforts by local implementors.
In the implementation of the OLHS, this did not happen for at
least two reasons.
First, the government's own objective of speed worked
against it. As one official pointed out, despite the portrayal of
the programme as a "public effort", execution and monitoring was
under tight control of district collectors. The District
Collectors had overall charge of implementation at the local
level and were directly answerable to the Housing Minister for
the progress of the OLHS. Conscious of pressure from the latter
to act with speed, very few district collectors or the special
"works" committees set up under them at the panchayat level,
spent time recruiting local voluntary labor. As it was, not many
"volunteers" could be found who were willing to work for free.
Therefore, if initial surveys by the works committee did not
reveal sufficient "voluntary" workers, district collectors often
authorized the committee to hire workers on minimum or negotiated
wages. This is one reason why the government ended up paying for
over 80% of the unskilled labor, bearing an unenvisaged 9% of
total construction costs, but at the same time creating 1.6
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million additional man-days of labor".
Furthermore, the works committee, that was officially
charged to recruit voluntary services and labor, operated at the
panchayat level, rather than the village level"1 . Many of its
members, hence, were not familiar with the laborer households--
potential providers of voluntary labor--in the selected villages.
Their occasional trips to the villages, where construction was in
progress, were clearly inadequate to organize sufficient
voluntary help. It is surprising that the village extension
officers, who have closer contact with village residents, and
therefore are better placed to mobilize voluntary labor by virtue
of their long-standing relationship with them, were not made
officially responsible for the task. The district collectors'
concern for speed, and the distance between the officials
mandated to organize voluntary labor and the potential providers
of labor, thus served to slacken recruitment efforts.
The second reason why extensive efforts at recruiting
voluntary labor were lacking relates to the "impatience" of
contractors--not an uncommon problem in construction projects
where speed is made a criteria by the project sponsors. If the
chain of command at the sub-state level began with the district
collectors, it ended with the contractor at the project site
level. Many contractors, who shared the district collectors'
50 Adapted from Nalapat M.D., op. cit. and Statistics for
Planning 1983, op. cit.
51 A Panchayat is an administrative unit that has at an
average, 40-50 rural towns and villages under its jurisdiction.
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concern with speed, preferred not to work with "volunteers". They
found an uncoordinated and unpredictable flow of voluntary
workers more a hinderance than a help. Rather than invest time
allocating tasks to voluntary help that would "come one day and
not the next", they found it more "productive" to work with their
own, more familiar, contract labor--skilled and unskilled. In
particular, they complained about the difficulty of
"disciplining" and managing voluntary workers who regarded their
contribution as charity, instead of regular work. As a result,
often, either the contractor concerned would discourage voluntary
laborers, or as a response to frictions with the contractors, the
labor themselves would discontinue their services. Contractors
desirous of "getting on with the job", therefore, were another
factor that dissuaded energetic recruitment efforts of voluntary
labor.
Unfamiliarity with construction techniques is usually not
a problem for unskilled workers who lack experience in
construction work. In the case of the OLHS, however, an exogenous
condition made it one. As noted earlier, the implementation of
the OLHS coincided with the peak period of the outmigration of
the "best among the skilled" construction workers to the Middle-
East. This flight of skilled masons and carpenters led to a
shortage of good-quality workers in the construction industry; 2
which in turn, caused contractors to rely on unskilled labor to
perform relatively more skilled tasks. For example, splicing and
52 Interview with M.S. Matthews.
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fixing of joints, installation of purlins, and so forth.
Unskilled workers, usually drawn from among agricultural
laborers, or head-load bearers, who had little experience with
such techniques found it difficult to cope--often to the point of
leaving or being asked to leave. This implies that even if
voluntary unskilled workers were found, they did not necessarily
stay with the project for long. It is also possible that such
workers were not willing to perform "skilled" tasks without
remuneration, when formal skilled labor was being paid. Another
impact of this reliance on second-class skilled workers and
inexperienced unskilled workers by several contractors, was the
relatively poor quality of construction of the OLHS units. This
outcome led to indirect social repercussions, as we will see
later.
Apart from the quality of work expected from unskilled
labor, there is also the duration of time that such laborers are
expected to work without returns, that will determine their
willingness to work for free. This works in two opposing ways in
building construction programmes. First, building construction
requires sustained, relatively long-term work that passes through
many sequential, time-bound stages. For example once foundation
work is initiated, all mortar work must be finished relatively
quickly before it sets; plastering once started must be completed
within a fixed time period; similarly the brick-work must be
cured well for the requisite time period, for it to gain
strength, before plastering, or roofing can begin. All of these
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tasks are labor-intensive, and time-bound. Disruption in the
supply of labor is detrimental to the quality and integrity of
the work, unlike, say the digging of an irrigation canal. In the
latter case, an intermittent labor supply will not effect the
work at hand.
Therefore, from the perspective of the contractor or the
building agency, long continued, and predictable stretches of
labor time are preferable. They will prefer workers on whom
training time has been initially invested--such workers gradually
get more familiar with the work, and hence better at it,
requiring less supervision. From the perspective of the laborers
involved, this is unrealistic, if expected free, unless they have
other income-earners in the household. The very poor, which is
what the unskilled laborers inevitably are, obviously do not fit
this description. It is not surprising therefore, that free
voluntary labor for the OLHS, was not forthcoming in large
measure from the poor. Instead, one social category that did fit
the above description, included youth wings of political parties,
college student organizations, and social service groups--
religious, ethnic or secular. (Their economic opportunity cost of
providing voluntary labor free are, relatively less: political
parties, and social service organizations have their own sources
of finance; the former stand to reap political rewards, while the
latter are in the field of rendering social service because of a
shared motivation for the notion of social justice underlying
voluntary work. College student groups are also similarly
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motivated, in part. They are also often affiliated with political
parties. They are not financially burdened. Kerala, akin to the
rest of the country, they are dependent on family and kin
networks.) It was precisely this group that contributed a
substantial proportion of the 18% of the voluntary labor that the
government did manage to receive for the OLHS.5 3
This is not to say that voluntary labor from the poor was
entirely absent. If it was received, however, it was not from
potential beneficiaries, nor out of the government's "ideal of
community participation". Rather, local circumstances in some
cases helped overcome the general constraints I have discussed
above. Local political parties, local elite, and village (as
opposed to panchayat) officers played a major role in such
recruiting of non-beneficiary voluntary labor, as is illustrated
by the three examples discussed below.
Panchayat presidents are elected officials at the local
level, with a constituency of their own. Political parties whose
members are elected to these positions often wield considerable
influence over decisions made by their party members at the sub-
distrct level. At the time when the OLHS was implemented,
panchayat elections had not been held since 1963 as a result of
which most panchayats were not "representative". However, some
local governments did remain more responsive than others,
particularly where panchayat officials came from the political
party with the strongest local base in the jurisdiction of that
53 Interview P.K.Shivanandan, Thomas Poulose.
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panchayat. A communist led panchayat in Trichur district was one
such example. The coming together of several factors facilitated
the recruitment of voluntary labor here. These factors included:
a strong left lobby for the "rights" of the landless among the
upper caste communist party members; the efforts of the local
party workers committed to making the OLHS segment in the
panchayat a success so that benefits could reach at least a
proportion of the landless; and the active involvement of the
panchayat president."* This evidently led to the successful
recruitment of members from several laborer households (some of
whom were potential beneficiaries) who were party members,
sharing a common ideology with the communist leaders who
organized them, and hence were easier to recruit. But it is
noteworthy that, most of the "volunteers" thus recruited, were
not heads of households or the primary income-earners in their
respective families--they were dependent members. This reiterates
the point made by a section of the OLHS beneficiaries in
Trivandrum district, noted earlier, that the poor rarely donate
their labor free, if doing so displaces their potential to
otherwise earn a living. Forced voluntary labor, therefore, is
not participatory--the poor cannot economically afford such
participation. Nor will they always want it.
5
"
5* Talks with a senior official of the local district
cooperative bank.
" Even in the particular case discussed above, the
recruitment efforts were not uniform in all the selected villages
under this panchayat. Yet, local conditions, in some of them did
help surmount the more usual problems noted earlier.
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The second example comes from a village where a section of
unskilled, unemployed laborers worked on the OLHS because they
hoped to later solicit potential jobs from the panchayat
president. A local NGO, and youth congress workers in the
district, urged them to "first show their ability, then ask for
work."56 Here the incentive for voluntary work, therefore, was
the expectation of a potential reward--in the form of
remunerative employment--that might be forthcoming if credibility
and hard work was demonstrated. Short-term work without wages,
then, can at times be viewed by non-beneficiary voluntary workers
as a possible means for gaining access to longer-term economic
security.
The third example illustrates when local conditions can
come close to evoking community participation. The case involves
a village in Thalore panchayat, Trichur district, where a local
contractor was hired for implementing the 20 houses under the
OLHS in the village. Being from the village itself, social ties
existed between the contractor and the potential target group, as
well as non-beneficiary laborer households. Although nominal
wages were paid by the contractor to secure unskilled labor, his
56 Matthews pointed out that this is not uncommon in cases
where relatively small but labor-intensive projects are sponsored
by influential communal-based Societies. He cited an example of
an extension to a school-building owned by the Nair Service
Society in Ouilon district. A number of the unskilled laborers
who worked without wages or at nominal wages on the project,
later sought posts as peons, sweepers, or guards for themselves
or other family members from the much wealthier, and influential
owners of the school.
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familiarity with laborer households helped obtain several hours
of free voluntary labor. Furthermore, the village extension
officer also took interest, actively organizing local workers to
facilitate participation. The fact that a prestigious contract
was obtained by a village resident, in contrast to the
involvement of larger contractors and the Block Development
Committee that was more usual in other places, instilled a shared
incentive within the community to ensure its success. Converting
a "massive" state-wide programme into a "local affair", where the
credit for success would be retained by the village residents,
rather than be appropriated by an external implementation agency,
therefore encouraged greater local involvement.
Local conditions, however, can also create just the
reverse conditions--contrary to those that encourage the
involvement of labor. For example, influential local non-
governmental groups may resent a one-time, but highly publicized,
large, government intervention targeted towards the constituency
they have been working with in more modest ways for a much longer
period of time. If they perceive such programmes as threats to
their control over the constituencies they work with, they may
indeed discourage local participation necessary to make the
programmes work. Stronger exogenous factors may become important
to elicit the involvement of the poor in such cases.
An informant in Trivandrum reported a similar instance
from his "memory" of the implementation of the OLHS in his home
village in Alleppy district. The programme, there, faced immense
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opposition as an outcome of conflict between a pro-congress
church group, which was in favor of the OLHS idea, and another
splinter church-based pro-liberation theology NGO. The latter had
a history of mobilizing local laborers and fisherfolk around
issues of employment and income generation. Although in agreement
with the idea behind the programme it disagreed with the concept
of free labor, and sought to use the OLHS to express its
opposition to the rival NGO. The group therefore campaigned
against the local laborers working for free, arguing that the
government was "exploitative"; it should generate employment for
the poor rather than extract surplus from those who might not
even accrue benefits. This campaign was initially successful. But
there was an upsurge in voluntary contributions of cash as well
as of labor in this village in the "latter half of the
programme", presumably due to the sense of "competition between
districts" that the media created by publishing reports on the
progress of the OLHS. Official survey results also show that
Alleppy added to its OLHS stock by 20.9 percentage points between
1974 and 1976."7 (However, none of my other official informants
corroborated such incidents, nor linked the increase to anything
but "better management" by the implementation committees.)
Despite the increase--from 13.1% of the total target in 1974, to
34.0% in 1976--Alleppy district remains among the poorest
performers among all districts.
67 Nalapat M.D., op. cit.
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3.3 Conclusion.
The common theme in the above examples is that "voluntary"
labor from beneficiary and non-beneficiary laborers may be
forthcoming if an incentive is provided to elicit it. The most
effective of incentives for the poor is usually a material one--
either an immediate monetary gain such as wages, or a potential
one such as future employment. Local conditions, such as a shared
purpose, interest in the success of the programme and extensive
recruitment efforts by local authorities and institutions, can
also encourage "voluntary" labor. But local conditions may also
produce the opposite effect--they may be non-conducive to the
involvement of labor. To the extent however, that labor from the
poor must be "elicited" against incentive mechanisms, "voluntary"
labor is more myth than reality; and it is rarely
"participatory".
So far we have seen how the government made public
participation the central theme of the OLHS. The nature of this
participation, in conjunction with the pivotal role played by the
media--both in terms of the strategic way in which it was used by
the government, and the media's own reaction to government
strategy--helped popularize and politicize the OLHS. These latter
attributes facilitated public support from below, which, along
with the prestige bestowed by the involvement of key ministers at
the highest level in the state-government, from above, succeeded
in converting a programme targeted towards a single, low-status
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client group into a virtual, state-wide "movement". Popular
support and involvement not only helped the government elicit
finance from the elite, but it also ensured that the benefits
indeed reached the target group. At the same time, however,
popular support and attention from the media, served to undermine
beneficiary participation and the contribution of free voluntary
labor. Yet, the broad-based publicity successfully provided the
government with the support and stability it sought through the
OLHS. The "public nature" of the OLHS is also one reason why the
programme is remembered today as the state's most popular housing
programme, whose success is associated with the "stability" of
the Achutha Menon regime.**
But even while public participation served as an effective
bridge between the state government and the people in this "top-
down" programme, the actual implementation and execution of the
OLHS remained tightly controlled in the hands of government
officials, throughout. This is clearly evidenced in the
procurement of land and the actual execution process, as we see
below.
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5* Achutha Menon was the CPI Chief Minister of the United
Front coalition government.
PART IV
4. Innovation in Land Acquisition: centralization, discretion,
and accountability in a "Top-down" approach.
Delays in land acquisition, which are often caused by high
land costs and tedious regulatory procedures governing land
transactions, are commonly regarded as factors that retard the
implementation of public shelter programmes. We noted earlier
that the high population density, and consequently, the high
pressure on land in Kerala makes it difficult to acquire both,
urban and rural land--there is little land to spare, costs are
high and speculation rampant. Therefore, in theory, acquiring
5,000 acres of land for the OLHS (@ one acre per 20 units, for
100,000 units) would be particularly difficult. The government's
decision to disaggregate the scale of the programme by dispersing
OLHS segments throughout the state, partly eased this problem as
it was necessary to acquire only one acre of land in each
participant village.
An early release of funds from the Center for acquiring
land also enabled land procurement to move rapidly. Land for the
entire programme, in all districts, was acquired within 8-9
months"'--an unusual achievement given that lengthy, and tightly
regulated land acquisition procedures are usually the bane of
governmental agencies engaged in programmes that involve
construction. The availability of finance from the center was an
important step in the relatively quick procurement of land by the
5' See "A Good Cause for Contractors" op. cit.
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government, but only the first one. Under pressure to act with
speed, the Housing Minister pursued three policies to expedite
the procurement process: (1) He centralized land acquisition
functions in the hands of a single department, (2) For purposes
of expediency good locations were traded off for ease of
acquisition, and, (3) He used governmental discretion to digress
from the usual but time-consuming procedures of acquiring land.
Instead, an unorthodox method--of obtaining land at negotiated
prices--was opted for.
4.1. Centralization: opting for a single department approach.
Land acquisition was centralized at the level of the state
government. A single government department--the Board of Revenue-
-was placed in charge of all acquisition procedures. The Board,
with the assistance of its various geographical units was given
the authority to take all relevant decisions from assessment to
negotiation, compensation and subsequent appropriation of land.
This was a task the department was good at, since land assessment
and processing land transactions were its routine responsibili-
ties. More significantly, the Board was already engaged as the
key entity in a major land reassessment process as part of the on
going land reforms. Data on land prices and information on most
private land holdings were already being compiled by the Board.
Getting another agency--for example the entity that managed the
execution of the OLHS--to handle land matters at this stage would
have been an intrusion into the Board's established style of
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working that the latter might have resented. Furthermore,
bypassing the Board would have caused confusion, as the final
approval for every potential land purchase would still have to
come from it. If resentful, the Board could drag its feet over
granting clearance, causing avoidable delays in the
implementation of the OLHS--just what the government wanted to
avoid. Therefore, it was important that the government did not
devolve the responsibility of acquiring land to the respective
local agencies incharge of implementation, but rather,
centralized this function in the Board of Revenues--a department
that otherwise had little to do with the execution of the OLHS.
But even while this move expedited land acquisition by minimizing
problems of coordination between the Board and entities at
various levels of government--we will see in (3) below, that the
method used to procure land was a significant departure from
conventional procedures the Board was used to. In addition,
contrary to existing norms, public participation was built into
the process. These changes were introduced by the Housing
Minister, and they worked well (as we will see) because of the
strong control he maintained over the functioning of the Board
officials assigned with the task of procuring land for the OLHS.
4.2. Expediency and trade-offs
To expedite land acquisition several tradeoffs were made
by the Board. The Board avoided all land that had high market
value, land that involved lengthy legal procedures, or was likely
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to be held up in ownership controversies. Such land was avoided
despite other attractive attributes it might possess--for
example, central locations within the villages, proximity to
public amenities and transportation routes. The Board (with the
acquiescence of the Housing Minister) therefore, traded off good
location against a pragmatic concern for ease in acquisition.
This factor became one of the variables that determined which
five villages were selected from each panchayat for inclusion in
the project. While this preference for expediency speeded up land
procurement, it also became one of the weaknesses of the
programme, from the beneficiaries point of view. Upon
completion of the OLHS it was found that houses in many villages,
where the OLHS sites were located on the fringes of the
settlement or away from public amenities, were not occupied by
the allotees for several months.'" Distance, and inconvenient
locations were one deterrent. Another more important reason
reported by some of the beneficiaries, was the social segregation
that resulted from the OLHS dwellings being clustered together,
and some of them even located outside the mainstream village
settlement.
In Kerala, it is common to find that social groups who
seek, or attain "status" (through wealth or education and hence
prestigious white-collar jobs) tend to become "elites" within
60 This was reported by Mr. P.K. Shivanandan, who observed
this phenomenon while in the field during the implementation of
the OLHS.
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their own caste or community." They seek to distance themselves
from others in the community, leading to a stratification along
lines of class in every caste and communal group. Although this
phenomenon is peculiar to all social groups, it is much more
pronounced among the lower castes who are far more conscious of
their stigmatized social position, and seek ways to transcend it.
Given this quest to mitigate caste-stigmas, lower castes will
often prefer not to remain segregated, or stay grouped with
others of their own caste. 2 Agricultural labourers--the
beneficiaries of the OLHS--are mostly from backward or scheduled
castes and tribes (SC-ST). Many of them therefore, did not want
to live clustered together with other scheduled castes and
tribes, in several of the more "isolated" OLHS units that were
already labeled as "SC-ST colonies". According to one field
officer,'" eventhough all the OLHS units were eventually occupied
by the selected beneficiaries,"* the children of several of the
61 Discussion with Professor K.K. Subramaniam, and
Gopikuttan.
62 Discussion with Professor K.K. Subramaniam of the Center
for Development Studies, Trivandrum.
63 P.K. Shivanandan.
64 The resale of these units was curtailed because of a 12
year legal limit before which such property could be alienated.
In any case there is not much of a market for these units. By the
late 1970's over 86.7% of agricultural workers owned land. The
economic condition of the remaining landless was too poor to
allow purchase the OLHS units without government aid. Moreover,
several of the beneficiary families, despite their complaints
about segregation, prefer to retain ownership of the units since
title to land and durable property such as the house is an
important means of access to institutional credit.
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original beneficiaries have tended to settle outside such
colonies. Significantly, this tendency was found to be far more
pronounced in the scheduled castes and tribes-dominated segments
of the OLHS, rather than among other backward castes who were
also beneficiaries of the OLHS.6 5
An important social characteristic of the beneficiary
group that was overlooked in planning the OLHS, therefore,
unintentionally caused social problems later. Inadvertently,
scope for caste-based frictions among the beneficiaries was
generated through a government programme--ironically, one that
was aimed at benefiting them, and was backed by a party (the
CPI), that was ideologically opposed to caste-based social
divisions."' This unanticipated outcome suggests that the "poor"
are not undifferentiated. Hence, while designing a programme
targeted towards the "poor"--even if it is a trade-bound group
such as agricultural labourers--it is important to ask what are
65 Discussion with Gopikuttan. The Scheduled castes and
Tribes, unlike the other backward castes are "untouchables". They
are particularly vulnerable to social stigmatization because
their backward status has been institutionalized by the
government as a means to help them attain access to economic,
educational and professional opportunities that were till recent
times denied to them. But other non-SC-ST groups who are also
economically (but not socially) depressed resent such
"reservation" towards a group by virtue of its caste. They argue
that this does not diffuse caste distinctions, rather,
perpetuates them.
66 At the same time, it is surprising that despite provisions
for the expression of public opinion made by the government, no
one seriously questioned the clustered and "segregated" nature of
the OLHS housing, until it became a problem in some villages
later.
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the specific social traits that distinguish one low-income
beneficiary group from another, and how can these differences be
realistically incorporated into the design public programmes.
Often it may be difficult to ascertain beforehand what
social problems will arise later in the life of a project or
programme. Therefore, spending time evaluating them subsequently
is important. However, while there is agreement that subsequent
evaluation is important, who does the evaluation and when it is
done will also be critical to what is eventually learnt from the
evaluation. For example, it is significant that my informants,
who held different governmental positions during the
implementation of the OLHS, had very different observations to
make. For example, the informants who pointed out the vacancy
problem noted above, were those who were field-level officers at
the time the OLHS was implemented, and had observed the programme
in its early stages. Therefore, unlike the informant who had
officially evaluated the programme later, the field officers
expressed much more of a concern that "in a programme where the
beneficiaries wanted land (and housing), the fact that so many
units were lying vacant initially indicates a flaw in the design
of the programme and in the distribution of its benefits. This in
itself forms an important research question.."6. By contrast,
the official evaluator, who found all the sample houses fully
occupied by the selected beneficiaries at the time of evaluation,
considered it far less important that in several of these cases
67 P.K. Shivanandan.
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initial vacancy had been a problem. On being questioned about it,
the informant dismissed it as a "marginal problem that sorted
itself out--as the results show". Since, at the time of the
"official" evaluation, all units were found to be inhabited, the
surveyors perhaps did not realize or know that many households
had been reluctant to move in initially, and that reasons for
this phenomenon might be important to probe.
What this suggests is that, while detailed evaluation of a
project or programme after it has been in operation long enough,
is important, it is also worthwhile to draw attention to the
significance of recording the observations of "un-official"
evaluators who have seen the programme through its implementation
stages. These evaluators could be officials such as
"implementors" or field level officials like the district
collectors in this case. They can maintain a formal record of
smaller, temporal, and localized details that tend to be missed
or forgotten later, but are crucial for understanding the
heterogeneity among programme beneficiaries and the indirect
effects and outcomes of designing or implementing programmes in
one way and not another. Evaluations by such officials during the
implementation stage may also help mitigate some of the problems
that arise during the course of execution.
In sum therefore, the policy of trading off location for
ease in acquisition expedited land acquisition. This allowed
construction to begin early, while public attention was still
focussed on the "newness" of the programme, but was not without
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its social costs.
4.3. Using discretion to set aside regulation; ensuring
accountability.
Finally, realizing that procuring land in each district
under the procedures laid down in the Land Acquisition Act (1894)
would take a long time, the Housing Minister suggested a bold
step: all non-governmental land was to be acquired at negotiated
prices.'" Governments usually avoid this method for fear of
public criticism, given the possibilities for graft, corruption
and nepotism it opens up (for example, collusion with speculative
real estate interests, or negotiating higher prices with those on
whom the officials incharge wish to bestow a favor). But the
cabinet of ministers permitted this unorthodox deviation,
presumably, appreciating its implications for speed. However, to
avoid public criticism, panchayat presidents were required to,
and did, display all information about the plots selected and
their negotiated prices prominently in their local offices,
village office, and at public places (for example, fair price
shops). Through the panchayat presidents, block development
officers, and, the village extension officers, the government
clarified to the people that any member of the public who had
reservations about any site, or thought the price too high, had
the option to suggest a better site at a lower price. Similarly,
68 Shivanandan. Also see, "A Good Cause For Contractors" in
Economic and Political Weekly, 1972, pp. 2268.
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the names of the applicants were also displayed publicly at the
village office for scrutiny by the people and elimination of
ineligible persons, if any were found. Therefore, despite the
overall responsibility assigned to the Board of Revenues, the
government made specific provisions for public input in land
acquisition and in the selection of potential beneficiaries.
The allotment of land and houses was subsequently made on the
basis of lots drawn by each panchayat president.7
Two issues stand out as striking in the above account.
First, the government did not expropriate land through eminent
domain, but rather purchased it. Given the low compensation
' Further empirical research will be necessary to evaluate
the exact impact of such participatory procedures. For example,
one needs to ask, to what extent did participation actually
occur? To what extent did it occur as a result of the "control"
devolved by the government to the people, and to what extent was
this "control" more important for its symbolic significance? I do
not have further details on this point, but the general response
of several informants indicates that there was a positive
correlation between the degree to which the laborers were
organized, and to their proportion in the local
population.
70 It is noteworthy that, consistent with the government's
efforts at according prestige to the programme, the dates for
various inaugurations were carefully picked for their symbolic
significance. For example, after land acquisition procedures were
completed, and lots drawn in several panchayats, the Prime
Minister laid the foundation stone of the first OLHS house on
October 2, (1972)--the birth anniversary of Mahatma Gandhi, the
Father of the Nation. On that day, the housing minister announced
that all completed units would be allotted to the beneficiaries
on January 26,--Republic Day--the following year. This
association with memorable days of national importance is not an
uncommon tactic used by politicians in programmes of political
significance. The OLHS, which was the government's first major
housing programme also acquired special public significance in a
similar way. (Source for dates: "A Good Cause for Contractors",
1972, op. cit.)
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prices for expropriated land, and the convoluted process of
involving a series of assessors to fix the price, appropriation
of land through this method might have alienated the land-owners
whose land was to be expropriated. Instead, land was bought at
negotiated prices--a method that sellers of land would rarely
object to.
The negotiated price method adopted by the state
government to purchase land, further, represents an instance of
uncommon departure from the rigidity with which governments
usually adhere to procedural rules. It is this rigidity with
which public-sector agencies and departments follow, or have to
follow, stipulated procedures--even when these procedures are
cumbersome, complex or outdated--that often results in the
inefficiencies and delays, that have come to characterize most
public sector programmes. Unlike state-governments are rarely
willing to simplify existing rules for single projects even if
efficiency lies in modifying or overriding them, the Kerala
government not only set aside a procedure it realized would
interfere with its goal of speed, but boldly adopted an
unconventional alternative. In adopting an unorthodox method to
expedite land acquisition, then, the government behaved less
like the usual entrenched public-sector bureaucracy. Rather,
recognizing the drawbacks of one of its own regulatory
procedures--that usual land acquisition procedures prescribed for
the public-sector in the Land Act were too time-consuming--the
government used another of its powers--of discretion--to
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circumvent them by deciding to acquire land at negotiated prices.
To the extent that the suggestion for procuring land at
negotiated prices came from the Housing Minister (who headed the
implementation hierarchy of the OLHS) and cabinet approval for it
was successfully won, it is evident that access to, or influence
over, key decision makers is critical for obtaining such
procedural flexibility. Not only was the Housing Minister a part
of the powerful cabinet that had the discretionary power to grant
such flexibility, but he also wielded significant influence in
the cabinet. The Housing Minister was a powerful politician. As a
popular peasant leader since his early days in the CPI, and a
politician known for his capability and commitment to the poor,
he commanded respect from his colleagues as well as from the
electorate. His vanguard role in affordable shelter, and
reputation of integrity, further added weight to his suggestions
regarding the OLHS. Thus, knowing that the leadership of the OLHS
was in the hands of a minister capable of curtailing corruption,
it was perhaps easier for the cabinet to approve a procedure that
is normally avoided because it opens up avenues for corruption
and can draw politically damaging criticism from the public.71
Typically, housing boards or building authorities, that
are semi-autonomous public agencies, lack the kind of discretion
71 All the officials I interviewed, reiterated the
popularity, integrity and commitment of M.N. Govindan Nair, then
Housing Minister. They emphasized the significance of the respect
he commanded not only within political and official circles, but
even among the people. As one official noted "such a bold step
was probably allowed because of the faith people had that a man
like Nair would not allow corruption.."
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in their leadership that we have seen the Housing Minister
possessed. For example, an agency such as the Kerala State
Housing Board (KSHB) could not have taken a decision to bypass
established rules, on its own. Unlike the state government
cabinet, which itself was the apex decision making body at the
state level, the KSHB would have to depend on the discretion of a
higher authority, such as the cabinet of ministers, to set aside
stipulated procedures in a similar way.
Apart from the question of an agency's dependence on the
government for permission to digress from established rules, it
is unlikely that the cabinet (which is composed of elected
ministers) will always be in agreement with the concerned agency
(which is usually headed by bureaucrats or technocrats) over the
importance or need for such digression, and therefore may not
allow it.7 2 Even if allowed in selected cases, departures from
prescribed rules granted to one agency are likely to set a
precedent for other agencies to make similar demands--demands
that a government cabinet will not want to encourage because
frequent relaxation of established rules can undermine its
72 Even though public agencies finally implement programmes
and projects that realize government policy, differences between
the leadership of the agency and members of the cabinet, may lead
to rivalry that might prevent agreement over implementation
procedures, precluding concessions of this nature.
Since the credit for a programme implemented successfully by a
semi-autonomous agency cannot be directly appropriated by the
government, competition between the agency and government
departments, if both are implementing programmes in the same
policy area--say low-income housing--can also inhibit such
allowances.
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control over its agencies. Unless procedural flexibility is built
into the operational framework of the public sector, in a way
that allows control from the top, arbitrary, case-by-case changes
will only confound public administration. Without coherent
monitoring and control from above (e.g., control by ministerial
executives, legislatures) individual agencies may use deviations
from stipulated procedures for their own ends--as a means of
aggrandizement of their power, for example--rather than in the
service of the programmes they are charged to implement. It is
less likely therefore, that a government will, as a norm, easily
allow procedural deviations by public sector agencies, even if
disallowing the deviation (or simplification) is often to the
detriment of the programmes."
The point I am making here is that, it was precisely
because the government took the implementation of the OLHS in its
own hands, rather than entrust it to a separate agency, that
cumbersome land acquisition procedures could be sidestepped and
an unorthodox method adopted to expedite the land acquisition
process. Acquiring land quickly was essential for construction to
be carried out with speed. Not only was speed important, but land
73 The adoption of the negotiated price method, even by the
state government, was a temporary digression, that remained
confined to the OLHS. It was not an attempt at a general reform
of bureaucratic procedures. Rather, it can be seen as a one-time
move by a government that recognized some of the weaknesses
(lengthy regulatory procedures) and strengths (the power of
discretion) inherent in governmental practice, and used the
latter to mitigate the former in order to facilitate the good
performance of a programme whose success was politically
important to it.
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in all districts had to be acquired simultaneously to actualize
the impact of the "massive" and grand scale of the OLHS. The
discretion of the government enabled it to adopt the negotiated
price method, which helped acquire land early. Centralizing land
procurement functions in a single department with state-wide
jurisdiction, facilitated land acquisition in all districts
simultaneously. Both were decisions that the state-government had
the power to take more easily than would a separate agency. Both
were decisions critical to the "success" of the OLHS.
The second point that is striking about the government's
handling of land acquisition procedures in the OLHS, is that in
order for the unorthodox, negotiated price method to work, it was
necessary for the government to combine highly centralized
implementation (by the Board of Revenue), with provisions for
public scrutiny and "democratic" participatory procedures at the
local level.
The government's decision to provide public scrutiny of
its land procurement process, was significant in at least three
ways. First, an "open" process, where the people were kept
informed of the details of the land being acquired, made
corruption or misuse of the negotiated price method by executing
officials, difficult. If a strong, incorrupt leadership in the
form of the Housing Minister, maintained vigilance against
corruption from above, public surveillance at the local level,
exerted pressure against corruption and mismanagement, from below
This reciprocal arrangement, thus ensured that even a
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controversial method fetched little public criticism on account
of charges of graft.7 *
Second, even while control over land acquisition was
centralized at the level of the Board of Revenues, local
residents were not only kept informed about what was being
acquired, but were given an avenue for participation--a say in
the process, in that they were free to suggest alternative sites.
Public scrutiny of the details of potential land purchases and
the freedom to suggest alternative sites (irrespective of the
extent to which alternative sites were actually proposed, or
not), thus, provided the people with a sense of control over
what, indeed, was a highly centralized process controlled tightly
by officials of the Board of Revenues.
Thirdly, apart from public involvement in the land
acquisition process, public scrutiny in the distribution of this
acquired land by panchayat level officials, also allowed the
state government to leave part of the monitoring of the
performance of local officials to the people. Public pressure
would make local level administrators accountable to the people,
7* Indeed, in all my interviews with various governmental
and non-governmental informants, corruption in land acquisition
was consistently ruled out. This is in sharp contrast with the
"underhand dealings" of some of the large contractors, who made
vast amounts of money through arbitration. As Mr. Babu Jacob
reported, in a process as open as the OLHS, especially the land
acquisition processes, corruption was difficult for government
officials. This did not hold for "some of these large, private
contractors. For example, several of the arbitration cases were
contrived. They would complete work worth Rs 1000 (roughly US $
100 in 1972 rates) and go in for an arbitration, demanding a
compensation of Rs 6000 (US $600 in 1972 rates).. .and then manage
to win these cases legally.
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prevent foot-dragging on their part, and, make the diversion of
benefits to ineligible interest groups more difficult (we will
examine this last point in more detail below). Lower level
officials were compelled to act with speed and adhere to
mechanisms that had already been made explicit. Thus, in sum,
the government's introduction of participatory provisions such as
the above reinforced the confidence of the people in the
government's commitment to making the OLHS work, and thereby
added to public support for the programme.
Providing scope for, indeed, taking advantage of public
vigilance in processes where money can potentially be made by
local implementors, is in sharp contrast with the way in which
public sector programmes are usually carried out in other states.
It is not surprising then, that several of the southern states
which are now attempting to emulate Kerala by introducing shelter
programmes that have the scale of the OLHS, but not the other
more consequential processes such as the above, find public
involvement hard to generate.
Similar to this lack of public involvement, several state-
governments also complain about the ineffectiveness of
"decentralization" mechanisms in programme implementation. By
contrast, the land acquisition and allotment procedures adopted
by the government in the OLHS, represent an instance of
relatively successful, though "controlled", decentralization."
75 See Susan Hadden, "Controlled Decentralization and Policy
Implementation: The Case of Rural Electrification in Rajasthan",
in Politics and Policy Implementation in the Third World. edited
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As we saw above, even though the Board acquired the land, local
residents had the option to review, critique and suggest
alternative sites; even though the Board controlled land
acquisition, the power to select beneficiaries was devolved to
the respective panchayat presidents, who were required to use a
politically neutral method of picking lots publicly. (Similarly,
eventhough the housing minister and district collectors
controlled the execution of the OLHS units, construction was very
localized.) The element of "control" in this decentralization is
evidenced by the fact that the panchayat presidents were required
to pick lots to delimit the beneficiary households. The method of
picking lots, rather than being arbitrary, appears to be a
conscious response by the government to the existing political
and organizational structure at the local level, and to its own
objective of ensuring that the target group was reached:
Reaching the actual target group was as important for the
government, as was the timely completion of the OLHS houses. For
a government that wanted to demonstrate to the electorate its
commitment to the poor, and ward off discontent among the
landless--the constituency that was targeted in the OLHS--
political rewards would accrue only if benefits actually reached
the landless labourers. Thus the government had to ensure that
benefits of the OLHS were not coopted by the less poor.
In devolving the power to select beneficiaries to the
by Merilee S.Grindle, 1980, Princeton University Press, U.K., pp.
170-191, for an extended discussion of this concept.
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panchayat level, it is significant, then, that the state
government did not leave the choice of the method by which
beneficiaries would be selected to the panchayat presidents.
Instead a politically neutral method of picking lots in public
was specified by the Housing Minister. This control maintained by
the Minister over lower level officers is easily understood if we
link it with the fact that panchayat elections had not been held
in the state since the past 8 years. As we noted earlier, the
panchayats, as local government bodies, were therefore no longer
"representative". It was necessary for the state government to
ensure that programme benefits were not diverted for political
reasons by panchayat presidents who might seek to favour a
constituency different from the targeted landless laborer
households. An a-political method of picking lots locally would
preclude partisanship in the selection of beneficiaries. At the
same time, picking lots in public, would allow local residents to
ensure that the land and houses were indeed allocated to only
those whose names were picked.
4.4 Conclusion.
It is evident, then, that for a government committed to
reaching the target group for which the programme was intended,
making provisions for public scrutiny of its procedures became
essential. At the same time, higher level officials established
"enforceable criteria"76 to channelize public-participation in
ways that would help the government to maintain some control over
7 Susan G. Hadden, op. cit. pp. 172.
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the outcome of this participation. Thus, greater and more
directed, rather than less control was necessary to ensure that
"decentralization" helped achieve programme goals.
Therefore, once again we note that elements of "top-down"
control coexisted with "bottom-up" procedures in the
implementation of the OLHS. Significantly, elements of these two
styles were consciously incorporated in the implementation of the
programme, so that they operated in compliment rather than in
opposition. In contrast to the way we usually think about public
participation and governmental control, it was the interaction
between control and participation, that enabled bold deviations
from existing governmental norms as well as "democratic"
participatory procedures to work well. For example, public
pressure from below reinforced the control maintained by the
housing minister from the top, to ensure that local level
officials would not misuse the power bestowed on them, and that
benefits indeed reached the target group. Control and
participation, centralization and decentralization, together,
facilitated the good performance of the OLHS in the acquisition
and distribution of land.
A strong administrative hierarchy, and carefully laid out
lines of control, helped achieve a similar "balance" between
centralized control and popular participation, in the
construction of the OLHS units as well. In the section below we
examine more closely some key aspects of this administrative
hierarchy.
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PART V
5. Execution: clarity of the lines of control.
Unlike public programmes that are implemented through a
specific agency, or a single government department, there was no
standard agency incharge of implementing the OLHS. Rather, a
"conglomerate" arrangement was structured out of the existing
hierarchy of the state's decentralized development
administration. The administrative structure for the OLHS was
essentially a hierarchy of officials, and special committees put
together at various levels of government, operating under the
tight, overall control of the Housing Minister. This is evident
from the "chain of command" outlined below.
5.1. The chain of command.
The chain of command in the administrative hierarchy of
the OLHS began at the level of the state government with the
Housing Minister in overall charge of the programme. At the
district level responsibility for implementation was placed in
the hands of district collectors--officers drawn from the Indian
Administrative Service (IAS), a distinguished corps of
development administrators. Under them, block level committees,
composed of the block development officer and field level
officials from the Rural Development Department, supervised the
performance of the panchayats in each block. Finally, the actual
construction of the OLHS units was entrusted to a special Works
Committee set up at the panchayat level.
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The advantages of this carefully laid out chain of command
were twofold: first, without establishing a whole new
administrative system, it effectively assembled a bureaucratic
structure parallel to the more entrenched, department or agency-
based bureaucracy. This parallel structure, helped avoid some of
the inefficiencies and delays that result from following the
routine administrative protocol common in most public sector
departments.
Second, we have seen that despite the massive of the OLHS,
execution remained disaggregated and localized. This made
construction management easier, but it also segmented the
responsibility of project execution in such a way that locally
based entities--such as the Works Committee--could be exploited
to manage construction. At the same time, because construction
was highly localized; the physical target per village small, and
the chain of command was not governed by the set procedures of a
given department or agency, procedural flexibility--for building
in local variations in construction arrangements--could be
obtained (we will examine this more closely below).
In, this administrative arrangement, the role of the Works
Committee, the authority invested in the district collectors and
the powerful, overall control maintained by the Housing Minister
are of particular significance to the way the OLHS finally turned
out.
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5.2. The Works Committee: decentralization, flexibility,
participation and control.
The Works Committee (henceforth called Committee), as the
execution arm of the OLHS based at the panchayat level, was
unusual in
president,
appointed
voluntary
residents.
typically
religious
political
its composition. It comprised of the panchayat
selected panchayat members, additional officials
by the government, and, significantly, a group of
non-official members drawn from amongst the local
The local residents who served on these committees
included influential elites such as representatives
institutions or prominent communal organizations,
party workers and contractors. 77
The primary function of the Committee was to coordinate
the construction of the OLHS units in the panchayat under its
jurisdiction. In addition, it was responsible for procuring
construction materials (such as bricks) that were not provided
directly by the state government; for organizing voluntary
services, unskilled labor and meeting all skilled labor costs.
Towards this end, the Committee was authorized by the government
to raise funds locally. It was also empowered to receive Rs.50
per unit (4% of the construction cost of each house) from
panchayat funds to meet part of the materials and labor costs.
Although the panchayat president was incharge of handling
funds and authorizing expenditures, the leadership of the
Committee was not restricted to him. The participant members of
77 Interview with Mr. P.K. Shivanandan.
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of
the Committee elected its primary coordinator. The leader of the
Committee, therefore, could easily be a non-official member from
the public. This procedure gave significant authority to non-
governmental members of Committee in making decisions about
construction.
The Committee, however, was more than a supervisory body
at the local level. Even though construction in most cases, was
carried out by contractors hired by the state government, the
Committee had the authority to recommend alternative arrangements
construction management that suited local conditions prevailing
in the villages under its jurisdiction--for example, external
contractors were not hired if there was sufficient potential in a
given panchayat to recruit a local organizer or contractor who
had the ability to construct the units efficiently and with
speed. The adoption of these alternative arrangements, however,
was contingent to the approval of the district collector incharge
of the panchayat, and the Housing Minister.7 " In some cases for
instance, the coordinator of the Committee himself (if he was a
non-official member with interests or contacts in the
construction industry) volunteered to take on the responsibility
for organizing construction locally.7 " This tendency was
especially strong in the early stages of the programme when
78 The relationship between the district collectors and
panchayats is that the latter is a sub-district unit composed of
50-60 towns or villages. Every district collector--or the key
official incharge at the district level, therefore has, at an
average, 50-60 (or more) panchayats under him.
' ibid., see footnote above.
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enthusiasm was at its highest.
The most striking example of the success of such instances
is recorded by Mr. Kocchakoshi, then special secretary to the
Housing minister, in his account of the OLHS."0 The example comes
from two panchayats noted for being the first to complete the 100
houses in the five respective villages under them. In both cases
the non-governmental Committee-coordinators took charge of
construction. One of these coordinators was a private contractor
(in Kalammacherry panchayat) while the other was a CPM party
worker. As word of these efforts spread through the media,
competition emerged between these two panchayats over who would
claim the distinction of completing the first 100 houses of the
OLHS. "Substantial local effort, in terms of cash, materials and
labor, was invested in both panchayats to complete construction
in record time. Construction was completed within months. Both
panchayats reached their physical target at around the same time
so that the Prime Minister--who was invited to inaugurate the
OLHS houses--had to inaugurated the units in both panchayats on
the same day." The OLHS segment in one village from each
panchayat was named after the respective Committee coordinators
responsible for the exemplary speed in project execution."
The exceptional speed of construction illustrated in this
example was facilitated by two factors. The first was the
80 Kocchakoshi, Looking into the Hour Glass, St. Joseph's
Press, Trivandrum.
81 From Mr. Kocchakoshi's account, as related by Mr. P.K.
Shivanandan.
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breaking down of the scale of the OLHS so that each Committee was
responsible for the management of only 100 units spread over 5
villages. This disaggregation made construction management easier
and allowed speed in project execution. The second factor was the
composition of the decentralized "works" committee. The
composition of the Committee provided scope for involving strong,
local non-beneficiary groups in decision making. Influential,
local non-beneficiaries who usually have little to do with the
management of programmes from which they will not benefit, were
inducted into the implementation efforts. If left out of active
implementation, as is more usual, they could potentially have
ignored, if not opposed the OLHS; but as part of the local
implementation body, they carried as much responsibility for the
good performance of the programme, as did the government
officials. To the extent that the actions of the Committee were
open to public scrutiny and hence accountable to the people, the
"elites" were compelled (in theory) to take their responsibility
seriously.
At the same time, the prestige attached to being civic-
minded may have provided an added incentive to perform well: If
they contributed to the success of the local programme segment,
they would earn rewards of status, as did the two coordinators in
the above story.
This arrangement of involving local residents and local
elite, also had the potential to prevent standard procedures of
execution from being uniformly imposed on all panchayats. Local
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residents are far more aware of local potentials and pitfalls
that might help or hamper implementation. Their being on the
committee allowed this knowledge to be exploited. By contrast,
single agencies, when in charge of implementing large and
dispersed projects, rarely have this flexibility to provide
similar potential for local variation in procedures of execution.
At the same time, even though decentralized implementation
provides flexibility at the local (village or panchayat) level,
it can also make overall programme management at a more
aggregated level (the district and state), difficult. This is
because of the various implementing entities involved and their
varying degree of competence. In the case of the OLHS, moreover,
the "success" of the programme depended on the good performance
of all the local subunits. In other words, some level of overall
control was necessary to prevent subunits from lagging in
implementation.
In the OLHS this control was achieved, first through
public participation and public pressure from below, which made
committee members accountable to the people. If members of the
Committee vacillated, local demonstrations, in several cases,
compelled them to act with speed. Second, even though each
panchayat (of which there are 960) had a separate execution or
Works Committee, these several committees were not structurally
different in their composition. Each was built around the
panchayat level leadership. There were hence some common rules
and a degree of institutional uniformity that governed its
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operation. Similarly, Block level Committees which supervised the
functioning of the works committee also operated on prescribed
rules. The significance of this point lies in the fact that to
manage flexibility at the local level (panchayat and village in
this case), in a programme where implementation is highly
dispersed, it might be necessary to retain some uniformity in the
functional and organizational structure of those who will be held
accountable for the performance of those below them. The third
method by which control was maintained by the Housing Minister
was through the authority invested in the district collectors to
oversee the performance of the Committee from the "top". In fact
the role of the district collectors is central to the
"successful" implementation of the OLHS. How? and why? we examine
below.
5.3. The district collector: an elite corps of administrators
and setting up a parallel bureaucratic structure.
We have seen that, even while the "works" committee sounds
like a participatory body, its performance was directly monitored
by the Block level Committees and closely controlled by the
respective district collectors. The district collectors, indeed,
were the key personnel responsible for coordinating
implementation in all subunits of the district (panchayats and
villages) under their command. They were directly answerable to
the Housing Minister for the progress of the OLHS in the 50-60
panchayats (or the 200-250 villages participating in the
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programme) that they controlled, at an average. It was in their
interest, therefore, to elicit good performance from the block
and panchayat level committees.
Their specific responsibilities included organizing cash
donations, coordinating the provision of subsidized cement and
roof-tiles from centralized outlets selected by the government to
each panchayat, assisting the "poorer" panchayats with cash, and,
assessing and approving recommendations made by the Works
Committee with regard to execution procedures.
District collectors are powerful bureaucrats. Unlike other
administrators they are highly trained generalists drawn from the
elitist cadres of the Indian Administrative Service. They are not
part of the routine bureaucracy attached to specific government
departments, but rather, as a special corps of development
administrators are located in the field. Most important however,
unlike other bureaucrats in the field, they have direct access to
state level ministers. It is significant, then, that the
government made the district collectors, rather than any other
type of senior official, responsible for the performance of the
OLHS in all the subunits of the state. The other officials on
whom the government could have entrusted this responsibility
were, for example, the regional engineers of the PWD who had
hitherto looked after shelter provision; the panchayat
presidents; or any other set of senior officials appointed by the
state-government from its own departmental bureaucracy.
In bypassing the regional engineers--appointees of the
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central government--the state government essentially understated
the role of technocrats in a position which called for an ability
to manage local conflict. Technocrats are hardly suited for this
role. District collectors, as generalists, have greater
experience and expertise at managing political conflict, and
therefore, made better candidates for such a position. In
addition, the government's decision to bypass the regional
engineers of the PWD ruled out ambiguity in the answerability of
such officials that could result from making central government
employees responsible for coordinating a politically important
state government programme. At the same time, it shut out a
potential avenue of interference by the Center in the
implementation of the OLHS.
Similarly, panchayat presidents were also excluded from
being made "second in command" after the Housing Minister. The
panchayat is too disaggregated a unit (there are 960 panchayats
in Kerala) at which to centralize vast amounts of supervisory
control over a programme whose smallest unit is the village and
the largest the entire state. The district, of which there are 11
in the state, as an alternative, forms a more reasonable regional
unit from which an intermediate level of authority can coordinate
the state-wide execution of a programme as dispersed as the OLHS.
Further, in granting greater authority to district collectors
vis-a-vis panchayat presidents, the government was also
presumably responding to the "unrepresentative" nature of most
panchayats due to the long gap in local government elections.
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Without strong administrative control over the panchayat
presidents it might have been presumptuous to expect all
panchayats to fall in line with directives from the Housing
Minister.
Panchayat presidents, moreover, were already part of the
Works Committee. Even in this role, some level of local
accountability had been built in from below by making provisions
for public participation. Control from above was thus, introduced
by making the panchayat presidents answerable to the district
collectors, who in turn were directly accountable to the Housing
Minister.
Finally, in sidestepping its own departmental bureaucracy,
the government sought to prevent the delays, loss of information
and distortion of commands that result from decisions being
channelized through an entrenched, routine-based administrative
hierarchy. In the Secretariat, as in other public sector
agencies, "any case has to go to a minimum of three departments
and to the council of ministers for a decision. Very often party
and community interests get over-riding priority over the merits
of the case. If the case has to go to more than one department
headed by ministers from different parties, the problem becomes
more complicated. To get a decision, one has therefore to
befriend a party-man and please officers at all levels" (EPW,
1972: 2183). Against this background of how the bureaucracy works
in Kerala, it is not surprising that the ministerial proponents
of the OLHS decided to bypass its own departments.
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As it was, none of the state-government departments were
adequately equipped in terms of staff and skills to handle the
OLHS given its scale, scope and the government's goal of speed in
programme realization. For example, the two departments that
could potentially have been made responsible for the OLHS were
the Housing Department and the Rural Development Department. The
former, was too sparsely staffed, limited in institutional
infrastructure and outreach, since the state government had
barely been involved with shelter provision so far--most of it
having been carried out by the central Public Works Department.
The Rural Development Department had several of its own
programmes to handle, and neither land acquisition, nor shelter
construction were its routine tasks. Implementing or even
managing the execution of the OLHS was beyond its institutional
capacity."2 Moreover, it would be difficult for the Housing
minister, who was one of the key figures behind the
conceptualization of the OLHS, to bypass the Rural Development
Minister and retain control over the staff of a department other
than his own, for a single programme. At the same time, given the
Housing Minister's motivation and deep personal involvement in
ensuring the success of the OLHS (he had long been arguing for a
82 In any case bestowing importance and visibility to either
department by making them responsible for executing the OLHS when
both were equally ill-equipped to implement it, may have caused
inter-departmental rivalries over the sudden prominence the
chosen department would receive. At the same time, project
realization may have suffered due to lack of enough personnel and
bureaucratic delays.
150
role for the public sector in housing provision for the poor and
now had the opportunity to demonstrate how well it could work) it
was perhaps important to the government that, he, rather than any
other minister remain incharge of implementing the OLHS.
Assembling a separate chain of command, with district collectors,
rather than senior officials of a specific state-level
department, as "second in command" allowed the Housing Minister
to remain in charge.
To recapitulate the above discussion, the government's
decision to choose district collectors as key officials
responsible for implementation at the regional level is
significant because, first, as members of an elite bureaucratic
corps (the accredited Indian Administrative Service--IAS), they
are highly trained development administrators with control over a
wide range of administrative functions. District collectors, whom
Robertson calls the "..near-omnipotent local political
officer[s]" have the authority to assume "almost any official
role in [their] area of jurisdiction" (1984: 154). Therefore, in
the case of the OLHS, unlike narrowly specialized technocrats,
they were well suited to cope with regional or local conflict, if
it arose, and were empowered to take situational decisions when
necessary.
Secondly, unlike other bureaucrats, district collectors
bear a distinguished status that comes from their being a part of
the "exclusive" IAS tradition. This "exclusivity", in part, dates
back to the IAS being modelled after the prestigious Indian Civil
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Service under the British Raj; but it also derives from the
ideology of competence and good performance that the Service has
come to embody. Even in recent times, upward mobility of IAS
officers, most of whom begin their careers by serving as field
officers or collectors, is linked with their demonstrated ability
to perform well. Placing such officials in charge of implementing
the OLHS at the district level not only allowed the government to
draw upon their tradition of good performance, but career
prospects could be effectively linked with the collectors'
performance in the OLHS. As one officer noted, the political
stake of the government in the success of the OLHS and the
personal involvement of the housing minister, kept most district
collectors and local officers who were concerned about their
careers, "on their feet". Career prospects were practically
synonymous with speed in project realization and good
performance. "Good performance was not only expected from the
district collectors themselves, but they were also expected to
get similar performance from those below them.""3 Thus, in
investing substantial discretion in the hands of the district
collectors, and in making them responsible for the performance of
those under them, the government set up an implicit mechanism to
maintain a check on the misuse of flexibility accorded to lower
level officials (such as members of the Works Committee). It is
noteworthy, that the district collectors of the worst performing
districts--Alleppy (34% of original target), Kottayam (27% of
83 M.S. Matthews.
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original target), Cannanore (21.3% of original target) and
Mallapuram (20.9%)," "..were on the average only one-and-a-half
years away from retirement by end-1974, and perhaps had no career
interests in the successful implementation of the scheme"
(Nalapat, 1972: 590). It is clear therefore, that implicitly, or
explicitly, the government linked the career prospects of
district collectors with their performance in the OLHS. In most
cases this worked to the advantage of the OLHS.
However, it must also be noted that the government could
effectively exploit this linkage between performance and
promotion primarily because upward mobility is closely linked to
an officer's track record in the Indian Administrative Service.
It is especially important for those district collectors who are
just starting out to demonstrate good performance. The need to
build a good track record is less of a concern for ordinary
bureaucrats who often do not have far to rise, and for whom
promotion is in any case, on the basis of seniority or success
public service examinations. This is not to suggest that the
government entrusted major responsibilities on the district
collectors, consciously, on the basis of such reasoning; But that
it is important to realize under what conditions a given strategy
is likely to work, or not: If the government had used its own
departmental officials to implement the OLHS, perhaps linking
performance with career prospects, that worked in the case of
district collectors, would have been far less effective.
84 Source for figures: Nalapat M.D. op.cit.
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Finally, district collectors, as part of the development
administration system, have direct access to the ministry. As one
officer who evaluated the OLHS noted, the collectors' direct
access to the Minister, permitted close coordination between the
them, so that the collectors were "on the inside of decision
making". The district collectors acquired prestige and influence
from being part of the topmost decision-making body of the OLHS,
and being taken into confidence by the Housing Minister. This
influence, however, brought special responsibilities and high
expectations regarding their performance. These expectations, in
addition to the close contact with the Minister, generated
implicit pressure on the collectors to measure upto the
confidence placed in them. To the extent that the Minister
conferred with the collectors, and sought their opinion on
various aspects of the programme, it is likely that overt
opposition to the OLHS from any of the collectors was also
diffused. At the same time, this proximity between the collectors
and the Minister, prevented sanitization of local level
information because there were fewer intermediate levels at which
it could stop, or be manipulated, as it moved up the system. By
the same reasoning, the Minister was better able to maintain
control over his immediate subordinates, and thereby, the entire
hierarchy.
Therefore, even while the district collectors were
involved in decisions made at the "top", and given substantial
powers of discretion, their performance was closely monitored by
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the Housing Minister. This control was important. As a senior
officer pointed out, this control was necessary because, despite
the tradition of good performance, IAS officers (district
collectors in this case) like other bureaucrats everywhere, are
also varied in their abilities, and have their own political
preferences or opinions on policy. Even though the ostensibly
"non-partisan" creed of bureaucrats precludes their expressing
such views publicly, it is often the opposition of powerful or
entrenched bureaucrats to a programme that, in part, lies behind
its poor performance. Furthermore, powerful bureaucrats,
especially those in the field, inevitably play a political role
when they use the powers invested in them to take local decisions
during programme implementation. If they are not made accountable
for their actions, or if they know senior officials do not care
enough to check on what happens, it is likely that their personal
favour or disfavor for the programme will impact its performance.
Therefore, on the one hand, devolving discretionary power
by ministers to subordinate officials is desirable because it
bestows influence as well as responsibility on officials who
might otherwise be less motivated to produce good results because
they regard themselves as mere subordinates in a bureaucratic
chain of command. On the other hand, it is crucial that
sufficient control be maintained by higher level officials to
obtain performance consistent with the goals of the programme..
Most of the mechanisms of control used by the government
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that we have seen so far were implicit, rather than
authoritarian--linking career prospects with performance, the
personal care taken by the Minister to elicit details from
districts where progress was tardy, face to face contact between
the Minister and the Collectors. But the one critical feature
that enabled the minister to remain aware of what went on at the
district and panchayat level to monitor the actions of his
subordinates effectively, was his access to information. If close
contact between the minister and the subordinate officials,
prevented loss of information through "official" channels, the
minister also relied on informal sources to keep himself
informed. As Shivanandan pointed out, "if something goes wrong in
the field, the ministers learn about it the very next day. This
is because they maintain several channels of information." One
such source is the party. The ideologically bound, local level
workers of the ruling political party (CPI and the workers of the
Youth Congress) played a significant role in keeping the minister
informed. Although their presence is resented by non-communist
panchayat heads, and effectively resisted where political parties
of the latter have a mass-base, in the case of the OLHS, the
influence of the 8 party coalition was considerable. Between
them, the geographic dispersion of their control covered several
parts of the state, making such surveillance more feasible.
However, despite these factors, which in theory should
have elicited exceptional performance of the OLHS, only about 50%
of the physical target was eventually met. It is clear that there
156
are several other factors that play a role in programme
implementation that must be adequately researched. However, one
such factor that impacted the performance of the OLHS was an
exogenous one. In 1973, soon after land was acquired and
construction began, large parts of Kerala were struck by famine.
Nearly 187 panchayats were declared famine effected, and food
grain prices (especially of rice) more than doubled, even in some
of the government recognized distribution centers (EPW, 1973:
1407). Popular protests, work-stoppages, and, demonstrations were
organized by the opposition (in which even the CPI-controlled
unions participated), which demanded to know "what prevented the
state government, which claims to set models in many things for
other states to follow, from procuring the entire marketable
surplus, if necessary at a higher price?" (EPW, 1973: 1408). This
demand for the distribution of subsidized grain diverted popular
and official attention towards food, compelling the government to
cutback on other sectoral outlays--including the OLHS--in order
to alleviate the shortage of grain in the state.
Dealing with what was practically the first crisis faced
by the coalition government also caused mutual discord among the
partners of the alliance. The Congress held the "unpopular"
portfolios of home and food, while the communist and socialist
parties between them controlled social services, revenue, public
works and local administration. It was imperative that the
progress of the OLHS, which was managed by a CPI minister, would
be measured against allegations of mismanagement in food by the
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Congress. It is no co-incidence then, that in some of the
Congress dominated districts (including Ouilon, Alleppy and
Kottayam), where the mutual infighting between it and the CPI
subsequently became exacerbated, were also amongst the worst
performing districts in the OLHS, Alleppy and Kottayam having met
34% and 27% of their targets respectively (EPW, 1973: 1408).
5.4 Conclusion.
Even though less than 50% of the physical target was met
in the OLHS, both due to exogenous reasons such as the above, and
slack performance on the part of some district collectors and
local officials in certain panchayats, the execution arrangement
of the OLHS worked well. Indeed, several lessons can be learnt
from this experience.
Decentralization is desirable in principle, but often
needs to be "controlled" in order to ensure that the existing
political, organizational and other local variables are taken
into account. Rothenberg's study of administrative
decentralization of housing policy in Colombia illustrates how
mere devolution of power to lower level officials is not enough
to elicit representativeness in decision making (1980). As Hadden
has argued, some control will be necessary make decentraliza-
tion work (1980). These measures of "control" work best when they
combine pressure and accountability from below with firm
management and coordination from above. In the OLHS, the most
striking of such arrangements was the participatory nature of the
Works Committee and the strong role played by the district
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collectors. The significance of assigning a central role to the
latter in the cast of characters is succinctly captured by a
discussion by Evans and Rueschemyer on mechanisms that have the
potential to make decentralization effective and coherent. They
argue that:
.. a distinctive esprit de corps among higher
civil servants can function as a fluid form of
coordination combining relative autonomy for
officials with a shared sense of purpose, which
is reinforced by identification with the group.
This distinctive sense of identity, especially
when it coalesces with the emergence of civil
servants as a status group, can further act as a
barrier to outside influence (1985: 56).
The IAS background that district collectors have in common,
provided the "esprit de corps" the authors mention. The broad
discretionary powers invested in them, provided "relative
autonomy", but the linking of performance with career prospects
made this autonomy a tool through which the government obtained
good performance, not only from them, but also from the officials
below them.
This role of the district collectors, along with the
participatory nature of the Works Committee fostered
accountability and ensured monitoring by the people. The
disaggregation of the scale of the OLHS facilitated construction
management and flexibility. The strong control maintained by the
Housing Minister, provided institutional coherence to what was an
assembled, surrogate chain of command. Together, all of these
elements successfully substituted for a well worked out
administrative hierarchy within a single agency.
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PART VI
6. Conclusion.
The OLHS represents an unusual case of a public shelter
programme which has worked well. It is considered "successful"
not only by government officials and politicians, but by people
throughout the state. Its drawbacks are considered as much a part
of its "success", as its achievements, because they have provided
important lessons for the design and implementation of future
shelter programmes in the public sector. Through the programme,
the state government of Kerala provided one lakh landless laborer
households, who had been excluded from the benefits of the
government's ongoing agrarian reform, with land. Of these, 44,000
households (eventually 60,000) were provided fully constructed
houses in addition to the land.
6.1 Good performance: constraints become opportunities
The good performance of the OLHS is especially noteworthy
because it was achieved despite the presence of what would seem
to be the opposite conditions considered necessary to implement a
major programme in a new sector--a turbulent period due to the
social conflicts generated by the state government's ongoing
agrarian reform; criticism from the supporters of the reform over
its slow implementation; the precarious balance of a newly
elected coalition government; and the government's lack of
previous experience with shelter. But it turned out that these
were just the conditions that led the government to design the
OLHS in a way that became conducive to its good performance.
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Even while the government designed the OLHS, primarily, to
ward off discontent among the excluded landless laborers, it
converted the potential threat posed by this discontent among a
politically important and well organized constituency over the
outcome of one of its redistributive programmes, into an
opportunity to further some of its own goals. The government
designed the OLHS as a large, visible, subsidized programme that
had to be implemented with speed. A large and visible programme,
if implemented with speed, would help mitigate the unrest among
the targeted constituency. It would also demonstrate the
coalition's institutional capacity and commitment to the poor. At
the same time it would provide a surrogate counterfoil to
government's sluggish performance in the land reform. But the
programme had to turn out a "success" to meet these goals. The
success of the OLHS therefore became a political necessity for
the government. This political interest in the good performance
of the OLHS invested it with prestige, government-priority and
commitment from those at the very top of the state level
administrative hierarchy.
6.2 good performance: what is "success" what is "failure".
The good performance of the programme is also of
significance because it was obtained despite the presence of
several features that we conventionally associate with "failure"-
-(1) direct intervention by the public sector, (2) provision of
fully constructed units, (3) lack of user participation, and (4)
a deep subsidy incurred by the government. These elements of
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"failure" however were not as drastic as normative assessments
would make them appear. Indeed it several cases they helped
elicit good programme performance. This implies that in assigning
"culprits" for failure, and "candidates" for success, we may
often be looking at wrong variables, or, more importantly missing
the relationship between the sequence of events, existing
circumstances at a particular historical moment, and the nature
of the actors involved, that might come together in ways that
make a programme work well despite the presence of features that
have led to poor performance in other cases.
(1) The "direct" intervention of the government, in fact
helped, rather than hindered programme implementation. Firstly,
unlike an agency such as the Housing Board, the state-government
possessed the financial and human infrastructure, and strong
discretionary powers invested in the elected ministers, that
enabled it to implement a programme of such large scale and
state-wide scope as the OLHS, efficiently.
By virtue of the strong discretionary powers invested in a
state-government, the Kerala government was able to use its
influence, and take several decisions that semi-autonomous public
agencies cannot. For example, it used its discretion to bypass
some of its own cumbersome rules to expedite the land acquisition
process--a move that turned out to be critical for the good
performance of the OLHS, because it allowed construction to start
early. The government officials incharge of the programme also
made serious efforts to elicit public (as opposed to beneficiary)
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participation, and succeeded in mobilizing public support at a
scale that is difficult for a single agency to manage. The
involvement of ministers at the apex of the state level hierarchy
was central to the government's obtaining this support.
The involvement of cabinet level ministers gave the
programme its "high profile". That such senior officials and
politicians were involved in the programme, accorded prestige and
authority to the programme. This was particularly instrumental in
eliciting finances from the non-beneficiary elite, which were
critical in obtaining the resources necessary for execution. An
independent agency would perhaps lack the authority to introduce
such an unconventional method--of calling for voluntary
donations--to finance its programmes. In any case, such an agency
would require the backing of the government to make its
programmes as much of a public event as the OLHS became, to make
it rewarding enough for potential donors to contribute liberally.
Furthermore, a public agency might not be trusted by the
people to the same extent as the government was, for state-wide
fund-raising of the nature we saw in the OLHS, to be successful.
This is primarily because politicians elected to state office,
and their political parties, are far better known to the people,
than are agency heads. The importance of this point is
illustrated by the fact that the government chose a popular,
highly respected, veteran leader of the CPI, who was known for
his integrity, to head the implementation of the OLHS. By
contrast, public agencies, such as Housing Boards, are often
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headed by bureaucrats or technocrats. These officials may be
honest and committed, but they are rarely public figures. Not
only do the people not know them because these officials have no
direct contact with the public, but they get transferred so
often, that there is not much scope for the development of a
public image. Thus it was important for the OLHS that the
government implemented the programme directly.
Secondly, because the government was directly incharge, it
was able to link up with the central government and its
programmes much more easily. For example, it successfully
manipulated national level political alliances to make changes in
a standard central programme (MNP) to suit local needs. It also
exploited these same national level relationships to obtain
additional finances from the center. In this regard the Kerala
government's being a coalition was of special significance.
We usually tend to assume that sharing political power
undermines a government's performance and institutional capacity,
because it introduces uncertainty about the coalition's
stability. This uncertainty is assumed to be particularly
detrimental to the successful implementation of programmes that
require control and coordination at various levels of government,
and agreement between ministers from different political parties.
The performance of the OLHS, shows that this need not always be
the case.
The OLHS-case shows that, on the contrary, it was
precisely because the Kerala government was a coalition, that it
164
could obtain support and funds from the center for a much
expanded programme, that opposition-led state governments usually
find difficult to obtain. However, the Kerala government obtained
this support not because it was a coalition per se, but because
of the particular composition of the coalition. It was the
presence of the congress--the party that was also in power at the
center--in the center-left coalition of Kerala, that gave the
alliance clout with the center. Any other type of coalition, in
which the congress did not feature, would have been far less
potent, if at all. Another reason why the coalition managed to
obtain significant concessions from New Delhi, is attributable to
the change that the congress party at the national level, itself
was going through at the particular historical moment when the
OLHS was conceived. As a result of a string of recent electoral
disasters in several states, and a split in its own ranks, the
congress at that time, was actively seeking a left-of-center
image, and hoped to repeat the congress-CPI alliance that had
worked well in Kerala, in the imminent national elections. It was
in its interest therefore to make the Kerala alliance look good
by helping make one of its major programmes to turn out
successful--even if the programme was conceived and managed by
left ministers.
Thirdly, even at the state level, to the extent that there
were 8 members in the coalition, and each would be hurt
politically if the OLHS did not work out well, the OLHS benefited
from obtaining the support of 8 parties and their respective
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constituencies, rather than only one. Sharing political power,
will not always undermine performance, as we tend to assume.
Therefore, it is important that we reconsider our view
that coalitions invariably suggest weak governments with doubtful
capacity to implement major programmes. But at the same time we
need to be wary of falling into the trap at the opposite extreme-
-that coalition governments can work well regardless of their
configuration, vis-a-vis the pattern of political power at the
next higher level.
This then, feeds back to the point that, in several ways,
the fact that the government (at the ministerial level) directly
took on the responsibility of implementing the OLHS, rather
entrust it to a separate agency, facilitated the success of a
programme of such massive scope as the OLHS.
(2) The fully constructed units were important because
they provided visibility to the programme--visibility became one
of the factors that motivated the government to ensure that the
programme performed well.
(3) User participation, as it turned out, was of marginal
importance to the success of the programme. (Nor was it
forthcoming on its own. Yet this lack of beneficiary
participation did not divert benefits to a different
constituency, as is often the case in low-income shelter
programmes.
Eventhough only marginal efforts were made at obtaining
beneficiary participation, the constituency targeted in the OLHS
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was made public from the very start. More than making identity of
the target group public, the fact that the programme was
explicitly targeted towards a group that had been excluded from
benefits of the agrarian reform, helped the government obtain
public support for the OLHS.
This made diversion of benefits away from them, difficult,
for two main reasons. One the one hand, the people in the state
are, for the most part, highly politically and socially
conscious--a trait that can be traced to the history of social
development in Kerala. Because it was public knowledge that the
OLHS was targeted towards the landless, the people could, in
essence, monitor the distribution of its benefits. Widespread
resentment against the government could develop among the people,
if it was found that the government had reneged, or was lax in
distributing programme benefits to those targeted. The active
role of the media also played a significant part in keeping up
this pressure from below.
On the other hand, powerholders at the state level in
Kerala, have also traditionally derived political legitimacy, in
part, by emphasizing their commitment to the lower classes, to
reform and structural change. It would be in their own interests
to ensure that the benefits of the OLHS reached the target group.
It was, therefore, this common concern at the top and bottom that
prevented benefits from being appropriated by other, non-
targeted, low-income groups. Beneficiary participation was not
necessary to achieve this.
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(4) Finally, the subsidy incurred by the government was
not unusually heavy, as it managed to spread part of the
financial burden to the better-off, non-beneficiary elite. The
financial arrangements, as they finally turned out, were far more
progressive than is the case even in the more usual
"participatory" or "self-help" programmes.
This suggests that by categorizing programme outcomes,
normatively into "successes" or "failures", we may be looking at
the wrong variables. In doing so, we may often fail to understand
why some programmes work exceptionally well despite possessing
the culprits associated with "failure", because we miss out the
key relationships between events and actors that are not evident
on the surface but indeed, make for good performance.
6.3 Setting up a programme to compel good performance:
prominence and public support.
Apart from conditional factors, the approach of the
government towards the OLHS was also instrumental in the
programme's relatively good performance. In striking contrast to
the way in which most state governments approach public shelter
programmes, the coalition government deliberately set up the OLHS
so as to compel good performance: It made the programme and its
implementation very visible. Good performance would bring
political rewards--of institutional capacity and stability. But
if the programme failed, the visibility of the failure could cost
the government its credibility at a time when it could least
afford to do so. This bold move, also, inadvertently, or perhaps
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deliberately, projected an image of "confidence"--that the
government had the institutional capacity to pull off the OLHS
successfully, or it would not be taking such a risk. The
government was therefore compelled to carefully establish
implementation procedures and an administrative hierarchy that
would indeed ensure that the OLHS perform well.
Making the programme's good performance a political
necessity also helped diffuse potential opposition to the large
state-level outlay for the OLHS from those member-parties of the
coalition (and their affiliates) whose constituencies would have
little to gain from it. The key to good performance, then, lay in
mobilizing public support and involvement, which the government
consciously worked towards obtaining, primarily by bestowing
prominence to the programme.
The prominence that the government bestowed on the OLHS
came from (1) the massive scale of the programme, (2) its
politicization through slogans, the visible involvement of the
highest of the state government officials, (3) broad-based,
state-wide publicity through skillful use of the media, and (4)
focussing on public rather than beneficiary participation. All of
these factors, together, converted a public shelter programme
targeted towards a single, low-status client group into a virtual
state-wide "movement".
The large scale of the programme captured public
attention--a "hundred thousand" units sound more impressive than
do a "thousand" or two thousand. But significantly, while the
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programme was projected as one of massive scale, its
implementation was decentralized. At an aggregate level the
"massiveness" generated the desired impact, but breaking down the
programme into smaller components of 20 units dispersed across
participant villages throughout the state, kept execution very
localized. This decentralization made construction management
easier. It also provided a sense of involvement to people in all
parts of the state--the OLHS was not something people just heard
about, rather they saw it being implemented in their own
respective panchayats. For this reason, participation from local
residents was forthcoming in several villages. It is thus the
large scale but decentralized implementation of the programme
that enabled the programme to work well.
6.4 The power of the media.
The significance of using the media to both, popularize
and monitor/evaluate government programmes is now receiving
increasing attention from researchers as evidenced by the recent
literature on the subject. The OLHS stands out as a relatively
effective, and instructive early attempt by a government to use
the media to publicize as well as monitor a programme whose
success was of major political importance to it.
The proponents of the programme in the government
evidently understood, and exploited, the potency of using the
media in a state where there are 44 local language dailies in
addition to others, where the typical middle-class household buys
at least two newspapers (usually a "leftist" or "rightist" daily
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and a more "objective" one to "keep track of what is actually
going on.."85), and, high literacy levels have produced a class
of "newspaper reading laborers". The government exploited this
broad audience by regularly publishing messages and statements
about the OLHS from prominent ministers in newspapers over which
it had influence.
At the same time the media itself aided in focussing
public attention on the programme by responding to the
government's statements on the OLHS. It reported public opinion,
criticism, and debates on the merits and drawbacks of the
programme. It published updates on the spatial distribution of
the progress of the OLHS that implicitly created a sense of
competition between the various districts. Since every district
and panchayat in the state participated in the OLHS, and
localized execution provided a shared sense of public
responsibility, in several instances this constructive
"competition" generated by the media helped speed up tardy
progress.
The lesson suggested by this outcome is that in contrast
to the constant problems faced during implementation, of getting
a government programme to do its own monitoring and evaluation
(which can often be biased depending upon who carries out the
evaluation versus who wields the power and what the
"powerholders" want to hear), the media and the implicit "public
pressure" it generates can play an important role in eliciting
85 Discussion with B. Kuriakose.
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good performance in a public programme, effectively. It is
obvious that if a regime is authoritarian, it may not be in its
interest to allow such "public monitoring", especially if it
implies foregoing some of its control over what may be published.
Similarly, if much of the media is "captured" by the government,
then it may be used to portray what the government considers
important to its implementation strategy, or what it wants the
public to see and hear. In either case, it is evident that the
media is a powerful (and therefore also a dangerous) monitoring
tool through which public attention can be focussed on the
implementation of government programmes--to the benefit or
detriment of its performance as originally designed.
6.4.1 The media, public pressure and elite participation.
The effectiveness of using the media is also evidenced by
the relative success with which the government transferred part
of the burden of financing the OLHS to the non-beneficiary elite.
Contrary to our usual understanding of "welfare" programmes,
where the government comes in with a deep subsidy, the Kerala
government expected upto 48% of the construction cost of the OLHS
to be borne by the public. This was expected through voluntary
donations of cash, services and unskilled labor. Since capital
was more important to ensure the financial feasibility of the
OLHS, and non-beneficiary elite were the potential "donors" of
this capital, the government focussed most of its efforts to
obtain the active support and participation of such elite.
The public-based, rather than beneficiary-based publicity
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was one means by which the government sought to elicit elite
participation. Generating pressure through the media was another.
In a social environment where status is attached to being
egalitarian and socially conscious, using the media to create
pressure as well as provide the incentive of publicizing the
donors and their donations, proved to be an effective strategy.
Central to this strategy was the fact that the donations
called for by the governemtn's were voluntary. If in doing so the
government exploited the tradition of "patronage" that still
exists between the better-off and the poor, in Kerala, it also
consciously provided incentives that would make it socially
rewarding for the elite to contribute voluntarily. The government
bestowed public prominence on elite donors by naming some of the
OLHS colonies after those who donated more than Rs.1O-20,000
(roughly US $1-2000 at 1972 exchange rates). The media provided
similar incentives by publishing the names of prominent non-
beneficiary donors, and by exerting negative pressure against
regions where donations were meager. In part, as a result of
appeals from the government for the well-off to participate, and
the "pressure from below" generated by the media, the government
succeeded in obtaining nearly half the voluntary cash donations
it expected from the elite, without resorting to coercion,
regulation, or, compulsion.
Non-beneficiary elite also contributed to the programme--
from which they did not directly accrue benefits--if by helping
the programme they also helped themselves in some way. This is
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evidenced by the stories of the contractors who wanted
government contracts, plantation workers and some large
landlords.
It is noteworthy, however, that publicizing a programme
widely will not secure similar responses of voluntary
participation from different socii-economic classes. For example,
the mechanism of publicity through the media that was so vital in
eliciting finance from the elite, worked contrary to the
government's expectations in acquiring free voluntary labor. The
same media that successfully pressured the elite to donate cash,
led the beneficiaries--also potential providers of voluntary
labor--to believe that the entire state was being mobilized for
their cause and that they--the poorest, who would rather spend
their time earning a living, than donating their labor free--
need not pay in any form to obtain the benefits of the OLHS. With
the government politically committed to making the programme
work, they would obtain its benefits anyway--moreover, as it was
the programme was publicized as a "welfare" or relief measure. To
the beneficiaries this meant that they were not required, or
expected to pay.
However, to the extent that the non-beneficiary, better-
off elite contributed more towards funding the OLHS, (through
their donations of cash), than did the actual beneficiaries
(through donations of unskilled labor), the financial
arrangements of the OLHS finally turned out more progressive than
is the case in the more usual public programmes for the poor. It
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is nevertheless clear that expectations of free voluntary labor
from poorer clients is unrealistic and exploitative; and will not
necessarily be forthcoming on its own.
But, at the same time, good programme performance need not
be contingent on beneficiary involvement, just as the lack of
beneficiary participation does not, in itself, imply that
programme benefits will be appropriated by the less poor. If
sufficient scope is built into the programme for public scrutiny
and involvement, as was the case in the OLHS, then, even without
user participation, benefits can reach the original target group.
Lack of user-participation, then, is not always a sign of poor
programme performance. But it is also important to note that this
lack of user input may, in some cases, result in problems later
by virtue of programme designers having overlooked important
social traits and heterogeinity among the "poor" who are
beneficiaries. This drawback was evident in the OLHS in one
aspect of project design--the provision of housing in clustered
arrangements--that led to social problems later.
6.5 Participation, control and the administrative heirarchy.
Along with provisions for public participation, some
degree of centralization of control will usually be necessary to
ensure that programme goals are indeed met, as designed. This
combination of participation and control is clearly manifested in
the execution procedures of the OLHS, particularly in the chain
of command set-up by the government. In lieu of a highly
sophisticated institutional arrangement in a single agency, the
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government assembled a "hybrid" structure. It created separate,
decentralized implementation agencies at the panchayat level, to
which considerable powers were devolved. These decentralized
units operated under the strong overall authority centralized in
the Housing Minister.
Most significantly, this structure was outside the
procedure-based mainstream hierarchy of government departments.
This kept the operation of the subunits insulated from the
state's departmental bureaucracy, thus minimizing bureaucratic
red-tapism and inefficiencies often seen in public agencies and
governmental departments. This "parallel" structure, in addition,
allowed decentralized execution and local level participation,
even while it enabled the Minister to maintain tight, overall
control of the programme.
Of particular significance to this arrangement was the
composition of the Works Committee--included prominent local
residents, and the choice of district collectors as "second in
command" after the Housing minister. In the case of the former,
specific provisions for public scrutiny, made lower level
implementors accountable to the people. These measures prevented
"footdragging" on their part and made diversion of benefits away
from the target group difficult. In the case of the latter,
linking the performance of the district collectors--officials of
the distinguished IAS corps--with prospects of career
advancement, and making them answerable for the performance of
officials below them, the government successfully established an
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effective but implicit mechanism of top-down control on local
implementors. This was possible because unlike most bureaucrats,
upward mobility for these officials is governed by their track
record. Moreover, the "esprit de corps" that binds the members of
the IAS, provides officials such as the district collectors with
a sense of purpose and achievement, which makes their cooptation
by external interests difficult.
Therefore, in sum, bottom-up processes and top-down
control were combined to ensure that the established goals of the
government in the OLHS--speed in project realization and ensuring
that benefits reach the actual target group--were met. Even
though the original physical target of the OLHS was not fully
realized, and the programme took more time than the initial
estimate of one year, we have seen this was due to exogenous
factors, as well as slack performance in some districts.
The programme, however, did make one hundred thousand
landless agricultural laborers, who are at the lowest end of the
income distribution, owners of land. It also made 44,000 (a total
of 60,000, ultimately) beneficiary households owners of finished
houses. This in itself is a noteworthy achievement because in
contrast to the several voluntary agencies in the field whose
shelter programmes usually exclude the lowest income groups
because they are "chronic" cases of poverty and too poor to
reach, the benefits of the OLHS indeed, accrued to the "poorest
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of the poor""
6.6 When elements of "top-down" development coexist with
"bottom-up" pressure.
Finally the programme performed well not only because
there were leaders at the top committed to making the OLHS
successful, but also because there was powerful pressure, and
"monitoring" by the people--both as part of government strategy,
and in response to it--that compelled good performance. For
example, there are several instances in other states where senior
bureaucrats or ministers are committed to the success of
government programmes targeted towards the poor. Similarly there
are as many cases where people--even socially motivated elites in
some cases--have organized from below to pressure a reluctant
government to respond to the demands of the poor. But so far we
86 The OLHS we noted, provided tenure of land and
ownership of individual houses to the programme beneficiaries.
Considering that the landless agricultural workers are at the
bottom of the income spectrum, title to land and ownership of a
fixed asset, such as a "pucca" (brick and plaster, rather than
mud and thatch) house, has provided them access to institutional
credit. This access to credit has helped them, in however modest
a way, to alleviate their poor economic condition in small ways.
The most common example of a secondary source of income that
access to credit has allowed the beneficiaries to obtain, is
through marginal poultry "farms"--households consume as well as
sell eggs in the neighborhood; some sell meat. In one case in
Ouilon district, land title was used as the "security" by an OLHS
beneficiary household to purchase an auto-rickshaw, as part of a
"hire-purchase" scheme introduced by a nationalized bank (State-
bank of India). This particular household had 3 adults. While two
of them worked as part agricultural laborers and part head-load
coolies, the auto-rickshaw added considerably to their overall
income, compared to the time when all three were field laborers.
Similarly small shops have sprung up in many of the OLHS
colonies, to start which some households borrowed low-interest
loans from local Primary Service Societies.
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have documented too few cases where both these forces--commitment
from the top, and pressure from below, coexist to the degree we
saw in the OLHS.
In the absence of either of these forces it is less likely
that the programme would have worked out as well as it did. For
example, if the government was not concerned about good results
in the OLHS, it is unlikely that, even with demand-making and
public pressure from below, it would have taken up a programme of
such expanded and unprecedented scope--a mere gesture would
perhaps have been considered enough of a compromise. Nor would it
have gone out of its way to organize the funds and the manpower
necessary to carry such an expanded programme successfully, as it
did in the case of the OLHS. Similarly, without the enthusiastic
response and support from the people, even highly motivated
government officials would find it difficult to generate the kind
of interest and public involvement that was instrumental in
making the OLHS a "success-story", and a programme that even
today remains the state's "most popular, much publicized and much
criticized" shelter programme.
Thus the coexistence of "top-down" control and "bottom-up"
pressure, and more significantly the constructive relationships
between the "top" and the "bottom" were key factors that resulted
in the good performance of the OLHS. But what is most impressive
about the OLHS is that it was not a "one-time success" or a dead
end programme, but has continued till the present time in more
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modest and modified form.17 Most of all, it has served as a
valuable learning experience that has led to several innovations-
-innovations that provide shelter process in Kerala with a
distinction that most other states in the country seek to
emulate.
" The land and shelter component of the MNP was devolved to
the state-list in 1974. Since then the government of Kerala has
modified the programme by splitting it into two components--under
one programme land is acquired by the government and distributed
to the landless through the district collectors. Under the second
programme financial assistance (a loan and grant package provided
out of state and central funds) is made available to those who
have benefited from the first scheme, to enable them to construct
their own houses, with or without the assistance of voluntary
agencies.
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